Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

524. Telegram 5847 to London¹

Washington, February 2, 1960, 8:33 p.m.

5847. Please deliver following to Selwyn Lloyd from the Secretary. Advise date time delivery.

QUOTE February 2, 1960

Dear Selwyn:

It was good of you to give me your assessment of the situation in the nuclear tests conference and your reaction to the threshold proposal that Jerry Wadsworth has been discussing with Sir Michael Wright.

I am sorry that our views are still at variance on one or two important aspects of the proposal. I am hopeful, nevertheless, that we will be able to develop an agreed basis for proceeding in the near future.

I share fully, of course, your assessment of the significance of a test cessation for restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and of the importance of getting the Soviets to actually accept the international controls to which they are now largely committed before world opinion.

On the matter of high altitude tests, our own position does not at present go beyond the general principle I mentioned in my letter of January 23. In essence it is simply that our obligations in the initial phase should be commensurate with the controls we agree to install. I think if we accepted any commitments beyond this it would serve to undercut the principle upon which the threshold proposal is based and which it is our purpose to maintain. We have in mind, for example, cessation of tests up to a height of not more than 100,000 kilometers if installation of adequate ground based controls is agreed, and up to greater heights if installation of satellite controls is agreed. The problem is partly the practical one of weighing the costs and technological problems of control against technological capabilities for outer space during testing the first phase of the treaty. The obligations we can agree upon for underground testing also have a bearing, since it would be hard to justify the costs of, for example, a solar satellite system to prevent tests at very great distances in space during a phase of the treaty in which underground tests were not prohibited by the treaty. Accordingly, we had thought it would be best from the tactical standpoint to continue our efforts to resolve the current deadlock on the underground environment before going ahead to treaty language on outer space.

I have given further serious thought to the question of the acceptability of the threshold proposal to the Soviets, and the course of action we should pursue if it is rejected. I continue to believe that the other side could not with advantage take so immediate and drastic a step as to break off the negotiations and resume atmospheric testing, particularly in the absence of any specific announcement of our intention to resume testing. I doubt they could profit from this kind of response to a carefully considered Western proposal for circumventing technical disagreements, consolidating the broadest possible existing area of agreement, and working constructively toward extending that area of agreement. On the other hand I do agree that in the light of past positions of the Soviet Union against the holding of any tests this proposal is not likely to find ready acceptance. The issue, however, seems to me to be one of principle, namely that we should not agree to any arms control measure to which adequate controls cannot be extended. It is a principle understandable from the standpoint of world opinion, and one which I consider to be equally essential from the standpoint of this agreement and of broader future agreements in the field of disarmament. I recognize the connection between this negotiation and the ten-power disarmament negotiation. But to compromise such a principle would start the ten-power talks under poor auspices. Thus, while I share of course your doubts as to any immediate acceptability of the proposal, I consider it an essential negotiating move to narrow down and bring to a focus both the principle involved and the area of technical problems for which a resolution must be found before we can proceed to a comprehensive treaty. As you know, our purpose in entering into the technical talks in November was to seek to determine whether a sound technical basis could be found for proceeding to a comprehensive treaty. The Soviets have been far from helpful in their response, both in the technical discussions and in their more recent reiteration of the politically motivated positions taken by their scientists. I think what is needed at this stage is a proposal which poses again as clearly as possible these inescapable issues, and which confronts the Soviets with the consequences of their failure to agree to reasonable criteria or to face in a realistic way the technical problems that must be resolved. In this negotiating context I continue to feel that a moratorium proposal going beyond the limits of effective control might serve to reduce the clarity of the issues involved, to relax somewhat the pressures we need to exert upon Soviet positions and most importantly, of course, to reduce the clarity and force of the principle that agreement must be commensurate with effective controls.

I recognize fully that the position you propose draws a clear and important distinction between temporary undertakings in fields not yet subject to effective controls, and a cessation of indefinite duration in areas on which adequate controls can now be agreed. This, however, is a somewhat different distinction from that involved in the principle of agreement to cease tests only in areas where effective controls can be provided. It is the latter principle that is the basis of U.S. policy. In addition to the soundness of this principle, it is one which cannot be compromised if Senate consent to ratification is to be achieved.

The difference between us here appears, I regret to say, to be an important one. I think it is particularly unfortunate not only that unauthorized leaks to the press during the past few weeks, which have obviously come from American sources, have occurred prior to our reaching agreement between us, but also that they have tended to point up the aspects of the proposal which will be least attractive from a public and negotiating standpoint. I hope, nevertheless, that we will be able to agree on a course of action in the near future. Since your objections do not seem to go to the threshold proposal as such but only to the question of an accompanying moratorium, perhaps we can agree that the U.S. delegation should be authorized to proceed with the proposal on the basis I have outlined. On the moratorium question perhaps we could agree to take the line that the treaty would itself contain no provision regarding tests below the threshold.

I know that this solution is far from satisfactory in its potential for Soviet maneuver to exploit any apparent difference. There have been certain differences in the past, however, in our respective unilateral statements regarding a moratorium, and they have thus far proved manageable by our respective delegations. Since there is in my view a strong need for a new Western move at Geneva at this time, I hope that with the arrival of David Ormsby-Gore we will be able to work out an agreed basis for proceeding.

Incidentally, in connection with our efforts to facilitate progress toward a comprehensive treaty I think you will be glad to learn that our existing program on underground test detection was recently augmented by an additional allocation of some seven million dollars for this fiscal year. This augmented program has already been planned in considerable detail and is getting under way at the present time.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

Christian A. Herter  UNQUOTE

Herter

1. Source: Reply from Herter to Lloyd acknowledging differences, proposing interim steps at nuclear test talks. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, U.K. Officials Correspondence with Secretary Herter.