Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

CR–21. Despatch from the Ambassador in Costa Rica (Willauer) to the Department of State¹

[Extracts]
No. 288

San José, December 15, 1959

REF

• CA-1486, August 14, 1959²

SUBJECT

• Regional Operations Plan for Latin America: Costa Rica

This document consists of 2 pages, No. 1 of 7 copies, Series A.

The reference communication requested the Chief of Mission to forward to the Department as brief a statement as possible on:

(A) “Country Objectives”; (B) “Country Programs and Other Implementing Operations”³ and (C) “Recommendations” (Optional), within the framework of the Regional Operations Plan for Latin America dated July 1, 1959. Such statement was to be focused on objectives capable of being partially or wholly attained over the next two or three years, with appropriate reference to their relation to long-term U.S. objectives. Attention is directed to Recommendation No. 1, under “Recommendations.”

The statement set forth below follows the outline of the “Regional Operations Plan for Latin America,” with specific citations to numbered items of the OCR plan of July 1, 1959.

RECOMMENDATIONS

NOTE: The recommendations which follow were drafted personally by me after my review of the preceding sections which I also participated in drafting. The recommendations were then reviewed by the contributing members of the Embassy staff, who were invited to suggest revisions or additions. This resulted in several additions, but otherwise no alterations were made in my original draft. The Embassy staff concurs in the opinion that the following recommendations should be placed before the Operations Coordinating Board.

Recommendation No. 1

Overall Recommendation as to the Operation of the OCB

In a personal and confidential letter to the Secretary on November 13, 1959 (Tab A)⁴ I stated in substance that I felt the United States was lax in its system of implementing policy and made a recommendation for new functions of the OCB (see in particular page 2, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Tab A).

I have been making similar recommendations for more than four years, which I gathered together in another memorandum which was presented to the Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador during April of this year. It is entitled “Policy and Performance” and is attached as Tab B.

Recommendation No. 2

Political – Reference (15 c (1)—Enforcement and Adoption of Laws to Control Communist Activities

The entire problem of communist penetration of Latin America stems from a lack of Latin American appreciation that communism is imperialist intervention by Russia. In Latin America it is generally believed that the communists are just another political party. Also, in a sense, the communist are, at times, at the very least put up with because of the superficial but widely accepted idea that the way to get help from us is to appear to embrace communism.

Step No. 1, which I feel might in a year’s time cause a realization of the degree of this communist intervention in Latin America, would be the general adoption of a law modeled on our old Foreign Agents Registration Act.⁵ This I recommended on June 3, 1958. (See Tab C.)⁶

Other steps might be undertaken to encourage further participation in intelligence and counter-intelligence training programs for armed forces, and police. Such training is available from Army sources, and can be used to emphasize the nature of the Soviet threat to hemispheric security.

Recommendation No. 3

(15 c (7)

As previously stated, economic relations between Costa Rica and the Soviet bloc are not as yet very significant. Nevertheless, the threat of economic penetration by the communist is always present and cannot be ignored. It is public knowledge that the threat elsewhere in Latin America seems likely to become serious soon. I have suggested to the Secretary that there be a re-examination of my memorandum to him of January 12, 1958 (see Tab D)⁷ in which I proposed, in substance, that we call Russia’s “bluff” by inviting her to compete on a 50-50 basis straight across the board (aid, technical assistance and trade), at the same time stating we will not stay in the game at all in any country on a 90-10% basis.

A couple of months ago I talked personally with the Secretary about my memorandum of January 12, 1958 and he instructed me to discuss it further with Assistant Secretary Mann, who in turn had called a conference of himself, myself, and a representative of Mr. Terrill’s⁸ office (presumably now Ambassador Bohlen’s⁹ office). I reiterated at the time that my memorandum was principally devised to be provocative of thought and I requested a counter-memorandum which I have never received.

