Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–9. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubbottom) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, December 10, 1959

SUBJECT

• Policy to Meet Contingencies in the Dominican Republic

Discussion:

1. Problem.

To determine what should be the policy and posture of the United States towards the Dominican Republic with a view especially to preventing, if possible, the establishment of a Castro-like regime in the event of the end or fall of the regime of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo before the end of 1960.

In view of a distinct possibility that the Government of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo might face a crisis or fall before the end of 1960, it is of great importance that the United States work, without exposing itself to charges of violation of non-intervention commitments, towards assuring insofar as possible that any successor government is reasonably friendly to the United States and in harmony with U.S. objectives for Latin America. In particular, the coming to power during the critical months ahead, of a Castro-like government in the Dominican Republic might very well set in motion a chain reaction, replacing the Government of Haiti and probably one or more governments in the Central American area with governments more in consonance with Castro’s way of doing things than ours. Such a development, added to the Panamanian problem, could give rise to a much more serious situation in the Caribbean than we now face and would seriously jeopardize our chances of effectively dealing with the Cuban situation.

It will admittedly be difficult for an experienced leadership friendly to the United States to fill the vacuum in the Dominican Republic if and when the Trujillo regime goes, and we cannot be certain that anything we can do would make such a result certain. The authoritarian regime which has governed the Dominican Republic for a generation has effectively liquidated and enfeebled virtually all potentially rival and democratic leadership while the current ‘anti-dictatorship’ feelings of Latin American and the inevitable urge to settle old scores upon the exit of the dictator will tend to give an opening to the radial leadership supported by Castro and, in many cases, infiltrated by pro-Communist elements.

There are, however, several factors which give some hope and an opportunity worthwhile taking to reach our goals. Among the professional and commercial classes, including the active student elements, of the Dominican Republic there is growing determination to take action to supplant the Trujillo regime with a more democratic regime which would, however, not be patterned on, or susceptible to guidance from, Castro. These elements are usually friendly to the United States, although of late there has been growing resentment against us for not playing a role in overthrowing Trujillo. Certain elements among them think they have, or are working on obtaining, military support and may if they can get organized make an attempt to overthrow the government at an early date. Whether or not this attempt takes place or succeeds, it is primarily to this group that we must look for a government in accord with our interests because (a) at present, in the event of the death, incapacity, assassination, or overthrow of the Generalissimo, it appears improbable that his regime can long be successfully carried on by any member of his family or other strongmen, and (b) the more radical leadership, now represented by Dominican exile organizations in Cuba, Venezuela and elsewhere, would be unlikely to establish a government in accord with our interests.

The period of greatest danger, as it appears now, will be in the next ninety days when deteriorated economic conditions will coincide with the fear of moderate ant-Trujillo elements that if they do not move quickly they might be discovered and liquidated. Should the Generalissimo survive and weather this period, the prospect is fair that there will be time for a stronger and better organized moderate group to prepare itself to step in at the time of his eventual exist.

2. Proposed Policy.

The essentials of the policy towards the Dominican Republic which, with your approval, would guide us through 1960 would be:

a) In the event that the Generalissimo survives this period, maintain our official contacts with his government at their present almost minimal level while discreetly expanding our contacts with moderate elements and orienting our policies, actions and statements primarily towards encouraging them to be prepared to establish a successor government friendly to us and our objectives.

b) In the event that an attempt is made to install a government bringing to power members of Trujillo’s family or clique upon his leaving the scene, recognize that such a government is unlikely to achieve stability and withhold recognition or support until it is clear that there is a reasonable chance of stability and/or a significant number of other American Republics extend recognition on their own initiative, meanwhile also orienting ourselves so as to encourage the moderate elements.

c) In the event of a seizure of power by moderate elements with a reasonable chance of success, be prepared promptly to extend recognition and support and to exercise our influence to encourage the new government to oppose infiltration by pre-Castro and pro-Communist elements.

d) In the event of a take-over by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements, withhold recognition as long as there might be hope for an immediate counter-move by moderate forces but, if this does not materialize, extend recognition in concert with the other American Republics but continue to orient our policies, actions and statements so as to encourage moderate elements.

Recommendations

That you approve the policy outline in paragraph 2 above for the general guidance of the Department, other agencies concerned, and the American Ambassador at Ciudad Trujillo, in which event I would send out more detailed implementing guidance as shown in the enclosure.² It is understood, of course, that the rapidly developing situation might require review and revision of these estimates and guidance at any time.³

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files, Lot 62 D 24, “Dominican Republic Planning and NSC Briefings 1960.” Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text was Tab A attached to a covering memorandum from Hill to Rubottom dated December 3, 1959. It is a summary of a longer paper entitled “Current Policy Toward the Dominican Republic,” which accompanied it as Tab B, not printed. In the covering memorandum, Hill suggested a handling procedure whereby Rubottom would review both papers, send the summary forward for approval to Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and, if approved by him, assign the coordination and implementation of the policy to CMA.
2. Not printed.
3. A notation on the source text indicated that Dillon approved and initialed this memorandum on December 17, 1959.