Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–7. Despatch from the Chargé in the Dominican Republic (Lofton) to the Department of State¹

No. 481

Ciudad Trujillo, May 26, 1959

SUBJECT

• An Assessment of the Political Future of the Dominican Republic.

An assessment of current thinking concerning the possible political future of the Dominican Republic is set forth below in view of the intensification of Communist efforts in Latin America, invasion threats now circulating, the increasing age and pressures under which the mortal Generalissimo works, and the apparent failure of Trujillo to take any public steps toward designating a successor.

On the theory that many minds are better than one, one of the reporting officers (Mr. Barfield) has just completed a survey of available qualified opinion. Four key questions were asked in the survey, but some of the contacts were of such delicate nature that specific questions were omitted. The group queried (a total of twenty four) was comprised of eleven official Americans, three members of the local diplomatic corps, two American clergymen, four American businessmen, and four Dominican citizens. No one who has lived in the Dominican Republic less than a year was approached. Excluding Dominicans, the average length of residence here of the participants is approximately three years.

The questions posed and their answers follow:

(1) Do you think there will be a serious invasion attempt against the Dominican Republic in the next six months and, if so, would it be successful?

Answer – Eighteen answered that they believed there would be no serious invasion attempt within the next six months and six indicated one is unlikely. Only one person predicted that an invasion would be successful if attempted.

(2) How long will the present regime survive?

Answer – All but one person expressed the belief the present regime will survive until the Generalissimo becomes seriously incapacitated or dies. The average estimate before this would transpire, was approximately four years. One source thinks the Generalissimo would retain control for an indefinite period even though seriously incapacitated – in much the same fashion as Henri Christophe did in Haiti.² (It is noted that Trujillo’s mother is reportedly 96 years old and is still active.)

(3) What will be the sequel to the downfall of the Generalissimo with respect to the assumption of authority?

Answer – Five sources said all contenders are so far overshadowed by the Generalissimo that it is impossible to make anything approximating an intelligent prediction. One said son Ramfis would take over on a permanent basis together with President Hector Trujillo. Two held out strongly for the chances of Lt. General Jose Garcia Trujillo. The remaining vast majority simply stated that a military junta would take over. Only two said this would be done without violence. The prevailing sentiment was that a relatively short period of time of tranquility will transpire, accompanied by furious jockeying for power behind the scenes, before the onset of inevitable violence.

(4) Will the government that eventually stabilizes the political situation be more or less cooperative with the United States than the present one?

Answer – Nine answered more cooperative, nine about the same, and four less cooperative.

Summary of Survey: Most of the persons questioned qualified their remarks; therefore, the above is something of an oversimplification. A basic pattern of expectation emerges, however, from a consideration of this and other data available. There will be no serious invasion attempt against the Dominican Republic within the next six months and if there should be one, it will not be successful. The present government, will probably survive until the death or serious incapacitation of Trujillo. This is not likely to happen (barring death by violence) within less than two years or more than ten, but when it does a military junta will take over after a period of violence. Such violence will likely occur within a year (or two at the outside) after the Generalissimo’s death and the emergent military junta will probably not include any of the Trujillo family. Several of the Trujillo family now show a potential to assume control including Lt. General Jose Trujillo Garcia and Brig. General Virgilio Trujillo. Except for one dissenting vote, all participants in the above survey discounted “Ramfis” as a prospective political entity except, perhaps, transitionally. He is not popular with the Armed forces, is not noted for perseverance, and is not thought to be highly motivated toward continuing in his father’s footsteps.

Comment: Although the majority of those queried did not predict it, there is enough evidence to support a prediction that the military junta possibly will set the stage for a more democratic government. Recently, one of the reporting officers had a conversation with an influential professional man who essentially corroborated the statements previously made by other sources relating to the role of the professional class in the post-Trujillo era.

He referred to a “democratic explosion” in the Latin American area and emphasized the existence of competent persons in Dominican society who would be capable of giving a more democratic twist to the Dominican Government when the time arrives. He also stated that his group of friends has undergone considerable harassment in recent times. The crux of the matter is likely to be whether or not this group can prevail over the insidious attempts of the Communists to infiltrate Dominican power circles on Trujillo’s exit.

The Embassy agrees with the views of the professional mentioned above that there no doubt exists competent persons in Dominican business and professional circles not only capable of producing, but undoubtedly desirous of a more democratic regime, but it is of the strong opinion that these groups are not now willing to risk or assist in a change. Numerous persons of these groups have repeatedly mentioned to Embassy officers that they are most apprehensive in regard to the Cuban situation with particular emphasis on the Communist menace and the obviously socialistic share-the-land-and-wealth programs of Castro.