Recommendation No. 4

(18 e) Visa Policy

The Intelligence Division of the Department, [text not declassified] should send special task forces to the field to weed out improper allegations of communism or other subversive activities currently cluttering up Embassy files. The Embassies themselves (at least the smaller ones) are not staffed nor do they have the facilities to carry out this work. Under the policy of not keeping files for more than five years much of the basic materials that led to these old allegations are no longer in the Embassy and all we have is a note on some file card.

One of the most embarrassing situations in my experience as an Ambassador arose because of this problem. The wife of the first freely elected President of Honduras in all its history, Señora de Villeda Morales, wanted to make a trip to New Orleans to buy her inauguration “trousseau” and sought visas for several of her lady friends to aid her in this project. As I recall, at least one of these ladies showed up with a commie mark on her file card, which is quite natural since Villeda was a sworn enemy of Carías, who made it a practice for 20 years to allege communism against most of his political enemies. We ultimately were able, with the help of the Department, to get over this hump, but the delay was extremely embarrassing and I can assure the OCD that this is a frequent kind of occurrence.

Recommendation No. 5

Regional Plan 19—Labor

I understand that the basic philosophy of a free labor movement is that management and labor in the United States and throughout the Free World have accepted the principle that a healthy labor movement produces buying power and efficient operation of the free enterprise system, and that enlightened capitalism aids in the well being of workers. True, we have our rows about the details of the operation of this basic principle, but in the final analysis the principle is accepted on both sides.

So far as the policy of United States free enterprise abroad is concerned, it has been my observation that the acceptance of this principle has not generally percolated down to the level of the local managers. Nor has it become a tenet of labor leaders in Latin America who are representing the free labor movement. All too often in the local scene I find that the basic philosophy on both sides remains that of Marx: “Labor must fight capital” and vice versa.

My suggestions are:

(A) That the “head office” management of our American enterprises abroad be approached to see whether they believe that labor and capital abroad in their various enterprises can and should work together to their mutual advantage.

This is a delicate problem because conditions vary from country to country. For instance, here in Costa Rica the laws and administration of labor affairs are so relatively advanced that representatives of capital feel that concessions to labor have reached the point where it is economically impossible to make more concessions. I do not necessarily agree with the employers here but this is how they think. Labor, on the other hand, is so well treated in Costa Rica that there is only a slight incentive for a free and democratic labor movement. The situation in Honduras or in Guatemala is completely different. Without attempting to suggest what the policy of the free labor movement should be in every country, I wish to point out that it is not sufficient to “lump” Latin American labor in one category and to adopt one policy for all the countries involved. Like all policies, it is highly important that a “policy board” study and evaluate the actual conditions in every country before going into action.

(B) That in any case, where it is agreed that the policy of cooperation of labor and management is correct, the local managers should be called home for consultation and “given the word.”

(C) That in those countries where ORIT has active affiliated labor organizations, general labor policy concerning these countries be discussed and outlined between a top representative of ORIT and the top (home) management of U.S. companies operating in these countries with a view of attempting to secure the issuance of appropriate instructions to the local management of such companies concerning the basic labor policies of each individual company vis a vis ORIT as well as local labor organizations. In addition, occasional visits by top management to countries operating would be helpful.

Recommendation No. 6

Regional Plan 20—U.S. Business Objectives

About four years ago, when I was Ambassador to Honduras, I made a recommendation that Embassies should talk with U.S. business executives about the concept of partnership relationships with local businessmen and I have followed that practice for a long time. I am glad to see that this concept has now become official policy. I am not sure that all of the Ambassadors, nor indeed many of the economic officers, have had the personal business experience which I have had in operating a partnership abroad so as to be convincing on this score. For possible use in amplifying the instructions to meet this difficulty I am appending a copy of my speech to the Hispanic American Society of Stanford University (Tab E)¹⁰ and particularly recommend the entire text of the Atlantic Monthly article by Presidential Assistant Clarence Randall quoted from in the speech.

