143. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Ambassador in Argentina (Beaulac) and President-elect Frondizi, Buenos Aires, March 6, 19581
I called on Dr. Frondizi last night by appointment. Mr. Pedro San Martin accompanied me from the Residence to Frondizi’s offices in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and was present at the conference. Also present was Mr. Del Carril.
I told Dr. Frondizi I had come to congratulate him on his election and to wish him every success in his important mission as President. I expressed the opinion that his success was important not only to him and Argentina but to the United States and the Continent, and I said my Government wanted to cooperate in ways that were appropriate and possible in helping to bring about that result.
I said that with the majority vote that he had received, and with the good will of important institutions of the country, I was confident that he would have a very successful administration.
Dr. Frondizi thanked me for my statement and he said that he wanted to have the very best and closest relations with the United States and welcomed my offer of cooperation, which he reciprocated. He said he was very happy to have received the majority he did and felt that it did indeed constitute support which would be very helpful to him in carrying out his task. He cited figures which probably were intended to show that he would have won even without the help of Perón.
[Page 469]Dr. Frondizi said he loves his country (he showed a little emotion at this point) and he wants to do the best job he can. He will try to do what is right. He wants to have close relations with me. He will be accessible at all times. He will be quite frank. When he says “yes”, he will mean “yes”, and when he says “no”, he will mean “no”.
That will be his attitude with everybody. He has told labor that he will agree to retroactive increase once, but only once. Retroactive increases are contrary to the country’s interest because they do not permit companies to make accurate estimates of costs.
He suggested that I not hesitate in asking for anything. If he can do it, he will. If he cannot, he will say so. But his sensibilities will never be offended no matter what I may ask.
I said I appreciated that, and that I would have the same attitude toward him. I said I would speak very clearly with him. I noted that with all the responsibilities the United States has throughout the world, it necessarily must proceed on the basis of truth. It is truthful with others and hopes that others will be truthful with it.
I said that my mission in Argentina is a simple one. It is to contribute to the extent possible to the process of political and economic recuperation which is going on here. It is in the interest of the United States to have a friendly Argentina and we want that friend to be strong and stable. Argentina’s interests, therefore, are ours.
What we can do in Argentina depends, of course, on what Argentina does. What we can do is to add something to what Argentina does. We hope that Argentina will do a lot so that we can do a lot.
I noted that there were difficulties in the way of cooperation. There was Argentina’s chronic shortage of dollars, for example. I said that we estimated that in the year 1961, for example, the cost of servicing Argentina’s now existing dollar debt would be $60 million. Argentina’s dollar income today is only $120 million. If that rate continues there would be only $60 million left for the servicing of new debt and for the payment of imports.
I said that it was my understanding that Argentina now had $303 million in foreign exchange, including currency reserves and that the country’s trade deficit for last year was $340 million.
I said that these facts spoke for themselves and indicated that something was wrong which only Argentina could cure.
I said I was very optimistic regarding Argentina’s future because, compared with other countries where I had served, its problems were simple. It had vast unused resources which were largely untouched. In order to make these resources available to the Argentine people only simple decisions on the part of the Argentine Government were required. Most countries were not in this fortunate position.
Dr. Frondizi indicated that he agreed.
[Page 470]I said that the United States had few problems in Argentina. When I had come here there were two—the problem of the meatpackers, deriving from the practice of the Perón Government of subsidizing the price of meat to the consumer, and the ANSEC problem. I said that the meatpackers’ problem seemed to be well on the way to solution. Agreement had been reached concerning the principles which should apply in solving the problem, and there appeared to remain only the business of settling the accounts along the lines agreed to.
Dr. Frondizi asked whether this problem could be solved before May 1. I said I understood that it would be.2
He expressed gratification.
I then referred to the ANSEC problem. I said that the problem was, of course, of importance to American & Foreign Power and it was a problem in which the Government of the United States was bound to concern itself because American & Foreign Power is a legitimate American interest. However, the problem was most important to Argentina because failure to solve it had damaged Argentine credit abroad and had prevented the United States from being helpful in the field of electric power.