The majority of commercial and professional Dominicans probably harbor no personal love for Trujillo as there are few that the 29 year Era has not touched in some manner. They are, however, quick to emphasize their economic well being derives from the Trujillo regime and openly state they would be most reluctant to move against it or effect drastic changes, even after Trujillo’s demise. They would prefer and will probably demand a transition to a much more democratic regime through which their personal interests would continue to be protected.

Politically significant discontent exists in several segments of the population. The Embassy does not consider that such discontent is likely to erupt in overt revolution under present circumstances. Elements of disconent have been discerned within the professional classes, the younger military officer class (not considered to be extensive and difficult to estimate), the non-Trujillo middle class merchant group, the well to do agriculturists of the Cibae. Recently, an Embassy officer has observed a nucleus of potential disaffection within the group of high level business associates of the Generalissimo. Members of the two latter groups must be classified as opportunists who will swing with the tides of fortune.

The Embassy considers the most important political development since January 1 affecting the Dominican Republic was the downfall of Batista, Castro’s action in placing numerous military supporters of Batista before the firing squad doubtless converted many Dominicans who previously adhered to his cause to active enemies, through fear of any Castro inspired action against the Dominican Republic.

The anticipation of violence marking the end of the “Era of Trujillo” inclines most people to “bear the ills they have rather than fly to others they know not of”, particularly when the present economic and political situation is compared to the pre-Trujillo one and the choice between retrogression and painful advance is contemplated. There seems little doubt that a greater degree of unity was achieved by Trujillo during the months of January, February, and March of this year than has been previously observed within recent years. Fear of Castro has probably accomplished for Trujillo what nothing else could have.

Since the conference of American ambassadors at San Salvador and the intervention of the OAS in Panama, this unity has dissipated somewhat, motivated primarily by the adverse economic picture and lessening tension. However, in view of the recent slight increase over the previously existing rock bottom price for sugar and the encouraging upturn in the U.S. economy which sooner or later should be reflected in the Dominican economy, some improvement in the economic situation here is foreseen. Therefore, if the Dominican Government exercises even a modicum of restraint with respect to its purchases of weapons abroad, it appears probable that a reasonable degree of political stability may be contemplated for the Dominican Republic for the foreseeable future. A most important prerequisite for the validity of this prediction is that the Dominican Government will take no overt step to exacerbate its international problems. This unfortunately, cannot be guaranteed. A factor auguring well for the future, however, is the current absence of the bitter diatribes against Betancourt in the local press which appeared both before and since his inauguration as President of Venezuela and the tangible steps taken to normalize relations between the two countries. The result of this campaign are, however, problematical.

The most influential group of Dominicans today consist of those who are wealthy industrialists and property owners and who have benefitted directly from the Trujillo regime. Because of their influence, numbers, and popular support which they control, this group must be considered in any analysis of future political developments in the Dominican Republic. The recent policies of Castro have unquestionably had a profound effect and have noticeably instilled fear in this important element. During recent weeks members of this group have indicated to Embassy officers their strong belief that if Trujillo were to meet his demise today, by natural causes or violence, they and their supporters would through the framework of the Dominican Party supported by the military, be able to continue for some time the status quo with a view to gradual transition to a more democratic government. While members of this influential group have long supported the Generalissimo, they have not indicated they wish to continue indefinitely with Ramfis or other members of the family. This group could be visualized as supporting a figurehead (perhaps President Hector Trujillo) while moving toward a more democratic government similar to that of the Somzas in Nicaragua.

Whatever happens, a most significant factor to bear in mind is the basic friendliness of the Dominican people to the United States. There is unquestionably a reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S. among all levels of Dominican society. At the time of the June 16 resolution of the Dominican Congress to cancel aid agreements with the United States, it was apparent from numerous indications that knowledgeable Dominicans did not agree with the official line attributing the Dominican Republic’s economic and political woes to the United States.

One final factor in the analysis of the political future of the Dominican Republic which should not be overlooked is the fact that the people are not now politically educated to accept democracy as it exists in the United States. The person who emerges either from the ashes of the Trujillo regime or from a relatively peaceful transition must be a forceful leader, albeit not necessarily as dangerously leftist as Castro or extremely rightist as dictator Trujillo.

In conclusion the Embassy must, perforce, qualify the above by stating that dependable and objective Dominican sources of information, as in all totalitarian countries, are scarce and hard to find.

Harry M. Lefton

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/5–2659. Confidential. Drafted by Harry M. Lofton, Chargé d’Affaires, and John D. Barfield, Second Secretary of the Embassy.
2. Reference is to a leader of the Haitian war of independence who established a kingdom in northern Haiti in the first years of the nineteenth century. Henri Christophe suffered a paralytic stroke in 1820 and committed suicide later that year when revolts broke out at news of his incapacitating illness.