Recommendation No. 7

Regional Plan 21—Attitude towards U.S. Personnel Overseas

It has long been my feeling that the U.S. Government now sends too many full-time employees abroad to do jobs which could be better contracted for through private consulting firms or educational institutions. I feel, for instance, that too much of our technical assistance program is being handled by direct U.S. Government employees who, quite humanly, tend to try to freeze themselves in their jobs. While in Honduras and previously while in China as Foreign Economic Administrator for the Orient during World War II, I developed quite a lot of usefulness from private consulting firms instead of direct government employees. If desired I could write a whole paper on this subject and will do so upon request. Parenthetically, I have been directly associated with the problems of foreign aid since April of 1940.

Recommendation No. 8

Cultural—General Recommendation

I understand that the expression “cultural relations” means that peoples of various nations basically understand each other in the sense that they mutually know the history, the customs, the language and the aspirations of each other.

In our cultural relations program we send art exhibitions, ballets, orchestras, basketball teams, etc., to Latin America, and all of these accomplish great good in the objectives of mutual understanding.

Also we have a program of inter-change of students through scholarships between Latin America and the United States and this also is a good thing. However, the size of this student exchange program, which is the most important one that I can think of in the realm of cultural relations, is totally inadequate to accomplish the kind of understanding we are attempting. It particularly fails in the quantity and quality of students from the United States that study in Latin America. My recommendations are:

(A) At least 10,000 scholarships for Latin American students in the United States. At an average rate of $4,000 each this would total $40 million.

(B) At least a thousand scholarships for North Americans to study or teach in Latin America. In this case I would allocate for each student the sum of $10,000 (or any sum required to be competitive) for a total cost of $10 million. I have suggested the higher allocation for North American students and teachers because I am certain that we ought to make it so attractive to them that they cannot refuse to go.

I would hope that the experience of the first thousand students would prove so rewarding that the word would spread among the student bodies of the United States that Latin America is a place to seek out.

(C) Costa Rica stands at or near the top in mass education of its population. It also has one of the highest ratings for sympathy towards U.S. policies and problems in the hemisphere. I submit that there is a large element of cause and effect in this coincidence.

I submit for evaluation as to cost and feasibility a campaign aided by the U.S. to stamp out illiteracy in the hemisphere in ten years. I think if this goal could even be approximated it would pay us greater dividends than any other course of action in other fields which we might be contemplating.

(D) Perhaps the U.S. Armed Forces could make greater use of the Latin American service schools. At present, to my knowledge, we are sending only one student per year to the Uruguayan Staff College. Several of the other countries have similar institutions, such as Chile and Argentina. The current reason given for not sending officers to these schools is that they are not as advanced as Leavenworth. Little consideration is given to the idea that these officers will gain a tremendous amount of knowledge from a year’s continuous and daily contact with Latin Americans under academic conditions.

Recommendation No. 9

Public information Program—General

I am generally satisfied with what we are doing to date [text not declassified]

(A) However, I have long been dissatisfied that we are doing everything possible to help the U.S. press report Latin American news correctly. I believe that the impact of the New York Times, Time, Newsweek and Vision are much more important than what we put out ourselves, even though not usually attributed to us.

I believe that what we knew in the Embassies about current events in the field should be made available to the editorial writers of at least the aforementioned influential publications. Three or four years ago I suggested officially (recommendations to OCB from Honduras) that by arrangement with the editors their reporters ought to check with the Embassies for our version of the news.

I have discussed my suggestion with influential friends in the United States press, such as Time president Roy E. Larsen. I think he believes that something like this might be arranged. I have, however, found that USIA director, Ambassador Allen, is skeptical. The problem seems to boil down to a feeling that orders to reporters in the field might be interpreted, or twisted into something against freedom of the press. Since my suggestion is only that reporters in the field include on their “beat” as news gatherers the information available to the Embassy, I find it hard to accept this judgment. I am not suggesting that the United States Government attempt to influence how the reporters report the news. I simply say that there exists in the United States Embassies part of “the news.”

However, if the criticism that the United States Government is somehow or other trying to control the news cannot be overcome by having publishers require their reporters to check with Embassies, then I suggest a half-way house. Could we not persuade the editors in the U.S. to advise the Department of major up-coming stories (not what they are going to say, but simply the subject matter). At this point, on a priority basis, the Department could obtain the facts known in the Embassies and disseminate whatever material the Department thinks proper to the editorial writers.

