Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

CO–12. Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State¹

No. 31

Bogotá, July 11, 1958

REF

• Embtels 16, 17, 18 and 19²

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation—Carlos SANZ DE SANTAMARIA, Foreign Minister, and John M. Cabot, American Ambassador, on July 9, 1958

The Foreign Minister mentioned to me that he wished to see me and I consequently secured an appointment at 5 o’clock on Wednesday, July 9th.

The Foreign Minister first referred to the religious question. He read to me and then handed me a Note proposing that a commission of two Americans, one Catholic and one Protestant, be sent to this country to investigate the entire religious situation and render a report. This Note and a translation thereof are enclosed.³ I did not comment on the Note at this time. The Foreign Minister mentioned that he had no objections to my suggestion that the commission should include Catholic and Protestant representatives from other nations if that were considered convenient.

The Foreign Minister then referred to the cafeteria matter which I had raised with him in our previous conversation. He said that he had consulted three of the committee of ladies who had organized and were running the cafeterias, and that they had flatly refused to abolish the 10 centavo charge. They had informed him that they would rather close the cafeterias than do this. The cafeterias were organized as a social project rather than as a charity. Under present conditions many self-respecting families were simply unable to get the food which they needed. They did not want charity but if they could get food for a nominal charge it supplied a vital need for them. If, on the other hand, the cafeterias were freely opened to all comers, the self-respecting element would be driven out, and the cafeterias would be taken over by beggars and paupers. So far as the committee was concerned, pure charity work was in the hands of the parish priests and they did not wish to invade this field. The Foreign Minister pointed out that “limosna” had a derogatory meaning in Colombia. It really was essential in each country to take that country’s idiosyncrasies into account. We should not insist on rigid rules on a world-wide basis.

The Foreign Minister then proposed that signs be posted in the cafeteria, spelling out that the milk and flour were given by the United States, and he said that it could even be spelled out that the total cost of the meals was, say, 40 centavos, of which so much was given by the United States, so much by the Coffee Federation, and so much paid by the 10 centavo charge. I said that the Department of Agriculture had rejected this formula when I proposed it and insisted that no charge could be made in connection with food given by the United States. I said that I did not see how the position of the ladies’ committee and the Department of Agriculture could be reconciled, but I felt a formula must be found. I was sure that he agreed with me that if it were not, a grave social crisis would result. He said that this was true, but I did not get the impression that he was as concerned as I was. (I do not believe that the upper classes in Colombia fully appreciate how close Colombia is to social revolution. They talk much of this with their lips but I doubt that they really feel it in their hearts).

The Foreign Minister then said he wanted to discuss with me threats to the public order and that he would be as frank as he had always been. He had received a series of messages which indicated that a vast plot was being organized to overthrow the governments of various American republics and establish dictatorships. (He skipped from one point to another and the following is therefore a synthesis rather than a direct account of what he said).

With regard to Colombia there were indications that Rojas Pinilla was again planning to return. The Foreign Minister referred to the letter which Rojas Pinilla had written to the armed forces.⁴ He said that the loyalty of the armed forces was questionable. The Junta was convinced that the armed forces were loyal but then they had been similarly convinced before May 2nd. The Foreign Minister then got out a series of telegrams, apparently most or all of which originated in the Colombian Embassy at Cuidad Trujillo.⁵ According to these telegrams General Trujillo had suggested to the Panamanian Military Attaché (Aued?) that he organize a coup against the present Panamanian Government. Another message reported that Peron planned in conjunction with opposition elements in southern Brazil to go to southern Brazil or possibly Paraguay with the eventual purpose of re-entering Argentina and overthrowing the Government there. The Foreign Minister thought that communists might be included among these opposition elements. I asked whether Peron was supposed already to be in southern Brazil and the Foreign Minister said he did not know from the telegram. With regard to Samuel Moreno Diaz, Rojas Pinilla’s son-in-law, he had arrived in Cuidad Trujillo. He had been met at the airport by protocol officers and taken to the Hotel Paz, which was a second-class hotel owned by the Government. There he had received many telephone calls.

The Foreign Minister then said [text not declassified] that there had been a great deal of arms smuggling recently to furnish weapons to dissident elements in various parts of the country. He said that he had looked into it, and was convinced that the actual smuggling was purely commercial but that didn’t alter the fact than the arms were getting into the hands of disgruntled elements. I said that we, too, had reports of arms smuggling, particularly from Panama, and that we had been looking into this matter to see if there were anything we could do to cooperate in stopping it. He said that they also knew that arms were coming in from Panama.

The Foreign Minister then said that he thought it would be an effective discouragement to any military men who were considering a coup if we should announce that we were sending a special mission to the Lleras inauguration. In making the announcement, he suggested that we underscore that we were sending the mission in order to express our great satisfaction at the return of Colombia to democratic government, and say anything else which would indicate that we would take it decidedly amiss if Colombia were not returned to democratic government. I said that the idea of a statement seemed to me a good one. On previous occasions I had indicated to key military men that in the event of a military coup Colombia could expect no further help from the United States. He enthusiastically agreed that this was a wise move on my part since American aid was obviously essential to Colombia in the present circumstances. He suggested that the military might be further impressed if a military figure were included in the special mission. I said that I saw the point of sending a special mission, but it was slightly embarrassing for me; I had discussed this matter with several of my colleagues, and since I understood that Lleras had not wished special missions to be sent to the inauguration, I had indicated that we were somewhat adverse to sending one unless we found that everybody else was planning to do so. The Foreign Minister said that it was a reversal of his position also. However, he felt that the circumstances warranted it.

The Foreign Minister then said that since we were talking so frankly he wanted to tell me about his experiences on the morning of May 2nd. He had gotten away from his apartment at 5 a.m. with Jorge Mejia (Minister of Agriculture) before the military police had picked him up, as they had other high government officials. They had been stopped by a patrol (he did not specify whether it was a military or police patrol), and that at that moment they saw the car of General Paris (he said “not the Junta member, but his brother”), and Santamaria had said to Mejia in English, “Let’s get into this military car”. They had thus safely reached the barracks at Usaquen. Santamaria and Mejia agreed that if they found the military had also risen they would simply get arrested a few hours before they would be in any case. They found a scene of wild confusion at Usaquen, since no one knew what was going on. Apparently “some 45 officers” were undecided what to do. He had hastily harangued them, pointing out that if Colonel Forero thought he could run the country in the face of popular opposition and the inability of Colombia to get “one dollar to finance imports”, he was greatly mistaken. The officers appeared impressed with this argument and eventually he was taken to General Gomez Arenas, who was by that time organizing the counter-attack of the loyal forces.

I then said that since we were talking so intimately I wanted to ask him a direct question: why had the Government done nothing about the other officers who were known to be implicated in the May 2nd uprising? (I mentioned no names). The Foreign Minister smiled faintly and said he didn’t know; the Junta had simply not done anything about them. [text not declassified]

The Foreign Minister said that he was seriously concerned at the problem of communism in Venezuela. He had heard from various Venezuelan friends that a very dangerous trend had developed in this direction. He particularly mentioned that “Mendoza”, obviously the former member of the Junta, had told him how disturbed he was.

The Foreign Minister then let me read a long draft Note which he was preparing to send to the OAS with regard to a meeting of Foreign Ministers.⁶ The date of the meeting was, as the Foreign Minister pointed out, purposely left very vague. The purpose would be to discuss the whole question of economic cooperation in the Hemisphere. I did not like the general tone of the Note and mentioned to the Foreign Minister that I didn’t think we would be altogether in agreement with him, but that he of course had the right to express his own views. I particularly took exception to a paragraph suggesting that cooperation has not been as close and ample as it should have been. The Foreign Minister immediately said that he had not intended this as a criticism of the United States but rather as a statement of the undeniable fact that the Latin American republics have not cooperated among themselves. He would re-draft this paragraph and make this clear.

