Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

525. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 3, 1960

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Wiggin, First Secretary, British Embassy
• Mr. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
• Mr. Farley, S/AE

The Secretary gave the British Ambassador a copy of his letter delivered earlier in the day in London to Selwyn Lloyd, regarding future proposals in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations. After reading through the letter Sir Harold commented that he understood the United States was eager to put forward the threshold proposal as soon as possible but did not plan to do so until after discussions with David Ormsby-Gore early in the following week. The Secretary confirmed this and said that we thought it most important to have a clear agreed understanding as to how we would handle the proposal and the questions which would be raised by the Soviets.

Sir Harold said that, speaking personally, he thought that perhaps a distinction might be made between the types of testing which could be detected and controlled, and the types which could not at the present time. Wadsworth and Sir Michael Wright might propose that tests in the former category be covered by a cessation agreement to be negotiated promptly by them with Tsarapkin; tests in the undetectable category raised a political problem which was beyond their competence and which would have to be referred to the highest level, presumably at the forthcoming summit meeting. The Secretary said that there appeared to be no problem regarding the tests which could be detected and identified. We were, of course, ready to enter into a safeguarded agreement now ending such tests. We were also determined to pursue the test suspension further as rapidly as the technical uncertainties could be resolved. He referred to the work now under way, to the extent of seven million dollars, to resolve the technical problem of underground test detection. We were prepared to join in a coordinated research program in areas under any threshold. Mr. Merchant observed that Sir Harold’s suggestion might appear to derogate from the authority of our negotiators, whose instructions could be as broad as their governments chose. More importantly, we should not appear to compromise the principle of entering into disarmament agreements only when they could be adequately controlled, as would be done in implying a possible political resolution of what was essentially a control problem.

It was agreed that the Secretary would meet with the British Ambassador and Mr. Ormsby-Gore on Monday, February 8, to discuss the matter further.

1. Source: Attempt to coordinate positions for nuclear test talks. Confidential. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.