Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

EC–23. Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 16, 1960

SUBJECT

• Intelligence Note: The Situation in Ecuador

Dr. José María Velasco Ibarra was swept into the presidency on June 5, 1960 by almost an absolute majority of the total votes cast in a four candidate race. President of Ecuador three times previously (1934–35, 1944–47, 1952–56), Velasco has retained his personal political magnetism through persuasive, sometimes demagogic oratory, personal honesty, and a broadly defined program promising benefits both to the laboring classes and to business interests. Nicknamed El Loco (the crazy one), Velasco is temperamental, nationalistic, unpredictable, and although he recognizes the benefits derived from association with the United States, he places greater emphasis upon Hispano-Americanism than upon Pan-Americanism. Aware of the dangers of communism, Velasco has nevertheless publicly played upon the possibility of a closer association with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc in an attempt to further Ecuador’s position in its boundary dispute with Peru.

Committed by his campaign to a program of prompt and effective economic development, Velasco, since his inauguration on September 1, instead has placed major emphasis on the long standing boundary dispute. By agitation of this issue Velasco has apparently hoped to obtain a revision of the Rio Protocol of 1942 which ended a limited border war between the two countries on terms generally favorable to Peru. The United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile countersigned the protocol as “guarantors”. As a consequence of Velasco’s affirmation that the Rio Protocol is null because Ecuador had agreed to it under duress, and after a telegram from Foreign Minister José Chiriboga to the guarantor powers pressing this thesis, the four guarantor powers issued a statement on December 7 which basically reaffirmed the protocol’s validity short of an agreement by both countries for its modification or adjudication. The Ecuadorean reaction to the guarantors’ statement was sharp and the popular demonstrations which followed were directed almost exclusively against the United States.² The Minister or Government, Manuel Araujo, a rabidly pro-Castro left-winger, has taken advantage of the widespread resentment to urge that Ecuador turn to the Soviet Bloc for support. The cabinet voted to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China and the Vice President, Julio Arosemena, publicly advocated declining the “dubious honor” of hosting the XI Inter-American Conference, once postponed and now rescheduled for Quito beginning March 1, 1961. However, there has already been substantial opposition to these gestures toward the Soviet Bloc by the more moderate elements within Ecuador and President Velasco has indicated privately that he would not take the initiative to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union although he would give favorable consideration to any such Soviet request. These relations, according to Velasco, would be completely without commitments or strings and the Soviet Embassy would be drastically limited in its size and activities. The factors mentioned above, combined with the favorable reception in Ecuador of the recent U.S. affirmation of our respect for OAS treaty obligations to come to the defense of any American nation which suffers aggression,³ have reduced the probability that diplomatic relations will be established with the Soviet Union or that the Inter-American Conference will be cancelled.

The decision as to whether, and if so, when, the XI Inter-American Conference will be held is now under consideration by President Velasco. His decision to attempt to hold the conference as scheduled, or to work for its postponement or cancellation, will be of major importance. Outright cancellation of the conference is reportedly favored by a majority of the cabinet and could imply Ecuadorean repudiation of the OAS. However, it is believed that Velasco is aware of the unfavorable impact that this would have on his economic development plans. Likewise, a further postponement of the Inter-American Conference would be a blow to Velasco’s prestige as he has severely chastised the preceding administration for the original delay. Holding the conference in Quito as scheduled, or even after some delay, could possibly reinforce Ecuador’s ties with the American system at a time when they are strained but also runs the risk of serious popular demonstrations against the OAS and the Rio Protocol guarantor powers. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Minister of Government, Araujo, has authority over the police and conceivably could allow such demonstrations to wreck the conference. It has been reported that Velasco would like to remove Araujo from office prior to the date set for the conference. Yet, despite several opportunities, Velasco has failed to move against Araujo and Velasco may feel that he is unable to do so under the present conditions. In spite of the President’s assurances that adequate security measures would be taken should the conference be held, there remains a probability of serious demonstrations as a result of deliberate leftist agitation of the already emotionally charged boundary issue. Barring a previous determination concerning the conference by Velasco, the situation will be discussed further when Foreign Minister Chiriboga arrives for a Washington holiday about December 22.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 722.00/12–1660. Secret. This memorandum was transmitted to the Secretary of State via the Executive Secretariat.
2. In despatch 292 from Quito, December 12, 1960, Ambassador Bernbaum reported on the Ecuadoran reaction to the guarantor powers’ declaration of December 7, stating that the physical damage to the U.S. Embassy and other U.S. buildings in Quito and Guayaquil was considerable. He predicted that Ecuador would neither acccept nor implement the guarantor declaration in the foreseeable future. (622.233/12–1360)
   A memorandum of December 15 from Deputy Director Samuel O. Lane of the Office of West Coast Affairs sent through Deputy Assistant Secretary Coerr to Assistant Secretary Mann summarized anti-U.S. demonstrations in Quito on December 9, and Guayaquil, December 9–10 and 13, resulting from the guarantor statement of December 7. (722.00/12–1560)
3. Reference is to a statement at the press briefing of December 13, 1960, by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News; text in S/PRS Files, Lot 77 D 11, National Archives accession NC 3–59–77–3, Daily Briefings, vol. 22.