Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

CR–23. Despatch from the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Department of State¹

No. 14.

San José, July 11, 1960

SUBJECT

• Review of Our Relations with Costa Rica with Special Reference to Echandi Government’s Attitude and Probable Public Position re Cuba in the Current Issues of a Consolidated Break of Relations by Central America with Cuba and the Forthcoming Meeting of Foreign Ministers

In my letter of March 30, 1960 to Assistant Secretary Rubottom on the then-current problem of the election of the director of the Agricultural Institute at Turrialba,² I reviewed the series of Echandi’s disappointments in U.S. treatment of his various requests for help from us since his inauguration two years ago. After urging a careful review of the balance of our relationships with Costa Rica, I stated:

“We are going to need Costa Rica one day and I do not like the growing feeling here that they are being neglected, and the half-jokingly expressed view, which may one day become seriously held, that the way to get cooperation from the United States is to play hard to get. Considering the great tactical and psychological advantage of having Costa Rica on our side in Latin American problems, such a result would be little short of tragic.”

Unfortunately, my expressed fears as to a hardening of Echandi’s attitude have been completely borne out, and this attitude has become an important factor in his failure to cooperate with the U.S.-supported request of the other Central American countries for an immediate joint break of relations with Cuba. (See Embtel 24 of July 11, Embtel 21 of July 8 and Managua’s NIACT to Department No. 10,³ end of first paragraph of cable to Somoza from his Ambassador in San José.)

An attitude that Costa Rica has always been a genuine friend of the United States but that this policy has not furthered Costa Rica’s own interests; and that in general in Latin America the United States is slower to help its real friends than to respond to the threats of an unfriendly action, has now spread far beyond Echandi and represents a widespread public attitude. It makes no difference really whether this appraisal of our policy is justified, when we are considering, as we now must, how to obtain the support of Costa Rica in our forthcoming showdown about Castro.

I strongly favor an immediate attempt to change this attitude in Costa Rica by taking favorable action on Costa Rican economic problems at once. I recommend this because not only do I feel that Costa Rica’s fine international reputation makes it a pivotal country in Latin thinking, but because I think that the hopes of successfully changing the Costa Rican attitude by things which we can do immediately and without great cost to ourselves are considerable, at least as compared to the overall problem in most of the other Latin American countries. I think that Costa Rica at the moment is hanging on a very delicate balance. On the one hand, not only supporters of Echandi, but much of the opposition, are ideologically convinced that Castro means communism, and that Cuba today is a real threat to the hemisphere. On the other hand, it is an unfortunate fact of political life here that the very independence and democracy which gives Costa Rica such an important stature in Latin American eyes carries with it a psychology which demands that all Costa Rican political leaders assume an attitude of independent thinking and choice of action on international issues. Stemming from this very independence and quite openly coupling with it “enlightened self-interest”, Costa Rican public opinion in all parties tends, as a matter of national pride, to adopt the feeling that a very high degree of attention and consideration should be given by the U.S. to Costa Rica’s own internal problems. From all walks of life I and the members of my staff continually hear it said:

“Costa Rica has been a true and faithful friend of the United States and of democracy. What has this gotten us? Virtually nothing. Because we have been so helpful to you, you people in the United States Government seem to take us for granted. In our own struggles with our far left in Congress and in public opinion, those of us who wish to help the United States are confronted with practical political problems. We need to be able to point to concrete examples as to why it is in Costa Rica’s best selfish interest to stay four-square on the side of the United States.”

Perhaps it may prove to be impossible to tip the balance immediately back in our favor on the specific issue of trying to get more Costa Rican leadership on our side in Latin America on the Castro problem now. But personally I doubt that this is true, at least to the extent of strongly recommending that we at once take concrete steps to this end. Furthermore, I think it is true that we must act now, if only to check this harmful Costa Rican attitude from growing worse.

Specifically there are at least three local problems on which we could help if we could give immediate loans or aid to Costa Rica. The first is the critical need to relieve the public water shortage in San José. Anything done on this would have a terrific immediate public impact right here in the capital where national public opinion is moulded. The price tag on the first stage of this project, which would cure the current water shortage, is estimated at about $3.5 million. A study under Point IV as to the general requirements has been made and paid for by us. Before a specific program could be started, a detailed engineering study at a cost of about $150,000–$200,000 must be made. A grant of this amount with expressions of encouragement that a loan for the final project would be favorably considered would have far-reaching public effects, but it alone would not suffice for the political objective envisaged, because the substantive work would have to come much later.

Secondly, Costa Rica’s two-year-old application for $5 million of DLF 10-year (or better) money to beef up the splendid rural credit system of the country would have great impact, and so far as the Embassy knows needs very little if any more paper work. This loan is particularly important because of the acute internal problem involving the entire banking situation following on the probable loss of $2–$3 million through the coffee scandal and the sharp internal dispute arising out of the Government’s move in diverting part of the short-term Chase Manhattan loan to rural credit purposes.⁴ A beefing up of the rural credit system would directly help all walks of life in this country.

Thirdly, the Echandi Administration is attempting to implement, through local bond issues which it can ill afford, a plan to improve its own road network, as distinguished from the Pan American Highway. This is known locally as the Plan Vial. Since every member of the Assembly has a direct interest in a piece of this project, help on this plan ought to gain us a lot of good will with the Congress, which is where we most badly will need it to forestall criticism, if the Executive acts on Cuba the way we want it to do.

Perhaps as a fourth point, we might try to find moans of purchasing more Costa Rican sugar than they would otherwise expect under the new law.⁵

If my recommendations are favorably received in principle, I suggest the desirability of early consultation to work out the best possible package and to decide on the most important matter of tactics for the utilization of decisions taken.

Whiting Willauer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.18/7–1160. Secret.
2. The referenced letter was not found in Department of State files.
3. Telegram 24, July 11, 1960, referred to Echandi’s resentment towards the United States for what he considered U.S. neglect of Costa Rica’s interests; in the telegram Willauer stated that he believed it necessary to have an “immediate review in search of creation better climate for Costa Rican cooperation our policy vis à vis Cuba.” (618.37/7–1160) Telegram 21, July 8, 1960, reported that conferences held July 7–8, convinced Willauer it was “impossible persuade Echandi at this time to break relations with Cuba.” (618.37/7–860) Telegram 10 from Managua, July 8, 1960, is not printed. (613.37/7–860)
4. The proposed use of the $10 million Chase Manhattan Loan is described in desp. 644 from San José, June 9, 1960. (818.10/6–960)
5. Reference is to P.L. 86–592, approved July 6, 1960, which authorized the President to cut the Cuban sugar quota and make up the deficit by purchases from certain other countries including Costa Rica. For text of the Act, see 74 State 330.