DR–15. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Representative at the Council of the Organization of American States (Dreier)1
SUBJECT
- Policy Towards the Dominican Republic
While all concerned, including Ambassador Farland, would whole-heartedly agree with the point in your memorandum2—that it would be desirable to encourage a satisfactory transition from the present regime to one which will work towards the development of “democratic procedures”—this has already been considered in very great detail, and the situation practically does not exist that this can be done within a period of, say, one year. The ideal is not in-harmony with the facts as they exist and there is, therefore, imposed on us the in escapable necessity over the next year of assigning priorities between our “negative” objective of keeping Castro out and our “positive” objective of working towards a more democratic regime. Unpleasant as it is, we must recognize that we must precariously ride both these horses as long as we can but that, if they come to a parting of the ways when a real possibility of a Castro or Castro-type takeover of the Dominican Republic exists, we must be prepared to jump solidly on the “stop-Castro” animal.
With an eye to the longer term—and to death, assassination or revolution this year—we must of course work with all possible assets to assure that a successor government comes in which is friendly to us, stable, and as “democratic” as Dominican realities will permit it to be. This is being done insofar as possible, although we must recognize that our overt activities—including those in the OAS—must necessarily be limited by the consideration that we should avoid giving the present government a too rough a shove down until we reach an estimate that this would help achieve a U.S.-oriented rather than Castro-oriented successor regime.
[Typeset Page 494]We must, at possibly considerable cost, avoid making a wish father to an illusion. The key to the Dominican situation is the growing, so-called “dissident” group of middle and upper middle-class, professional and business people who are normally U.S. oriented. Ardently as a quick victory might be wished for them to end their troubles and ours with Trujillo, a very detailed assessment—including a trip I made to consult with Ambassador Farland in Ciudad Trujillo and detailed consultation with all agencies concerned—lead to these conclusions: (a) the “dissident” group does not now have the capability or organization to control any revolution it sets afoot, even if it assassinated Trujillo and/or escaped immediate suppression; (b) it would in any event have to depend on decisive elements of the Dominican Armed Forces—not yet even identified—to maintain control of any revolution and to establish a stable government resistant to Castro and Communism; (c) such a government if established with the help of the Armed Forces, although less malodorous than [Facsimile Page 2] the present one, would have to pursue firm internal policies and would be the object of continuing Castro and Communist attacks as “anti-democratic”; and (d) unless the U. S. were to decide on more or less open material intervention, it will be many months before any actions of the U. S. could materially alter the situation in favor of the “dissidents” and that premature action on their part subjects them to piecemeal extermination, as so tragically shown earlier this year. It would, in short, be an illusion to think what we desire will be possible any time soon.
In the background, unfortunately, is the necessity for us to choose—if need be—until something better is available, between the continuation of Trujillo and the assumption of power by a Castro-oriented government. This is an extremely ugly choice, and in selecting either we must stay at arms length if possible. However, we must be sensitive to the fact any of our actions which turn out to be more helpful to the assumption of power by a Castro-type government than to a pro-U.S. government would not only prolong the Castro problem and be a severe blow to our security interests but also expose the Department to what might well be the greatest-yet criticism from Congress and public opinion.