480. Memorandum From Killian to Kistiakowsky1
I wish to put into this memorandum the suggestion that I made to you verbally for modifying the position paper for the Geneva Test Cessation Conference which you showed to me on Sunday and which was presented by the Department of State at the meeting of principals on Thursday.
My suggestion is this: that as a first step in a plan to propose a phased and evolutionary test ban, we seek to introduce into the Geneva discussions the whole problem of the Latter Hole. In doing this we would first of all make a complete disclosure of the concept and theory with a complete discussion of the uncertainties that we feel this introduces into the monitoring of underground tests. Next we should propose an agreement to conduct test experiments to gain solid evidence about the effects of the Latter Hole. These should include nuclear tests. Without nuclear tests, I doubt very much whether any experimentation is going to be convincing as to whether the theory is right or wrong or partially right.
A first step such as the one I propose would seem to put us in a more advantageous position. If the Soviets accepted the proposal for such tests, there could be a clear possibility of gaining more solid experimental evidence to proceed with further discussions of a monitoring system, in a manner which would make it clear to the world that we were troubled by the uncertainty which has been introduced by this new concept and that also we were anxious to get the facts and let them fall as they may.
If the Soviets refuse to agree to such a proposal, our position would seem to me to be much stronger before the world in that we have sincerely sought to make an effort to meet the technical uncertainties head on with information fully available to both sides.
If such a program of testing and experimentation to find the facts about the Latter Hole do proceed, we would then be in a much more solid position to determine what our next step should be. If, for example, the experiments support the theory of the Latter Hole and indicated very large decoupling factors, we might have to conclude that a second phase involving detection of underground tests might have to be drastically modified or even dropped. If, however, the tests showed [Typeset Page 1697] that the decoupling factors [Facsimile Page 2] are much smaller than those which theory indicates might be possible, we would have a solid technical base for looking at systems for detection of underground tests.
The step which I propose and describe is included in the State Department proposed position paper, but my plan puts it in a somewhat different setting and changes the timing. We would make such a proposal as I describe first, and then defer our decisions as to whether we propose an atmospheric ban as the first phase of an evolutionary plan.
One question that will have to be met in appraising my proposal is the time required to conduct such nuclear tests and the effect of the time required on our own planning. If it was agreed that we were to make such a proposal and if consequently the proposal were accepted, I think that we would be operating under a sense of urgency to make such a test and get the facts as soon as possible. I would hope that this could be a matter of two years rather than three to five years.
Whatever we now decide to do, I hope very much that we will cling to our policy of seeking to establish the principle of monitoring. We now know that monitoring systems are more complex than originally supposed, but I am not convinced that this additional complexity invalidates the concept of monitoring. I am convinced that the principle of monitoring is so important for any progressive development of arms limitation policies and procedures that we ought to pursue the effort to design and get agreement on monitoring systems with great determination. We have gone deeply into the technical aspects of nuclear test monitoring and inspection, and it may well be that we have a greater opportunity to reach sound agreements about this particular kind of monitoring system than we could expect in the future to reach with any other aspect of arms limitation.
More fundamental even than this is the importance in my view of making headway, however slight, in the development of methods of arms limitation which still provides adequately for the security of the United States. Despite all of the difficulties and frustrations that are inherent in the current negotiations, I still believe that these negotiations are worth continuing and warrant our being persistent and patient in seeking to achieve progress and further results.
- Source: Proposes discussing Latter Hole in nuclear test suspension talks. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.↩