Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

479. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, July 16, 1959

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of the Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • Mr. Dillon
  • Mr. Kohler—EUR
  • Mr. Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Blanchet—S/AE
  • Mr. Fessenden—S/AE
  • Mr. Borg—S/S
• White House
  • Mr. Gray
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeny
• D.O.D.
  • Gen. Loper
  • Gen. Fox
  • Mr. Knight
• CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
• A.E.C.
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. English
  • Col. Sherrill

Mr. Dillon explained that the meeting had been called to follow up the discussion on July 9 and was concerned with two problems: the presentation to the President of a simplified version of the report made by Dr. Bacher at the July 9 meeting; and secondly, recommendations as to what action should be taken in the light of the technical situation. He then asked Dr. Kistiakowsky what the status of the preparations for the submission to the President was and whether the report contemplated departed appreciably from Dr. Bacher’s comments last week.

Dr. Kistiakowsky replied the paper would be ready for presentation early next week. He said that it would not depart appreciably from Dr. Bacher’s remarks except in the avoidance of detail and the addition of visual aids. There had been no further meetings of the Panel. It was apparent that some of the findings reported by Dr. Bacher were technically supported while others were necessarily guesswork. He particularly noted the “P factor”, i.e., the estimated probability that an inspection party could actually determine the nature of a suspicious event. On this point there was great disagreement among the Panel members and agreement only on the point that there was no basis for reaching a firm estimate. Mr. Dillon interjected that this appeared to lend weight to the view that there was a need for additional experimentation. Dr. Kistiakowsky explained that experimentation would not contribute to a more precise evaluation of this factor since it involved unpredictable considerations like the skill of the investigators, how much information we might have of the area concerned from intelligence, etc. Mr. Dulles remarked that the conversation on July 9 had been largely confined to technical considerations and had not considered the psychological factors. It had not gone into how the Soviets would assess the risk of attempting evasion.

Mr. Dillon referred to the draft course of action (attached) circulated at the outset of the meeting. He commented that we should not alter our public position regarding our ultimate objective of a safeguarded test suspension, during a period in which we would ascertain whether we could, in fact, devise adequate safeguards for a discontinuance of tests. Mr. McCone said it was his impression on reading the paper that we were drifting away from the position of requiring adequate safeguards. Mr. Dillon replied that this was not our intention. Mr. Dillon then reviewed each of the recommendations of the paper in turn, calling particular attention to paragraph d concerning a U.S. declaration of willingness to withhold nuclear tests underground while an experimental program to clear up present uncertainties was being conducted.

Mr. McCone and General Loper noted that the estimate in the paper in paragraph c–5 that such a program could be conducted in two to three years was out of line with Dr. Northrup’s estimate of three to five years. Mr. Dillon said that this number would of course be changed to whatever the actual estimate was. General Loper then took exception to the statement of the problem at the outset of the paper which placed too great weight on the problem of the concealment of underground nuclear explosions. If this problem were solved there would still be the matter of detection of underground testing in the lower yield ranges where the deterrence factor was very small. He also questioned the recommendation in paragraph d that we should agree not to test underground, suggesting that the language should be changed to “refrain from testing in the atmosphere” so that there would be no contamination from radioactive fallout. He maintained that this had been the President’s idea all along. Mr. Dillon suggested that this paragraph be bracketed for the President’s decision and said that the statement of the problem would be generalized to take care of General Loper’s objection.

Dr. Kistiakowsky then gave a further account of the technical presentation that would be made to the President. He explained that there had been two key assumptions in Dr. Bacher’s presentation of July 9: that decoupling by a factor of 10 would be feasible and that probability of success in on-site inspections was very low. If these assumptions were set aside, the picture was very much as it was at the end of the experts’ discussions in 1958, provided that the improved instruments recommended by the Berkner Panel were incorporated into the system. The weight of these two assumptions would be brought out in a series of charts in which, by means of bar graphs, probability of detection would be plotted against detonations of different yield under varying assumptions as to the number of on-site inspections which could be carried out. One chart also showed the situation which would occur if decoupling should be feasible to the extent of reducing amplitude by a factor of 200.

