Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

52. Memorandum of discussion at the 365th NSC meeting of the NSC¹

Washington, May 8, 1958

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 365th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 8, 1958

Present at the 365th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Others present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy; the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (for Item 1); the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (participating in Item 6); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, President’s Science Advisory Committee; Colonel John White, Central Intelligence Agency; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Abbott Washburn for the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Information Projects (Item 1), for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the Naval Aide to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department of State; the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion of the meeting and the main points taken.

[Omitted here are agenda items 1–5.]

6. US–USSR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS

(NSC Action No. 1833)

In introducing the subject, Dr. Killian indicated that it was essentially a comparison of developments in the Soviet ballistic missiles program with our own U.S. ballistic missiles program. This was primarily a technical study, but the conclusions that he was about to produce were based upon sound technical judgments. The study was essentially an analysis of Soviet tests since 1954 of ballistic missiles in the various ranges, in comparison with U.S. experience in developing and testing similar missiles. Among the conclusions thereupon presented by Dr. Killian, there was one to the effect that in the field of the shorter-range ballistic missiles the Soviets had a larger variety of types and ranges than did the United States. With respect to both the intermediate range ballistic missiles and the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union was approximately a year ahead of the United States. There was also a suggestion of greater mobility for the longer-range Soviet ballistic missiles. ICBMs may be transportable by railroad. If so, this would indicate that the Soviets had developed a storable liquid fuel for their ballistic missiles.

Dr. Killian added that this general situation stemmed from the fact that the Soviets had inaugurated their ballistic missiles programs so much sooner than had the United States, rather than from the fact that the U.S. program was itself behind schedule. Dr. Killian then asked Dr. Kistiakowsky to provide the technical back-up and details behind these conclusions.

In his report, Dr. Kistiakowsky used two charts. The first was entitled “Guided Missiles Test Ranges”; the second, “Soviet Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Firings Since 1954”.

Following Dr. Kistiakowsky’s report, Dr. Killian added two conclusions.

The President commented that he had just read in the papers that a high official of the Defense Department had spoken in opposition to the creation of a civilian space agency. The President inquired whether this could be true. General Cutler identified the Defense Department official as Mr. Roy W. Johnson (Director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in the Pentagon).

Secretary Quarles rose to defend Mr. Johnson. He first described his own difficulties during his testimony before the Lyndon Johnson committee, and explained that Mr. Roy Johnson had been led into a trap of words. He was quite sure that Mr. Johnson did not disagree with the fundamental proposition of civilian control of the space program.

Mr. Dulles pointed out that the report of Dr. Killian and Dr. Kistiakowsky again brought up the matter which he had earlier proposed to the President and the Council, of the desirability of relative net estimates respecting U.S. and Soviet programs. Since that time, some weeks ago, he, General Twining, Dr. Killian, and General Cutler had had some conversations on this subject and were still working on a possible procedure to provide such comparative estimates. In a certain sense, the report today constituted the first trial of such a relative estimate. The President expressed his very strong approval of this kind of comparative estimate.

General Twining inquired of Dr. Killian whether he thought that there were any measures by which we could speed up the procedure for testing U.S. ballistic missiles. Dr. Killian replied that we were building a new test area on the West Coast to supplement the test facilities at Cape Canaveral. On the other hand, our immediate problem was not to provide more room for ballistic missiles tests, but to solve the propulsion problem in our ballistic missiles.

The President observed that Dr. Kistiakowsky’s report clearly showed that the Soviets were ahead of us in developing propulsion systems for their missiles. They may not, however, have been so successful in other aspects of their missiles program. Secretary McElroy wondered whether this report did not tend to over-emphasize Soviet capabilities for the reason mentioned by the President. It might be well if we did so over-estimate their capabilities, but we should bear the matter in mind. Dr. Kistiakowsky stated that every effort had been made to avoid over-emphasis.

At the conclusion of the presentation on this subject in the Cabinet Room, the President and certain members of the Council adjourned to the President’s office, where Dr. Killian and Dr. Kistiakowsky discussed for a quarter of an hour the intelligence material on which their report on Soviet ballistic missile developments had been based. A list of the persons attending this meeting is filed in the minutes of the NSC meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, assisted by Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky.

b. Noted the comment by the Director of Central Intelligence that this report was an example of the comparative estimates of U.S. and Soviet capabilities which he had recommended in NSC Action No. 1833; and that he was continuing to consult with Dr. Killian, General Twining and General Cutler to develop the best procedure for making such estimates.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for National Security Affairs.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Agenda item 6: US–USSR Ballistic Missile Developments. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.