584. Letter From Wadsworth to
Herter1
Geneva, July 21,
1960
Dear Chris:
[Facsimile Page 1]
Many thanks for your nice letter of July 16. You are quite right that things
have picked up considerably, but our information from Washington is that
there are still a few important things which are stalled.
I agree with you that if things looked as though we were close to agreement
in early August, the Conference should probably keep driving ahead. However,
given the existing rigid position of the Soviet Union on all matters over
the last several weeks, I am sure that this will not happen.
Cabot and I have had some conversation on the subject of your second
paragraph, and Doug Dillon and I
also skirted around the subject delicately while he was here. Although I
would, of course, like to carry this negotiation to a successful conclusion
for all kinds of reasons, I still think that I would prefer to come back to
New York in the event that Cabot goes on the ticket. This, of itself, is a
question of necessary timing, which I wish we could discuss quietly
together. Perhaps after the Convention we can work out some kind of an
arrangement of
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communication between you and Cabot, on the one hand, and Geneva on the
other.
As to personal and health considerations, there is no doubt but that, if I
have to come back to New York, we will have to have a very definite rest
period
[Facsimile Page 2]
before
plunging into preparations for the General Assembly. This might mean that
mid-August could turn out to be a little late for departure from Geneva.
Thanks again for your warm understanding—I appreciate it more than I can
say.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment
Letter From Herter to
Wadsworth
Washington, July 16,
1960
Dear Jerry:
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It seems for some reason that our personal correspondence by mail becomes
outdated by the rapidity with which events are moving. When you wrote me
on July 1, you were obviously very discouraged as to the turn the
negotiations had taken, but I gather from recent wires that things have
picked up considerably. However, I have the feeling that we are not out
of the woods as yet.
I do hope that the negotiations will be recessed in the middle of August,
unless it looks as though you were very close to completing an
agreement. A new factor has entered the picture insofar as you yourself
are concerned in that Cabot
Lodge may very possibly be nominated for Vice President
on the Republican ticket, in which case we might well feel that you
should take over in New York with the beginning of the September
session. I will, of course, be in very close touch with you on this just
as soon as our information is a little clearer.
In the meanwhile, take care of yourself and feel free to keep on sending
me your own personal views.
Best to you both,
As always,
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Attachment
Letter From Wadsworth to
Herter
Geneva, July 1,
1960
Dear Chris:
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Thanks so much for your nice letter of June 28. In one way, it makes me
feel much better; in another way, quite apprehensive. I am wondering if
people other than yourself who are struggling with this question realize
what the inevitable steps will be if we cannot come up with a reasonable
safeguard provision for these Project Vela explosions. Perhaps they
don’t care, but I would be surprised if this is the case.
One thing is sure: If we fail to come up with reasonable safeguards, and
if we fail to come up with positions on the various other things like
moratorium, composition of the Control Commission, etc., we will not
have the same kind of finale as the Disarmament talks.
On the contrary, it will be the United States which will be in the
position of not being able to defend itself before public opinion. I
agree with the British that the major saving factor in the ten-nation
debacle was the fact that Fred Eaton had a piece of paper ready to put
on the table. If we don’t put all of our pieces of paper on the table,
we will not have that advantage. In addition to this, I am quite sure
that public opinion would side with the Russians in their insistence
that adequate safeguards be placed around research explosions in order
to demonstrate that we are not seeking weapons development material.
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This is a frightful dilemma, and I don’t envy you people who have to make
the decision. If it comes to a “finale” for this Conference, you have
(1) no Conference, (2) no coordinated research program, (3) no
moratorium, (4) no treaty, (5) no control, and (6) the $64,000 question
as to resuming tests. If tests are resumed, even for research, you face
the inevitability of world-wide development of weapons. You have the
Soviet declaration that they would test in all elements, thus leading to
more public outcry which will be blamed on us because we were the first
to test. What would this sequence of events do to us in the United
Nations and the Western Alliance? Against this is the national security
argument.
As I indicated above, I know you are thoroughly aware of all of these
things, but I am just wondering if the other people who might oppose
executive declassification fully realize where this would inevitably
lead.
In the meantime I will be awaiting more cheerful news with as much
patience as I can muster.
Harty joins me in best to you and Mac.
Sincerely yours,
