Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

595. Memorandum From Farley to Herter¹

Washington, August 27, 1960

SUBJECT

• Developments in Connection with the Negotiations for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Testing, August 12–27, 1960

Recess

At a meeting in London of Chairman McCone and Under Secretary Merchant with Minister of State Ormsby-Gore and Sir Roger Makins, it was agreed that a recess of approximately four weeks’ duration would be desirable, and the delegations were instructed to approach the Soviets on this basis. It was further agreed that, during the recess, there would be U.S.–U.K. coordination to develop tactics for the post-recess period and that this should take place in good time to permit review of positions by the principals of both sides (TAB A and TAB B).

The Soviets readily acceded to our informal proposal, and the conference was recessed from August 22 to September 27, after the Western delegations put on record a restatement of major differences and stressed the need for a more flexible Soviet attitude.

In the past week, there have been two meetings of the interdepartmental working group for the purpose of outlining positions for a report to the principals and coordination with the U.K. Mr. Charles Stelle and Mr. David Popper are expected to arrive on August 28 and September 7, respectively, for the purpose of taking part in interdepartmental consultations and consultations with British political and technical people beginning September 7.

Nuclear Detonations in Connection with Seismic Research Program

At the London meeting, the British readily accepted our explanation as to our inability to proceed with the fallback position. They expressed the opinion, however, that any proposal short of unilateral disclosure of devices would not be acceptable to the Soviets, that no marked progress can be made in the negotiations without putting forward a new position on safeguards, and that we could not go ahead unilaterally with seismic research shots without causing a breakoff in the conference. They feel that, aside from safeguards, the question of decoupling shots is the only serious outstanding issue on the research program, and it is an issue on which the Soviets will not be in a strong position.

The British tried unsuccessfully to obtain assurances that we do not intend to schedule a nuclear shot until the next administration. We pointed out that the basic position remains as stated by the President on December 29, 1959, but that we have no intention of announcing a test during the recess or immediately afterwards. (TAB A and TAB B)

The President replied to the Prime Minister on August 26, pointing out the impossibility of obtaining congressional approval now for the fallback position and expressing the intention to consult further on the safeguards problem. (TAB C)

Moratorium on Testing Below the Threshold

At the meeting of August 12, the Soviets repeated that the duration issue is the most important before the conference and put forward once more a proposal of four to five years. Responding generally, the U.K. delegate called for a moratorium sufficiently long to allow research to show results and to allow discussion of these results.

In the London discussions, it was agreed that it would be desirable to put forward our position on duration of a moratorium after the recess, along the lines that it should be no longer than the time required for the research program (2 years) plus a few months (3–6) to assess results. (TAB A and TAB B)

Package Proposal on Organizational Matters

Although plenary discussion failed to reveal any Soviet movement on staffing issues, Soviet deputy representative Usachev, in a dinner conversation, expressed conviction that “a deal was possible” on the package proposal which had been informally presented by Ambassador Wadsworth on August 9. He interpreted Moscow’s rapid agreement to recess as a sign that quick and serious consideration is to be given the package.

Annex I, Detection and Identification System

Further informal technical discussion has taken place on reconciliation of the Soviet and the Western approach on phasing of installation of the system. The Soviet counter proposal of August 11 had revealed substantial agreement with our concept, but had suggested a rearrangement of the installation schedule in the southern hemisphere and 15 control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union instead of 21. Provision is made for formation of inspection groups only after entry into operation of Phase I control posts.

Soviet deputy representative Usachev told Mr. Popper that discussion could be based on the current U.S. draft of the Annex, rather than on the old Soviet version, and that there is general similarity of views on phasing. He implied that there are relatively few serious obstacles in connection with the Annex.

Quota of On-Site Inspections

At numerous pre-recess plenary meetings, debate has continued on the approach as to inspection of the two sides, the Western delegations stressing the paramount importance of technical considerations in determining a quota and the Soviets defending their politically based offer of three annual inspections, applicable to events above or below the threshold. The Soviets attempted to prove that a technically based quota would result in five times as many inspections on the territory of the United States as in the Soviet Union. They proposed that auxiliary aids be included in the treaty, so as to reduce drastically the number of unidentified events.

In the London discussions, Mr. Ormsby-Gore agreed that we should be “stern” on the inspection quota. He expressed belief that the Soviets would compromise on a figure, but not above ten. He wondered whether it would be feasible to carry out more than ten annual inspections. (TAB B)

AFTAC has prepared an estimate, showing average seismic activity in the U.S. to be one to one and a half times as great as in the Soviet Union and slightly more than that in territory under jurisdiction of Great Britain.

Parties Article

Usachev stated informally that the Soviets are adamant in their insistence on automatic accession of nth parties and on use of the term “states” in place of “states or authorities” in identifying parties in the text of the article.

High Altitude Detection

General, but inconclusive, discussion took place at the London meetings. The interdepartmental working group agreed that a briefing be arranged for the British on or about September 9.

Budget Contribution Shares

The concept of West-Soviet parity of budget contributions is contained in our organizational package. The U.K. has informally presented to us its views on ratio of contributions between it and the United States and on the share to be borne by nth countries. The British could accept a 12:38 ratio, as compared with the United States, and proposed that ultimately 25% of the total costs of the organization should be borne by countries other than the original three. We had previously expressed our opinion that such countries could not be expected to bear more than 10% of annual operating costs.

- - - - -

As Tab D to this memorandum there is also attached a report of an informal US–UK Delegation Meeting in Geneva, August 22, 1960.

1. Source: Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2760.