Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

BL–31. Telegram from the Ambassador in Bolivia (Strom) to the Department of State¹

La Paz, May 14, 1960, 10 a.m.

660. DEPTEL 329.²

Despite Guevara’s opinion, Embassy considers seizure of power by a military junta as immediate consequence of breakdown COMIBOL negotiations only remote possibility. Present military leaders obviously subject constant incitement to such action by right wing opposition. Believe highly unlikely they will respond for following reasons:

(1) Believe top officers genuinely regard themselves as servants legally constituted authority.

(2) Believe top officers doubt military strong enough to seize and hold power.

(3) Believe top military leaders have learned political lesson from 1952, i.e., while they anxious restore order they will do so as agent of political authority; not assume political responsibility for the bloodshed involved as would be case with military junta. Therefore although right wing coup attempt good possibility prior to or immediately after June 5 elections believe military will support GOB.

Rumors of possible installation of military junta by Siles rife last ten days. Embassy place little credence these reports. Believe rumors have two sources: (1) Effort of both left and right opposition drive wedge between GOB and military and (2) uninformed speculation on recent appointment military officers as prefects bringing total of military prefects to seven out of nine (several these military men extreme leftists who would not join any attempt establish rightist junta).

Should critical COMIBOL situation result in GOB bankruptcy, Embassy believes anarchy and political chaos likely results with extreme leftist holding political initiative. (For report on COMIBOL see EMBTEL 657). In Embassy’s opinion effort to establish military junta would only became probability at onus stage. In view likelihood that military and rightist leaders would be among first targets leftist night of long knives consider fruitless speculate on which individuals might lead such effort.

Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 724.00/5–1460. Confidential.
2. The Department’s telegram 349, May 9, 1960, requested an analysis of the statement by MNRA presidential candidate Walter Guevara Arze, reported earlier that day in Embassy despatch 597, that if Comibol negotiations broke down, a rightist military junta would seize control of the Government. (724.00/5–960)