551. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Test Suspension
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Caccia
- Lord Hood
- The Secretary
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. Farley
The Secretary said that the United States had formulated its tentative views on the recent Soviet proposal at Geneva. He gave the U.K. Ambassador a paper summarizing these views, in anticipation of discussions with the Prime Minister the following week. He said that the substance of the paper had been transmitted to Ambassador Whitney to give to Selwyn Lloyd.
After looking through the paper (which was substantially the same as the position paper on “Nuclear Testing” for the Macmillan visit) the U.K. Ambassador said that he did not understand the relationship of the proposal for a moratorium “from one to two years” and the statement that the President could only commit himself until January 20, 1961, which would be less than one year. The Secretary explained the legal problem involved. Mr. Kohler remarked that the Soviets, to judge by a recent piece in Tass, were aware of this problem and were citing it as evidence of their willingness to meet us more than half way in their proposal.
The U.K. Ambassador asked what our conception was of a “coordinated research program”. Mr. Farley said that we use the term “coordinated” rather than “joint” research to indicate that we wanted to go ahead actively with our national research without [Facsimile Page 2] holding it up until agreement was reached. As a matter of fact, what emerged would be for the most part discussion of national research activities in this field, some sharing of tasks, and exchange and comparison of results. This would undoubtedly be most efficient. In addition it would probably be desirable to have some actual joint effort with scientists of the three countries working together on individual projects. The Secretary suggested that advantage should be taken of the presence of Sir William Penney to hold informal discussions with Dr. Kistiakowsky, [Typeset Page 2022] Mr. McCone and others on the United States side. This might be done Monday afternoon, March 28, if the schedule at Camp David did not demand the presence of the proper participants. Mr. Farley agreed to set up tentative arrangements for such a session.
The Secretary said that he thought there was not too much difference between the United States approach and the U.K. approach as reflected in the points which Lord Hood had transmitted to Mr. Farley a day or two earlier. The U.K. Ambassador agreed, but observed that the U.K. might feel that a more positive Anglo-American approach was desirable rather than the exploratory approach reflected in the U.S. paper. The Secretary observed that there were a number of important issues still to be resolved and we should not give away prematurely our readiness to agree to a moratorium and thus weaken our bargaining power on these other issues. The U.K. Ambassador said that if other questions arose when the U.K. group examined the U.S. paper, they might call Mr. Farley in the period before the meeting at the Embassy on Monday morning.
- Source: U.S. position on Soviet proposal for a test moratorium in advance of Macmillan visit. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