At the request of Mr. Dillon General Loper then reported on a joint AEC–DOD study on what action should be taken to follow up the main recommendations of the Berkner Panel. He said that the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) had recommended that there should be applied research on the evolution of early improvements on the detection of underground tests and secondly that there should in addition be fundamental research in seismology. New projects in both fields had been recommended, and the recommendations had been submitted to Dr. York for review. A panel had been selected to examine the projects recommended and subsequently to advise AFTAC on the carrying out of these projects. AFTAC has already begun to accumulate Soviet periodicals on seismology and to establish contacts with U.S. laboratories working on allied fields. He said that the funding had not been settled but that the expenses had been estimated at $22.8 million for the first year and $30 million for the second year. General Loper noted parenthetically that AEC could look for assistance from the Department of Defense in the amount of $375,000 for work on the salt dome and granite experiments. McCone at this point inquired whether the Panel believed that it could make a real contribution to solving the problem—whether it could come up with recommendations which would make a real difference in the system. He suggested that the Panel’s recommendations would require very close examination, citing again Dr. Northrup’s opinion that three to five years would be necessary and that even under these circumstances there might not be successful results. General Loper said that this was why AFTAC had emphasized the need for fundamental advances in seismology. He explained that AFTAC had under consideration the establishment of a model station to test the deep-hole equipment, long-period equipment and other improved equipment.

In response to Mr. Dillon’s request, Mr. McCone then reported on a study of the AEC and DOD on the requirement for additional weapons tests, including the feasibility and cost of conducting them underground. McCone said that it had been prepared by a committee composed of a representative of the Division of Military Applications in the U.S. Air Force; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy; the Manager of the AEC installation at Albuquerque; the Directors of the Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories; and the Vice President of the Sandia Corporation. He said that the report set out various areas in which improvements, some of them of a dramatic nature, could be made in both low and high yields, in the refinement of the Polaris warhead and in the development of the Minute Man warhead. It projected a series of desirable underground tests extending into Fiscal Year 1960 and costing $50 million. It also projected other tests in the upper atmosphere which would cost $500 million to $775 million. Mr. Dillon asked what, in general, were the assumptions as to what could be done underground. Colonel Sherrill said they had arbitrarily limited the underground testing in the first instance to 50 KT. It might be possible to go higher than this but this would be impossible to determine without the benefit of further underground testing. They had programmed two tests which could go up to 130 KT if preliminary testing in lower yields should prove it feasible to go this high. Mr. McCone then read the conclusions of the report that further testing was necessary to develop “new concepts”; to explore the possibility of warheads for mobile ICBMs and effects tests for the study of high altitude defense; to develop high assurance and predictability in various weapons and to contribute to the further development of the anti-ICBMs warhead and anti-submarine weapons, as well as weapons with improved characteristics for use over land surfaces. Mr. McCone said that there was a supplementary statement by Dr. Teller as well as an amplification by the Department of Defense. This report pointed up the seriousness of the question before the present group.

Mr. Dillon asked whether all the principals would be available next week for the meeting with the President. Mr. McCone said that he would be away on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, but that someone else could represent him if there were reasons for going ahead with the meeting. Mr. Dillon indicated the meeting would be postponed until Mr. McCone’s return.

General Loper then raised the question of proposed instructions to the U.S. Delegation in Geneva concerning staffing. He said that he recognized that the position which the delegation was instructed to take was fundamentally sound, but he questioned on tactical grounds the wisdom of taking this position at this stage of the negotiations. Mr. Dillon and Mr. Farley outlined the reasons for going ahead on the discussion of staffing. Mr. McCone expressed the view that from his observation of the situation in Geneva it would be bad to try to stop further discussion on the staffing problem. He suggested that we might, however, in putting forth our position on staffing make dear that this was a peripheral issue in the negotiations and that the central issue lay elsewhere. It was agreed that Mr. Knight would discuss the matter with Mr. McElroy and call back in the evening.

