Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

BL–24. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

Washington, May 19, 1959

CONTINGENT PROSPECTS IN BOLIVIA²

THE ESTIMATE

This estimate, prepared in response to a request from the Department of State, is designed to answer the following specific questions.

1. What are the prospects for Bolivia if U.S. aid is continued at about the present level?

In this case, moderate MNR³ President Hernan Siles Zuazo will probably be able to remain in office until elections in 1960. U.S. aid will enable him to continue efforts to stabilize the Bolivian economy, though at best progress will continue to be slow. Although by law Siles cannot succeed himself, his successor will almost certainly be a member of the MNR. Because of growing opposition within the party to the U.S.-supported stabilization effort, the electoral period will almost certainly be characterized by an increase in anti-U.S. oratory. However, the next administration, while anxious to avoid antagonizing left-wing labor elements, will probably cooperate with the U.S. to the extent necessary to assure a continuation of aid.

2. If Siles leaves office for reasons other than a withdrawal of U.S. aid, what group, party, or faction in Bolivia would be most likely to succeed to power?

If U.S. aid continues but Siles leaves the presidency before 1960, his most likely immediate successor would be Federico Alvarez Plata, President of the Senate, who is next in the constitutional line of succession. Alvarez Plata’s continuation in office would depend on backing from ex-president Victor Paz Estenssoro, long-time party chief and symbol of MNR unity, and on accommodation with Juan Lechin, leader of the leftist wing of the party. Alvarez Plata would almost certainly seek such an accommodation, but would not go so far to the left as to jeopardize the continuation of U.S. aid. Failing such an accommodation among the key leaders, a violent intra-MNR conflict would probably ensue.

3. What is the leaning of the Carabineros and the armed forces?

The Carabineros (national police) and the armed forces are probably loyal to Siles. They, in conjunction with civilian militia units, would probably support the MNR government in sufficient numbers to put down any rightist or leftist attempt to seize power. However, if Siles had left office and a violent intra-MNR conflict were to occur, the action of the Carabineros and the armed forces would be uncertain. The bulk would be likely to support the MNR moderates as they have in the past, if there were a cohesive moderate group to support.

4. What would be the likely effect on the present moderate government of a withdrawal of U.S. aid?

The withdrawal of U.S. aid probably would bring Siles’ leadership of Bolivia to an abrupt end. He has become so strongly identified with the policy of co-operation with the U.S. that he would be completely discredited and probably could not remain in office even if he tried to do so. We believe it unlikely that he would try. There would be a strong upsurge of anti-American sentiment and the MNR left wing would become dominant in the party and in the successor government. These circumstances would enable the small orthodox Communist and the Trotskyite groups to increase their influence.

5. What would be the outlook for the successor government?

The tenure of the successor government would depend largely on its ability to cope with Bolivia’s economic problems. If U.S. aid had been denied, the success or government would desperately seek aid from any available source, including the Soviet Bloc, as an immediate action necessary to avert internal economic collapse and political chaos.

6. What would be the likely attitude of the successor government toward the U.S. and the possibility of fruitful U.S. cooperation with it?

Denied U.S. support, a successor government would adopt an extremely unfriendly attitude toward the U.S. and would seek to influence other Latin American countries to do the same. Internally, there would be a violent anti-American campaign which would probably involve acts of violence against U.S. property and persons.

7. What would be the effect of a withdrawal of U.S. aid to Bolivia upon U.S. relations in the inter-American community?

In these circumstances, there would be a widespread sympathy for Bolivia in Latin American opinion. It would be contended that Bolivia had made a reasonable effort to comply with unrealistic U.S. conditions for aid, and that the termination of U.S. aid in such circumstances constituted an intolerable interference in Bolivia’s domestic affairs and demonstrated the political folly of basing national policy on an assumption of continuing U.S. cooperation. The consequent anti-American reaction would adversely affect the ability of Latin American governments to cooperate with the U.S., especially in those countries where the adoption of stabilization measures was a condition of U.S. aid. In particular, the political position of Argentine President Frondizi, who is taking determined steps toward economic recovery with a U.S.-backed stabilization program, would almost certainly be adversely affected. In these circumstances, the Latin American countries would become increasingly receptive to offers of aid from the Soviet Bloc, thus presenting the Soviet Union with an excellent situation to exploit.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, INR Files. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, this SNIE was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and the following intelligence organizations participated in its preparation: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. The members of the United States Intelligence Board concurred in the special estimate on May 19, 1959, with the exception of the Atomic Energy Commission representative, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, all of whom “abstained, the subject being out of their jurisdiction.”
2. This estimate supplements NIE 92-58, “The Outlook for Bolivia,” 7 January 1958, which remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text.] For the text of NIE 92-58, see Document BL–1.
3. Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement). In 1952 the reformist MNR led a successful revolution against an incumbent military junta. President Siles was constitutionally elected in 1956 for a four-year term. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. An annex containing background information is not printed.