Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

584. Letter From Wadsworth to Herter¹

Geneva, July 21, 1960

Dear Chris:

Many thanks for your nice letter of July 16. You are quite right that things have picked up considerably, but our information from Washington is that there are still a few important things which are stalled.

I agree with you that if things looked as though we were close to agreement in early August, the Conference should probably keep driving ahead. However, given the existing rigid position of the Soviet Union on all matters over the last several weeks, I am sure that this will not happen.

Cabot and I have had some conversation on the subject of your second paragraph, and Doug Dillon and I also skirted around the subject delicately while he was here. Although I would, of course, like to carry this negotiation to a successful conclusion for all kinds of reasons, I still think that I would prefer to come back to New York in the event that Cabot goes on the ticket. This, of itself, is a question of necessary timing, which I wish we could discuss quietly together. Perhaps after the Convention we can work out some kind of an arrangement of communication between you and Cabot, on the one hand, and Geneva on the other.

As to personal and health considerations, there is no doubt but that, if I have to come back to New York, we will have to have a very definite rest period before plunging into preparations for the General Assembly. This might mean that mid-August could turn out to be a little late for departure from Geneva.

Thanks again for your warm understanding—I appreciate it more than I can say.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Wadsworth

Attachment

Letter From Herter to Wadsworth

Washington, July 16, 1960

Dear Jerry:

It seems for some reason that our personal correspondence by mail becomes outdated by the rapidity with which events are moving. When you wrote me on July 1, you were obviously very discouraged as to the turn the negotiations had taken, but I gather from recent wires that things have picked up considerably. However, I have the feeling that we are not out of the woods as yet.

I do hope that the negotiations will be recessed in the middle of August, unless it looks as though you were very close to completing an agreement. A new factor has entered the picture insofar as you yourself are concerned in that Cabot Lodge may very possibly be nominated for Vice President on the Republican ticket, in which case we might well feel that you should take over in New York with the beginning of the September session. I will, of course, be in very close touch with you on this just as soon as our information is a little clearer.

In the meanwhile, take care of yourself and feel free to keep on sending me your own personal views.

Best to you both,

As always,

Christian A. Herter

Attachment

Letter From Wadsworth to Herter

Geneva, July 1, 1960

Dear Chris:

Thanks so much for your nice letter of June 28. In one way, it makes me feel much better; in another way, quite apprehensive. I am wondering if people other than yourself who are struggling with this question realize what the inevitable steps will be if we cannot come up with a reasonable safeguard provision for these Project Vela explosions. Perhaps they don’t care, but I would be surprised if this is the case.

One thing is sure: If we fail to come up with reasonable safeguards, and if we fail to come up with positions on the various other things like moratorium, composition of the Control Commission, etc., we will not have the same kind of finale as the Disarmament talks.

On the contrary, it will be the United States which will be in the position of not being able to defend itself before public opinion. I agree with the British that the major saving factor in the ten-nation debacle was the fact that Fred Eaton had a piece of paper ready to put on the table. If we don’t put all of our pieces of paper on the table, we will not have that advantage. In addition to this, I am quite sure that public opinion would side with the Russians in their insistence that adequate safeguards be placed around research explosions in order to demonstrate that we are not seeking weapons development material.

This is a frightful dilemma, and I don’t envy you people who have to make the decision. If it comes to a “finale” for this Conference, you have (1) no Conference, (2) no coordinated research program, (3) no moratorium, (4) no treaty, (5) no control, and (6) the $64,000 question as to resuming tests. If tests are resumed, even for research, you face the inevitability of world-wide development of weapons. You have the Soviet declaration that they would test in all elements, thus leading to more public outcry which will be blamed on us because we were the first to test. What would this sequence of events do to us in the United Nations and the Western Alliance? Against this is the national security argument.

As I indicated above, I know you are thoroughly aware of all of these things, but I am just wondering if the other people who might oppose executive declassification fully realize where this would inevitably lead.

In the meantime I will be awaiting more cheerful news with as much patience as I can muster.

Harty joins me in best to you and Mac.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Wadsworth

1. Source: Exchange of three letters on state of negotiations and possibility that Wadsworth will replace Lodge. Personal and Confidential. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Letters-1960.