My classic illustration in favor of my recommendation is the 1954 general strike in Honduras just before the anti-communist Honduran-based revolution against the communist-dominated government of Guatemala. Time, basing its story of the strike solely on field reports from their left-wing reporter, Harvey Rosenhouse, never mentioned that the Guatemalan communists supplied the leaders and $800,000 for that strike. The Time story, as it appeared, spoke only of the iniquities of United Fruit Company labor policies—and indeed in that instance some of these were not good. I am sure the Time editors would have been interested in what I then knew about the situation. Maybe they would not have published it, maybe the Department would not have released it to them, but it was a part of “the news.” Also it was something generally known in the Honduran community, so I would not have been revealing “secret” information.

(B) The Cuban attack on the impartiality of the United States press. An American friend in Costa Rica close to the press points out that the responsible press (liberal and conservative) in a dozen Latin American countries has been at least as strong in attacking events in Cuba as the United States press has been. He suggests that all this material should be gathered and under appropriate auspices put out in “block-buster” form.

(C) Coverage of Latin American seminars: The fact that Herb Matthews¹¹ was able to get away with his defense of Castro in the top billing spot of the Stanford University October seminar pains me.

Because of then existing Department of State policy I had to remain silent at Stanford, and could not answer him officially.

In this connection I make the following suggestions:

(1) That it should be arranged that persons (preferably known liberals) who know the score about communism should refute that type of talk.

(2) That the agendas and subjects to be discussed at these influential meetings should carefully reviewed in advance by the Department. [text not declassified]

In any event, these influential meetings should not be allowed to “go by default.” There are too many Latin Americans who feel that what is said in these meetings somehow expresses U.S. opinion.

In this recommendation I am not unmindful of the excellent job that Dick Rubottom, Dr. Eisenhower and others do at these meetings. But what we need is a “task force” to cover these conferences. And the “task force” must also do a “follow-up” job after the meetings are finished. For instance whether or not we agree with Professor Tannenbaum¹² on Mexico and Cardenas,¹³ he made a speech at Stanford which basically refuted Matthews’ thesis. The “follow-up” would in this case involve an attempt to get Tannenbaum to write a “critique” on the Matthews speech.

(D) There are some indications that, either by design or by accident, the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America has had its attention diverted from communism into a program of resisting the inroads of Protestantism. Unfortunately, a propaganda link has been constructed between “Yanquismo,” U.S. Government representation and Protestant missionary efforts, which, carried to extremes, might produce a situation in which the Roman Catholics were actually playing the communist game.

I suggest that the Roman Catholic authorities be provided with material for conducting a sophisticated anti-communist program—this to be done without the slightest hint of favoritism to any of the religious bodies. The Protestant missionaries, which are becoming a more and more potent force in Latin America, could also use some of this kind of aid—and I might point out that such a program would reach right into the very classes of society to which the communists make their strongest appeals.

The important point in this discussion is that of preventing a clash between the religious bodies, and keeping them focused on a sworn enemy of religion—one that is dramatically opposed to Christianity in all forms.

Recommendation No. 10

Regional Plan 24—Information on UN and OAS Accomplishments. General.

Except for those members of Embassy staffs who have done duty with the UN or the OAS I feel that there is a considerable basic ignorance and appreciation of just how these organizations work and the good which they accomplish. Everyone knows about this in general terns but I feel a few simple expedients would greatly increase the efficiency of the presentation by diplomats in the field of the merits of these organizations. Specifically, I recommend:

(1) That a definite program of visits by Ambassadors and other important Embassy personnel, while home on leave or consultation, to the working sessions of these organizations, be arranged and budgeted for in terms of time and money. (Note: I was shocked to hear from Ambassador Lodge¹⁴ in 1954 when I paid a call on him in New York, that I was just about the first American Ambassador who had done so.)