Mr. McCone then stated that he did not think that the Tab A of the paper under discussion should go forward to the President, since the points included were matters of dispute. Mr. Dillon said that they had been attached as a tab for the information of the meeting participants rather than the President.

Attachment

Draft Course of Action

Problem. To outline a specific course of action in the event of a Presidential decision that the newly-developed theoretical techniques for concealment of underground nuclear explosions invalidate the Geneva Experts’ system to such a degree that agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban would, on balance, involve an unacceptable security risk for the U.S., at least prior to conduct and assessment of further research and experimentation.

Possible Course of Action. The following course of action, which is proposed for discussion with the U.K. after Presidential approval, would do most to minimize adverse reaction and accord with the considerations and basic objectives outlined in Tab A.

a) The Secretary to inform Lloyd of our present views, and offer an immediate visit by a U.S. technical team headed by Dr. Bacher to the U.K. to satisfy U.K. questions. (We should be prepared for a U.K. conclusion that the political advantages to be gained from agreement far outweigh the technical uncertainties involved. In addition the U.K. is likely to resist a change in position while the Foreign Ministers Conference is under way and so long as a Summit Conference is a possibility.)

b) Secretary Herter and Lloyd to advise Gromyko in Geneva that we are seriously concerned about Soviet unwillingness to join in reconsidering the effectiveness of the Geneva system for dealing with underground tests in the low yield ranges and that, in spite of the progress which the negotiators have made, we will be unable to agree to a comprehensive ban until there is a solution of this problem. Gromyko should be made to understand that our public and Congressional opinion will not accept an agreement which is not technically sound, and that we cannot longer defer facing up to this problem. Secretary Herter to offer that Dr. Bacher visit Geneva or Moscow to review the technical considerations with Dr. Feodorov or other Soviet scientists.

c) If, as is to be expected, the Soviet Union refuses to agree to the proposed technical reassessment despite this demarche, Wadsworth should be instructed to state in the meeting that the United States, short of finding ways of overcoming the technical uncertainties, no longer believes it possible to agree to a full test ban.

1) This would be preceded by a presentation in the meeting, by Dr. Bacher, of our full analysis of the technical situation.

2) This action would be coordinated with a message from Eisenhower to Khrushchev designed to authenticate this position.

3) If the USSR under this pressure, agrees to the proposed reassessment, the conclusions of the Bacher Panel and the Latter theory will stand up under Soviet technical criticism, and thus will provide even stronger justification for our action. If the USSR continues to refuse, it will bear the onus of ignoring the difficulties we have described in specific terms.

4) In either event we should introduce a draft treaty for a phased approach similar to that developed subsequent to the April 13 proposal, preserving as many as possible of the now agreed elements of the control system but extending to high altitude tests on the basis of the recent agreement in this area.

5) Concurrently, we should propose a concrete program of research and experimentation, to be conducted cooperatively over a definite period (2–3 years), designed to answer the present uncertainties about underground detection capabilities. The treaty would include provision for extending the ban to underground tests, perhaps in stages, as soon as effective control is proven possible by further study and experimentation. The initial stage might be to prohibit underground tests creating a seismic signal larger than 10–20 KT if this is deemed feasible.

d) In order to emphasize that the objective of the U.S. is to develop a sound system and not to find a pretext to resume testing, the U.S. should declare readiness for its part to withhold nuclear weapons tests underground while the experimental program is being conducted, provided the USSR agreed to this approach, to cooperate in the research program, and undertook a similar declaration on its own part. (We anticipate that without this provision it will probably not be possible to obtain U.K. concurrence to the outlined course of action.)

e) If the USSR does not accept this proposal, the President should issue a statement recalling the U.S. delegation temporarily, announcing the intention to undertake the experimental program unilaterally (or jointly with the U.K.) and proposing resumption of negotiations as soon as the program produces results sufficient to warrant this action. In this event we should refrain from conducting any tests in the atmosphere and limit ourselves to a modest and restricted program of underground weapons tests conducted with an absolute minimum of publicity. (We must anticipate Soviet and U.K. declarations of intent not to conduct any testing.)

Considerations. Any plan of action for a change in U.S. position with respect to the Geneva negotiations must be developed with the following considerations in mind:

a) The need to minimize the impression that the U.S. is seeking to evade agreement with the USSR now that it has become more of a practical possibility, or that the U.S. is seeking a pretext for resumption of nuclear weapons testing.

b) The necessity for full, candid and effective exposition of the reasons for our position.

c) The importance of holding on to such advances in Soviet willingness to accept international control and inspection as have been made during the course of these negotiations.

d) The importance of not prejudicing the possibilities of success in, or even the meaningful conduct of further disarmament negotiations.

e) The importance of avoiding a major policy split with the U.K., in which there is extreme internal pressure to obtain a successful result in the current negotiations.

f) The danger of unilateral Soviet foreswearing of all nuclear weapons tests as a likely response to a U.S. shift in position, and the consequent propaganda gain for the USSR.

g) The implications which a change in the prospects for an agreement on testing could have on other current or prospective negotiations with the USSR.

Basic Objectives. The U.S. initially decided to seek an agreement on suspension of nuclear tests for a number of reasons, which remain cogent:

a) A desire to combat the image of the U.S. as a military-minded nation, indifferent to world fears about nuclear war and world hopes that some means might be found to cope with the threat of modem arms.

b) To attack the 4th country problem, limiting the development of independent nuclear weapons production capabilities.

c) To break the 12-year disarmament impasse by taking an immediately practical first step that might make subsequent steps come easier.

d) To penetrate the Iron Curtain and force Soviet acceptance of the idea of international control.

e) To demonstrate to the world as well as to the Soviet Union U.S. willingness to seek sound agreements with the USSR and to probe the sincerity of Soviet professions of a desire for relaxation of tensions.

f) To freeze the status of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, insofar as possible, while it is still behind ours.

g) To counter a successful Soviet propaganda drive which enabled it to pose as champion of peace on this issue, and to forestall an unequivocal UN call for test cessation with or without controls.

h) In achieving these objectives, at the same time to dispose of the “fallout” issue which was stigmatizing the nuclear weapons on which we relied.

It is necessary to insure that any course of action adopted does not mean a reversal of the U.S. position or adoption of an obviously unnegotiable one which would mean a setback to the chance of achieving these objectives. If through a change in our position we convince others we are no longer interested in an agreement on nuclear tests there could be a serious impact on the confidence of our allies and of uncommitted countries in the U.S. as a responsible power which seeks an alternative to an arms race.

In view of these considerations and the history of the negotiations so far, the U.S. must be prepared to deal frankly and fully with the technical factors which we believe justify a change in our objectives. It would be unwise to base such a change on Soviet recalcitrance in the negotiations, since the gap between the Soviet and Western positions at present, though substantial, may well be bridgeable by further persistent effort. The Soviets have made substantial changes in position during the negotiations and have moved closer to our concept of international control than ever before in the long history of disarmament negotiations. There is no longer a clear, dramatic difference between the Soviet and Western positions on key issues. Initially the Soviets maintained that controls were unnecessary and, finally, during the 1958 Experts’ Conference accepted in toto the U.S. position on the full range of control methods which we deemed technically necessary. This Soviet acceptance of our proposals was duplicated during the recently concluded high altitude technical discussions. Accordingly, we believe that in order to be plausible we must clearly base any change in position on technical difficulties not foreseen last summer, which we must try jointly to overcome before we can be confident that a comprehensive test ban is in fact enforceable. We must be prepared, in particular, to explain the Latter concealment theory and its implications. This is the major new development justifying reassessment, since it was recognized as far back as the Experts’ Conference that underground events in the low yield ranges would be difficult to identify and that below some point (which now appears to be about .7 KT) some would go undetected. This level of risk has been considered acceptable, given the limited motivation for cheating in these ranges.

1. Source: Technical aspects of nuclear test suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy.