Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–8. Memorandum for the Record by the Ambassador in El Salvador (Kalijarvi)¹

San Salvador, May 5, 1959

1. As a follow-up of the request of the Foreign Minister [text not declassified]. I requested and was granted a session with the President in the company of the Foreign Minister this morning.

2. [text not declassified]

3. The President said that the problem of Communism had two aspects in El Salvador. The first was the possibility of infiltration into the campesino area. He commented that he could not understand how people who had suffered as long as the people in the country areas could still maintain their stability and loyalty. He recognized that this condition constituted a potential danger; however, he proposed constructive programs to raise the standard of living of the campesino. In this respect U.S. aid, both direct and indirect, would be of definite assistance.

4. The second aspect of Communism was the urban. In the towns and cities, workers were much closer together, better organized, in many instances more intelligent than the campesino, and were more easily influenced by subversive propaganda. He mentioned both the labor groups and the university students. In connection with the former, he referred to communist-dominated organizations; in the latter connection, namely, the university, he was concerned about the perennial, as he described it, “eternal” student. Both he and the Foreign Minister appeared to have the same view as we do of the situation which confronts El Salvador.

5. He briefly summarized what his Government was doing. He spoke of his displeasure with the newspapers for permitting various Communist articles or Communist-slanted articles to appear in their publications. He mentioned the column “Sputnik”, and the relative softness of Viera Altamirano, editor and director of “El Diario de Hoy,” toward Communists and Communist articles appearing in his paper. I was surprised at the emotion that he generated on this subject and the feelings he harbored with respect to certain writers. It was probably understandable because he took the articles as a personal affront, speaking of them as being anti-government.

6. He referred to the ease of movement across political frontiers by agitators and Communists in Central America. He felt further international cooperation was necessary, that no single government could take care of the problem by itself. He said that people had been granted visas for the U.S., Canada, and other countries, and within a few days it was common knowledge that they had reached Moscow.

7. In this connection he spoke of Cuba in derogatory terms. He and the Foreign Minister were in agreement that Castro was following tactics, especially in the liquidation of opposition, that were typically Communist and un-Latin. He said he was disturbed about the ease with which invasion of Central American areas could be engineered from other countries, and concluded by pointing out that the problem of Communism was extensive and involved.

8. He went on to say that the Communist objectives with respect to El Salvador were not hard to discern. The Foreign Minister concurred in Lemus’ view that the number-one objective of the Communists in Central America was El Salvador. He believed this was so because of the stability which this country has had for several years, politically, economically, and otherwise—a stability resting in part upon the liquidation in 1932 of the disturbing Communist element. Communist tactics aimed first at disaffecting all of El Salvador’s neighbors: Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica. (He said that Costa Rica was a hotbed of Communism in Central America and one which concerned him very much.) When all of the neighboring countries had been disaffected by Communism, the final blow was reserved for El Salvador.

9. He brought out literature and records seized from Arias Gomez and two or three other individuals who had been to Moscow and Cuba, and read passages from the books, especially those by Khrushchev, translated into Spanish.

10. Since we seemed to be arriving nowhere in spite of a long discussion, I said that as far as assistance in developmental programs both in the country and in the city were concerned, I saw no problem about what the U.S. might do to help. However, the correction of the internal situation and his wishes there were another matter. [text not declassified]

11. He replied he appointed a committee of high government officials to deal with security matters in the Presidency. He wished to raise this question with them. I commented that the U.S. had developed organizations to deal with Communism, including the enactment of specific laws. [text not declassified]

12. The Foreign Minister said there were two Cuban experts in anti-Communism to whom the Government of El Salvador had granted asylum. He thought they might be of assistance in connection with Communism here. The President said he would like to place the entire matter before the above-named committee.

13. [text not declassified]

14. The Foreign Minister, after the interview with the President, said his desire and the desire of a number of other members of the Cabinet was that the President should create a bureau for action against Communism in El Salvador [text not declassified].

Thorsten V. Kalijarvi

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant’s Files, Lot 62 D 24, [text not declassified] Papers, 1959.” Secret; Eyes Only. Hill sent the source text to Rubottom and Snow, June 11, 1959, under cover of a memorandum stating that Kalijarvi wanted Herter and Dillon to have the report, [text not declassified].