(2) In the field we sorely need more concise and readily usable information as to the functions and day-to-day operations of the two organizations. Particularly in the case of the OAS I have long been asking for a handbook with detailed appendices as to the operations of that organization. Every time a crisis comes up in the field we have to research through scattered pamphlets and even then we do not have a proper book which shows us the precedents and other necessary material. Besides talking about this with my friends in the Department, I specifically made the suggestion for such a book to Ambassador Dreier at the April meeting of Chiefs of Mission in El Salvador.¹⁵ About a month ago I made a similar recommendation to Carl Migdail of the Pan American Union, who seemed exceedingly interested in the idea.

(3) In addition to orienting State Department personnel, service Attachés and military mission members should also be checked out on the functions and operations of the OAS and UN. I am told that our War Colleges and the Strategic Intelligence School have overlooked this particular aspect of training.

Recommendation No. 11

Economic: B–2—Inter-American Highway

I have for several years now been recommending the creation of an Inter-American Highway authority to make possible sound maintenance and transportation practices on the Inter-American Highway when it is completed. This objective has been adopted by ARA and much successful work has been done. For reference of the OCB I attach Tab G.¹⁶

I have informally suggested to ARA ways and means to keep up the present impetus behind this idea.

Recommendation No. 12

Military—General Recommendation

I submit for further study and consideration a memorandum entitled “The Place of the Military in Latin American Affairs with Comments on the Movements towards ‘Dual Purpose’ Military Units” (Tab H).¹⁷ The OCB may not be aware of the fact that I was one of the first to take up the cudgels for the dual-purpose military unit concept while I was in Honduras. It may be useful at this time to review some of my thinking on the place of the military and of the reasoning behind dual-purpose military units as expressed in the attached Tab H. To the extent that the Board finds my ideas, or better ideas if they exist, valid, I think they should be widely disseminated in the field.

I hope that some way of providing military assistance to “dual-purpose” military organizations can be developed that takes advantage of the resources offered by both the Defense Department and ICA without provoking a bureaucratic struggle at home over “empire building” rights.

I should like to renew a previous suggestion to OCB that we get behind and support regional military schools in the hemisphere. So long as the military play the great part they now do in Latin American politics, there will be a crying need to “get the officers young and teach them right.”

Whiting Willauer
Ambassador

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.18/12–1559. Secret. Contributors to this despatch included Ambassador Willauer, Roy I. Kimmel, Counselor, Alexander A. Cohen, Second Secretary, James R. Johnston, Second Secretary, Lt. Col. Spencer P. Edwards, Jr., Army Attaché, Doris T. Aragon, USIS Public Affairs Assistant, and Hunter L. Estep, Second Secretary. The Department of State approved the country objectives; also approved, subject to availability of funds, the country programs; and noted the recommendations contained herein. (Airgram A–11 to San José, July 29, 1960; 611.18/7–2960)
2. The referred circular airgram transmitted to Embassies in Latin America the Regional Operations Plan for Latin America approved by the Operations Coordinating Board on July 1, 1959.
3. Sect. (A) “Country Objectives” and (B) “Country Programs and Other Implementing Operations” are not printed here.
4. Not printed
5. For text of this Act, Public Law 583, 75th Cong., approved June 8, 1938, see 52 State 631.
6. The recommendation was contained in a letter to Rubottom, not printed.
7. Not printed
8. Robert P. Terrill, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State.
9. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.
10. Ambassador Willauer gave his speech on Oct 9, 1959; not printed here.
11. Herbert L. Matthews, editorial staff, New York Times.
12. Frank Tannenbaum, Professor of History, Columbia University.
13. Gen. Lázaro Cárdenas, President of Mexico, December 1, 1934–November 30, 1940.
14. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Representative of the United States to the United Nations.
15. The Meeting of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Carribean Area was held at San Salvador, April 9–11, 1959.
16. At Tab G was “A Proposal for an Inter-American Highway Authority,” by Ambassador Willauer, not printed.
17. This undated memorandum by Ambassador Willauer, is not printed.