Dr. Frondizi said he realized the problem was unimportant to us in dollars, especially in the light of the enormous responsibilities we have throughout the world. He understood that what was important was the principle. He said he had asked the President and the Minister of Commerce and Industry to solve the ANSEC problem before May 1.
Having in mind the interview with Dr. Frondizi in yesterday’s New York Times, I asked him whether he was insisting that any agreement reached with American & Foreign Power should be approved by the new Congress.
He said that he did not insist on that at all. On the contrary, he doesn’t want the Congress to have to review the acts of the Provisional Government. That would create an intolerable situation. As he has said publicly, he wants to “draw the curtain” over what has passed and start all over again. He said he has told the Provisional Government that he wants the ANSEC problem cleaned up and as many other problems as possible cleaned up.
[Page 471]I asked Dr. Frondizi if I might quote him on this to the Argentine Government.
He said, certainly. The more problems that can be cleaned up the better. The Provisional Government is going out. It is responsible only to itself and has great authority. The Argentine Congress, on the other hand, will be difficult, especially in the beginning. He wants to limit the things that have to be submitted to Congress.
I told Dr. Frondizi I would like to talk to him about trips. I had read in the press that he might possibly make a trip abroad and that his trip might include the United States, but he had told Mr. Holcomb he was going to send someone up to the United States. I said we had informed Washington to that effect and that, in accordance with Dr. Frondizi’s request, Washington had been thinking about whom that person might see.
I said that I had heard nothing from Washington about any invitation to him, and, of course, I had no idea, nor did Washington, whether he would welcome an invitation. Any invitation would, of course, have to be cleared with President Eisenhower himself. I asked whether he would like to comment in that connection.
He said he had not decided about making a trip. What he would like to do, if possible, is to make a quick trip which would include the United States. He had been invited by Uruguay and Brazil and he would like to visit those countries. He would like to spend no more than two days in the United States. His object would be merely to greet United States officials. He would not want to talk business. Later on, he would want to send a person or a group up to talk business.
In this connection, he said that he would let me know whom he intended to send and would be glad to consult with me concerning the kind of person he should send. He would ask the person or the group to talk to me before going up, and to consult concerning whom they should talk to in the United States.
I said I would be happy to talk to his people.
I asked Dr. Frondizi how I might communicate with him quickly. He suggested that I might do this through Mr. San Martin, who was present. I said I would. I invited him to communicate to me anything he thought would be helpful or of interest, and he said he would.
I told Dr. Frondizi that a number of press representatives were waiting outside. He suggested we see them together, which we did. The press asked me whether I had invited Dr. Frondizi to visit the United States. I said we had not talked about that. I said I had come to congratulate him on his election and to offer my Government’s cooperation. We had talked about common problems and had agreed that collaboration would be helpful to both countries.
[Page 472]I said that, of course, Dr. Frondizi as a person and as future President of Argentina would be welcome in the United States now, or later, or at any time.
A newspaperman asked what problems we had discussed. Dr. Frondizi replied that we had not discussed specific problems, but general problems. We had agreed that our relationship should be as close as possible and that we should be quite frank with each other. He had promised that when he meant “yes”, he would say “yes”, and when he meant “no”, he would say “no”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.35/3–658. Confidential. Drafted by Beaulac. Transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 1 to despatch 1387 from Buenos Aires, March 6.↩
-
In a memorandum of conversation with President-elect Frondizi on March 10, transmitted to the Department under cover of despatch 1420 from Buenos Aires, March 12, Ambassador Beaulac stated, inter alia, the following:
“Dr. Frondizi later reverted to the ANSEC problem. He wanted to know whether it was in such shape that a solution could be reached before May 1.1 said I thought it was. I said that the company and the Government had been discussing bases for evaluating the properties for which compensation would be made and that I understood certain principles had been agreed to. My opinion was that the figures could be agreed to quickly. I understood that indemnification would be in pesos and that the company would be willing to reinvest the pesos in the country.” (ibid., 611.35/3–1258)
↩