Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–24. Memorandum of a Conversation between Edwin N. Clark and John C. Hill, Jr.¹

Washington, May 25, 1960

SUBJECT

• General Clark’s Role in U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic.

After General Clark had indicated that he could not come to the Department on the afternoon of May 24 or the morning of May 25, he accepted Mr. Rubottom’s offer that I ride out to the airport with him at noon today to brief him about developments with respect to the Dominican Republic which affected the plan on which he had been working.

Accordingly, I had a talk with General Clark at the National Airport. Following Mr. Rubottom’s instructions, I told him that the Secretary had wanted Mr. Rubottom to bring him up to date with respect to certain factors bearing on our planning for the Dominican Republic:

1. We had had a number of indications, confirmed by our consultations with Ambassador Farland here, that the Generalissimo had no intentions of retiring from the Dominican scene but that, on the contrary, he intended to go forward with plans for an opposition party and elections solely as window dressing. In this connection, I showed General Clark an extract of a conversation recently held by an American with the Generalissimo in which the Generalissimo had stated that he would not even consider the proposal made to him by General Clark. The Generalissimo had further said that when General Clark had asked him when he would retire he had not answered, but that he did not expect to retire before the year 2000.

2. We could assure him that contingency military planning with the Pentagon was well advanced and that, in fact, the U.S. was prepared to move when and if the President decided.

3. We felt that it was now necessary to develop a concrete solution on the assumption that we would not have the cooperation of the Generalissimo. I said that we were working on this within the government, and—since I did not in any way indicate he would be consulted—he should have got the inference that there was no role for him at this time.

After brief reflection, General Clark said that his preliminary comments were as follows:

1. He still strongly believed that the Generalissimo would leave the Dominican Republic if inducements were held out to him to do so. He felt that in the approach which he had made he had been so restricted by the Department that he could not offer the Generalissimo inducements—such as U.S. cooperation in settling him elsewhere and in having him appear before the OAS—which would make it attractive for the Generalissimo to leave. He thought that the possibility of the Generalissimo’s leaving voluntarily should not be ruled out until we had made concrete and official offers to him.

2. He felt that contingency planning was not sufficient; the U.S. must have an active plan to remove Trujillo from the scene if the situation were not to drift to our disadvantage.

3. He felt that, after working with us, he had presented a plan which the President had approved in the presence of the Secretary, we owed it to the President not to leave the matter dangling and to put before him a detailed plan in writing. He (General Clark) would do his best to go along with such a plan but would dissent from it if he felt that he had to do so. He clearly indicated that he expected at some later stage to get together with the President and the Secretary to approve a final plan for the Dominican Republic.

I had only a short time to reply to these comments, but did say that I was sure everyone was concerned with moving ahead and that the President was being kept informed.

As the General was boarding the plane, he said that we should both reflect further on these matters and that I should call him when he returned to Washington next week.

COMMENT:

I did not feel it my place to tell the General that he would be excluded from further phases of planning with respect to the Dominican Republic. It was clear, however, that he expected to continue to play a role in this matter, that he believed the President had approved his plan, and that—if it is not intended that he should continue to play his role—he will have to be told so at a high level.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/5–2560. Secret. Drafted by Hill on May 26.