Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

552. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 28, 1960, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• United Kingdom

  • Prime Minister Macmillan
  • Sir William Penney
  • Con O’Neill
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Lord Hood
  • Mr. Wiggin

• United States

  • • Dept. of State
    • Secretary Herter
    • Under Secretary Dillon
    • Mr. Kohler
    • Mr. Farley
  • Dept. of Defense
  • • Acting Secretary Douglas
  • • Atomic Energy Commission
    • Chairman McCone

The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation of the tremendous and sincere effort which had gone into preparation of the United States paper which Mr. Herter had given the British Ambassador on March 26. There were manifold political, technical, and even spiritual matters which were involved in trying to find a common position which would respond to the expectations of the world. Having studied the U.S. paper he was aware that the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom were so close together that he could only express his estimate of the situation by addressing to himself the familiar wartime admonition: “is your journey really necessary?”. He did think it was helpful to have a full understanding of the possibilities and the course of action which would be agreed. It might also make it easier for our highly competent negotiators to know that the people who are giving them instructions have gotten together and concerted their views.

The Secretary said that the United States side had examined the points transmitted to Mr. Farley by the British Ambassador and also felt for their part that there were no real differences.

The Prime Minister asked what the United States meant by referring to “coordinated research.” Sir William Penney said that he could perhaps comment on this since he had already held some informal discussions on the previous day with U.S. technical people; there were to be further technical talks later in the day. The concept is that national research programs should be worked out and that the technical people from the three countries should keep in close touch while they are being carried out. It was not contemplated that a U.S.–U.K.–USSR directorate should be set up to develop and conduct a single program. He observed that this concept of exchange of views and information was a familiar one in international cooperation among scientists. He observed that one point which needed further discussion was the question of use of nuclear detonations in the research program. Such detonations would have a great advantage but raised political difficulties.

Mr. McCone said that the United States had looked into the latter question carefully and concluded that nuclear explosions were needed if anything meaningful was to be done. The Prime Minister asked whether this was because the waves from chemical and nuclear explosions are different. Sir William said that nuclear detonations were proposed in order to check that point. The Secretary commented that the United States wanted to be sure that definitive results were obtained in a research program. We do not want to get again in a position where we find that we have entered an agreement and then find that our technical facts are inadequate. Mr. McCone commented that coordinated rather than joint research was important if results were to be obtained in a one to two year period. We could not hold up our own research while we were attempting to get agreement on a joint program.

The Prime Minister speculated that the Soviet Union will argue that the objective is to stop all tests rather than to find additional reasons for conducting nuclear explosions. The Secretary said that we would expect to conduct any nuclear detonations in accordance with procedures agreed on for nuclear detonations for application to peaceful purposes. It was important that our negotiators proceed to get agreement on the pertinent treaty article covering such procedures. Sir William Penney said that he thought from his discussions with Soviet representatives that the Soviets would be willing to agree to such procedures if they believe that weapons improvements will be barred. Mr. McCone said that there were several ways of accomplishing this. Examination of a nuclear device might be possible, at least by the Soviets, who presumably would not benefit as would potential Nth powers from study of the design of some of our weapons. However, it would be difficult to expose the design of some of our advanced reduced radiation devices to the Soviets, even though these are the devices which may be preferred for certain peaceful applications.

The Secretary said that for us the real justification of a moratorium on underground tests is the hope of progress in the research program. We must have simple and clear research objectives. The timing of commencement on the research program was a problem. We had to recognize that negotiations on the treaty might well be protracted for another six to twelve months on such issues as staffing and accession of other countries.

The Prime Minister said that, while there are many issues remaining, we should acknowledge that much of the past delay has been due to stalling on both sides. Given a common approach, we should be able to work through most of the remaining issues fairly quickly, although the inspection quota and perhaps one or two others will probably have to be resolved at the highest level. If the quota can be agreed at the Summit, he would anticipate signature of a treaty this summer. Ratification, of course, would depend on respective constitutional processes.

