Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

583. Letter From Herter to McCone¹

Washington, July 20, 1960

Dear John:

At the President’s request, I am sending you herewith a copy of a presentation entitled “Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations” recently made to the President by his Science Advisory Committee.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter

Enclosure

Presentation Prepared by the Science Advisory Board

Washington, July 12, 1960

Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations

Mr. President, we are concerned over the possibility that the nuclear test ban negotiations will end in failure under circumstances which may cause a substantial portion of world opinion to place the blame for the failure on the United States. We would, therefore, like to discuss two technical problems which could endanger our position before world opinion if these negotiations fail. These problems are the use of nuclear explosions for seismic research (Project Vela) and for peaceful purposes (Project Plowshare).

There are many important unsettled issues in the Geneva negotiations. On some of these issues both sides have presented positions which are being actively debated; on other issues one side or the other has not yet taken a position (The United States for example has not presented a position on the length of moratorium or the high altitude coverage of the Treaty). The technical issue concerning the use of nuclear explosions in the seismic research program to improve the control system is not in itself sufficiently critical that it should control the outcome of the negotiations.

We believe that the program for improving means of seismic detection of nuclear explosions which is now being pursued vigorously in this country is most desirable. Nevertheless, one must anticipate that the technical results of this program will not change the nature of the political decision which will have to be faced by the U.S. Government after a two year period. The technical basis for such decisions will, of course, be stronger. There will, however, still be a threshold yield of nuclear explosions, probably smaller than at present, below which it will not be possible to distinguish explosions from earthquakes. The United States will have to make a purely political decision whether to accept the possibility of evasion of a test ban under this threshold, or whether to press for a more extensive control system, or whether to resume testing of small weapons. In addition, methods of concealment will still exist, and even more powerful ones may have been conceived. The United States will still have to weigh these factors against the risks and costs to a potential violator, against the net military significance of continued nuclear weapons progress, and especially against the broad significance of achieving a first step toward more important measures of arms control and toward opening up the USSR.

A seismic research program using only conventional chemical explosives would contribute a great deal to seismic detection methods, but would fall far short of the objectives of the presently planned research program, particularly in the area of concealment by decoupling. Therefore, we recommend that every effort be made to propose at Geneva a safeguarding procedure involving the open inspection of obsolete U.S. devices whose design is already known to the USSR.

We believe that it is imperative that any nuclear explosions in the seismic research program be conducted solely for useful seismic experiments, so that our motives in conducting them cannot be subject to question. We are concerned, therefore, both by the possibility that such an early date will be picked for the first nuclear explosion that its scientific value will be drastically reduced and by present plans for the use of the so called LOLLIPOP site which has extensive and obvious military weapons effects tests built into tunnels in the immediate vicinity of the shot point.

Should attempts to arrive at a mutually agreed upon safeguarding procedure fail, we do not consider that the promise of the seismic research program toward clarifying the political issues is sufficient to warrant unilateral use of nuclear explosions. Under such circumstances, we recommend that the seismic research program be restricted at this time to chemical explosions. We believe that should the U.S. resume unilateral nuclear explosions, it should be only for valid military reasons. It would be unfortunate if weapons testing were resumed as a result of a program which itself was conceived to remove obstacles from the treaty to cease such tests.

The use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (Project Plowshare) presents a less immediate but more difficult problem than their use for seismic research. Although some exploratory work can be done in this field with both chemical explosives and obsolete nuclear devices, ultimate economic utilization of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses depends on the most advanced thermonuclear weapon design. The question of safeguarding procedures for these nuclear explosions will have to be faced both in drafting treaty provisions and in preparing for Plowshare nuclear explosions planned for next year. On the one hand, we cannot subject advanced devices to Soviet inspection in the foreseeable future; and, on the other hand, we cannot insist that the treaty be drawn to permit this project to proceed in an unrestricted fashion without creating an almost unlimited means of evading a ban on nuclear weapon development.

The Plowshare projects have several common features:

(a) they aim to accomplish, at a hoped for large economic advantage, objectives most of which could be achieved by ordinary means.

(b) they are long range, requiring further studies and test explosions before the actual tasks can be begun.

(c) they involve many new safety considerations which affect the engineering and economics of the projects.

We have no doubt concerning the soundness of the basic underlying physical principles. On the other hand, a realistic evaluation of the economic balance between nuclear and ordinary accomplishment of the projects has not been made. Such an analysis cannot be made until the economic significance of the radioactivity controls required in Plowshare undertakings is understood. Even if technically radioactivity proves controllable, a serious public relations problem remains. There does not appear to be any economic or scientific reason why such a program should be pursued in haste. We are concerned, therefore, that the proponents of this project may be overly optimistic over its immediate prospects, and that this project could be oversold by them in much the same manner as were fusion reactors and aircraft nuclear propulsion. A critical review by an unbiased competent group is essential before decision to push this program is taken.

While a soundly prosecuted Plowshare program might be of value to U.S. prestige, we are concerned with the probable adverse public reaction to potential radiation exposures, however small, and also with the inevitably widespread doubt concerning U.S. motives. We note in this connection that Mr. Vishinsky in November 1949, when announcing the first successful Russian nuclear tests to the United Nations, explained the explosions as having been carried out for just such peaceful economic purposes as are envisaged under the Plowshare program.

Under these circumstances, the United States may have difficulty justifying to world opinion, or to our own people, either unilateral initiation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes or insistence on treaty provisions which would appear to permit nuclear weapon development, if these courses of action were to result in the breakdown of the Geneva negotiations and (or) in the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.

We conclude reluctantly that an effectively controlled nuclear weapons test ban will necessarily involve some restrictions to an optimum program of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, unless such a program can be conducted openly.

1. Source: Conveys copy of presentation by the Science Advisory Board entitled “Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations.” Confidential. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing.