BL–14. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1
SUBJECT
- Attempted Rightist Coup in Bolivia
Facts:
On October 21 the rightist Bolivia Socialist Falange Party (FSB) attempted a revolt at La Paz. Armed units attacked public buildings and the homes of some high government officials and leaders of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), the Government party. Some Carabinero (police) units apparently were involved in the abortive coup and the chief of the Carabineros is under arrest. Three persons were reported killed and several injured, but no American citizens were hurt. President Siles decreed a nation-wide state of siege, and the Congress authorized its implementation. Since the revolt, MNR civilian militias have been patrolling the streets of La Paz. The Minister of Government subsequently announced that over 100 persons were under arrest, and both students’ and teachers’ federations are threatening to strike if their members under arrest are not released. There are reports that last minute efforts to postpone the revolt were successful in all but one suburb of La Paz.
The Communists and Lechín, head of the mine workers, claim the Government is responsible for the discontent which the reactionaries tried to utilize. Lechín has organized “emergency committees” for the “defense of the working classes.” La Paz and the rest of the country appears to be quiet and censorship imposed on October 21 ended two days later.
Background:
The FSB, the second strongest party in Bolivia, consists of extreme right wing elements and finds some support among the middle class and the military and police forces. It has been plotting to overthrow the Government since the MNR’s assumption of power in 1952, and as recently as last May it staged an unsuccessful uprising. Recently, the FSB has become associated with a loose coalition of small opposition [Typeset Page 171] parties. Apparently the FSB considered the moment opportune for a revolt, in view of difficult economic and political conditions facing the Government. A new stabilization agreement between the Bolivian Government and the IMF resulted in devaluation of the currency at the beginning of this month. Prices have gone up, and the Government is plagued by demands for wage increases. The dumping of tin by the USSR and the U.S. quotas on lead and zinc have complicated Bolivia’s already difficult foreign exchange picture.
[Facsimile Page 2]Evaluation:
- 1.
- The full force and strength of the plot may not have been revealed due to last minute efforts at postponement. It is, however, generally thought that the FSB, unless it obtains substantial military or police support, has no chance alone of effecting a successful coup.
- 2.
- While the attempted coup might normally have been expected to strengthen the Government by promoting MNR unity, it does not in this case appear to have done so, possibly due to the apparent weakness of the attempt.
- 3.
- As a result, the leftist-MNR labor leader, Juan Lichín, as well as other minor opposition groups, appear to be endeavoring to capitalize on the situation by sniping at the Government in one way and another.
- 4.
- To the extent that the attempted coup gave credence to the Government’s claim of persistent plotting and helped identify spots of disloyalty, particularly among the Carabineros, the long-run effects may be helpful to it.
- 5.
- The effect on the Government’s effort to stabilize the economy cannot yet be judged. Although the immediate result was the termination of a factory workers’ strike, accompanied by manifestations of loyalty, evidence of general discontent may weaken the Government’s resolve to impose stringent measures.
- Source: Department of State, Rubottom Files, Lot 60 D 553, “Bolivia 1958.” Confidential. Co-drafted by Ernest V. [illegible in the original], Director of the Office of West Coast Affairs, and Henry L. Pitts. The source text is an unsigned carbon copy.↩