The Secretary said that he envisaged the possibility that we might need to have simultaneous unilateral declarations of a moratorium on testing before signature of the treaty. We now have no moratorium, as the President made clear last December 29, which puts us in an anomalous situation. If negotiation on the treaty is protracted, we might wish to seek agreement on the research program and agree to the research program and unilateral moratorium simultaneously with a clause providing that the moratorium would end after a specified and brief period if the treaty is not signed.

Mr. McCone commented on the research work under way or planned by the United States. A station of the kind agreed to at Geneva is under construction in Oklahoma for completion in early fall. Also 20 smaller stations, without the full seismic array, are being built throughout the United States. By September or October we should be ready to make 5 kt detonations in granite and tuff, both nuclear and chemical, to test detection and decoupling. Tentative plans are under way for putting up five more stations in the United States and possibly Canada in 1960 and 1961. He commented that each experiment of course raises many new questions in addition to such answers as it gives to previous questions. Finally, about 15 unmanned stations are being built on a grid.

The Prime Minister said that apparently more thought needed to be given to the timing of the moratorium and research program. He had thought that we contemplated declaration of the moratorium and initiation of the research program simultaneously with signature of the treaty, as indicated in the U.S. paper. Mr. O’Neill said that the negotiating tactics might be quite different in the two approaches. He had thought that we wanted to hold out promise of the moratorium as an inducement to get favorable settlement of the remaining treaty issues. He saw that we could protect ourselves, and perhaps retain some bargaining power, by an escape clause in an agreement covering coordinated research and a moratorium, but doubted that this would be equally effective.

The Prime Minister said that there was a more fundamental negotiating problem. If this were a business negotiation we would simply continue negotiating out the remaining issues without saying much about the Soviet proposal and our position. Unfortunately our full position is in the press before we have finally agreed on it among ourselves and instructed our negotiators. He would like, if possible, to make a virtue out of this situation and thought perhaps this might be done by putting forward our position as an offer of a positive nature.

The Secretary said that he tended to favor an approach which focused on the remaining issues and threw back at the Soviets their statement that the remaining items are inconsequential. We should say that if these issues are indeed small, then here are solutions which are acceptable to us on which we can readily reach agreement. Mr. Douglas said that while he agreed with the approach to a coordinated research program outlined earlier by Sir William Penney, he thought there was virtue in some cases to having Soviet scientists actually participating in some of the work so that they can see and evaluate for themselves the results achieved. This was generally agreed. In response to a question by Mr. Herter, Sir William said that the Soviets can undoubtedly contribute significantly to such a research program, though he was certain that they would need to develop plans and find money, seismometers and people just as he would. Mr. McCone said that the program he had outlined would cost the United States 18 to 20 million dollars a year which would have to be found. Mr. Herter said a further technical meeting was scheduled later in the day which could look further into these problems and report back to the principals the following day.

The Prime Minister asked whether there were any other major points which should be identified. Mr. Douglas said that he thought it important any agreed inspection quota apply both above and below the threshold. Mr. O’Neill said that he understood the Soviets were prepared to agree to this. Mr. Farley said that this was the position Tsarapkin had taken, but in the context of a moratorium which was a treaty obligation.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary returned to the question of what our public posture should be. The Prime Minister said that we would have to point out at the outset that, because of our ratification processes, the moratorium would have to be outside the treaty. As for timing, there were two possibilities—a moratorium declared simultaneous with signature of the treaty, or a moratorium declared immediately with a proviso that it would lapse if the treaty is not signed soon. The Secretary said that a related question was whether we put our position as a counter-proposal or as an acceptance of the Soviet proposal. After some further discussion he agreed with the Prime Minister that a third possibility would be to avoid either accepting or rejecting the Soviet proposal, but instead to proceed with a negotiation designed to marry the February 11 Western proposal with the Soviet March 19 position.

The meeting broke up at 11:30 a.m. with agreement that further discussion would have to be devoted to the tactical line and to the question of communique.

1. Source: Coordinating the U.S.–U.K. position in nuclear test talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.