I said there were several things which I would like to take up with him. I first asked whether he had ascertained whether Lleras intended definitely to decline the President’s invitation to visit Washington in November. The Foreign Minister said he had unfortunately failed to ask Lleras this the one time he had seen him, but he would telephone me and let me know.

I then referred to the fact that the Banco de la Republica was letting us have only [illegible in the original] pesos to the dollar on money which we are drawing against payments for agricultural surpluses. Under the present exchange system this seemed to be in clear contravention of the terms of our agreement, and I hoped that instructions would be issued to the Banco de la Republica to pay us in accordance with these terms; i.e., certificate rate plus 10%. The Foreign Minister said that the 10% matter was being handled in Washington and I agreed to this. I noted that the Colombian Government was now collecting the 10% from purchases of surplus products. He agreed to take this matter up.

I then said that I did not wish to discuss the entire religious question but there was one aspect of it which did seriously concern me. The Catholic Church was apparently putting on a systematic campaign against the Embassy and the Consulate at Cali in connection with this question. I said that I was accustomed to attacks and they didn’t worry me, and that it was of course the privilege of the Catholic clergy to say what it wanted. However, it seemed to me extremely injudicious under the present circumstances to wash all of this dirty linen in public. The attacks completely misrepresented the position of the Embassy and the Consulate. They alleged that we were trying to Protestantize the country by distributing food, whereas the fact was that we were distributing the food through the Catholic clergy. Bishop Alvarez Restrepo had been particularly active, evidently as a means of getting one Protestant missionary out of the town of Supiá. I would think that the Catholics should realize that the only people who could profit from a quarrel of this kind were the Communists. I, on my part, had repeatedly urged moderation on the Protestants and their statements, and I feared that if the Catholic attacks continued the Protestants would join in the fray. That would be no atmosphere in which to get anything done in the religious question.

The Foreign Minister said that he knew that Bishop Alvarez Restrepo had been deeply offended by his conversation with the Consol in Cali. (Why, I can’t imagine - one of the two consular officers who spoke with him is a Catholic, and according to their account Alvarez Restrepo completely misrepresented the conversation). He thought that he might speak to the Nuncio and suggested I do the same. I agreed that this might be helpful.

The whole conversation lasted an hour and a half.

John M. Cabot
American Ambassador

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 821.413/7–1158. Secret.
2. Telegram 16, July 9, reported Colombian Foreign Minister Sanz de Santamaria’s concern about allegedly imminent efforts to reestablish dictatorial governments in various American republics (721.00/7-958); telegram 17, July 9, reported Sanz de Santamaria’s request for the United States to send a special mission to LLeras Camargo’s inauguration to help stabilize situation in Colombia (721.00/7–958); telegram 18, July 9, reported receipt of a note from Sanz de Santamaria formally suggesting establishment of a commission to study the religious question in Colombia (821.413/7–958); and telegram 19, July 10, reported on the cafeteria issue (821.49/7–1058).
3. The referenced note is an Aide-Mémoire, dated July 8; neither the Aide-Mémoire nor the translation is printed.
   In an Aide-Mémoire delivered to the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Relations on August 4 by a representative of the Embassy in Bogotá, the United States agreed to the Colombian Government’s proposal of July 8. The Aide-Mémoire stated in part the following: “The Government of the United States, although not a party to the contemplated action, believes that efforts of this nature to bring about a better understanding can aid significantly the finding of a just and definitive solution to these problems affecting citizens of the United States which so frequently have been discussed by our two Governments.” A copy of the Aide-Mémoire was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of despatch 114, August 5, 1958, not printed; 821.413/8–558.
4. No copy of the letter described here was found in Department of State files.
5. The referenced telegrams were not further identified.
6. No copy of the draft note described here was found in Department of State files.