447. Letter From Quarles to Herter1
Reference is made to the 26 February meeting of principals of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Disarmament, at which it was agreed that a Working Group from our staffs would proceed to develop a fall-back position for guidance of the U.S. Delegation and for use in the event of failure to reach agreement at the current Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests.
It is the view of the Department of Defense that an important first step in developing a fall-back position in the present situation should be the clarification of our basic policy on nuclear weapons test suspension. Then, within the concepts of that policy, the various possible fall-back positions would be explored.
As discussed at the last meeting of the principals, it was understood by the Department of Defense that the following concepts were accepted as a basis for future U.S. policy on nuclear weapon tests in these circumstances:
1. As a result of the Soviet Government conducting a series of nuclear weapons tests 1–3 November 1958 the United States was released from the voluntary suspension announced by the President on 22 August 1958. Nevertheless, the United States should continue to abide by its voluntary suspension until 31 October 1959, with the possible exception of some underground tests to gain data for improving the proposed detection and identification system. (If the USSR should resume testing during this period, our policy should be reviewed in light of the circumstances at that time.)
2. After 31 October 1959, the U.S. should reserve the right to test as we deem necessary, until such time as there is an agreement to discontinue specific types of tests under effective control.
3. The U.S. should take no further unilateral action to deny to ourselves the right to test.
4. The U.S. should enter into no further arrangements whereby we would agree to suspend any types of tests, even though the USSR would do likewise, in the absence of agreement on an effective control system.
[Typeset Page 1617]5. The U.S. should continue to support agreement to discontinue any types of tests which can and will be controlled effectively by an agreed control system.
6. Any fall-back position:
- a.
- should be consistent with the foregoing concepts, and
- b.
- should not be characterized as a change in present policy, but rather as an effort within the context of our present policy to seek agreement for discontinuance of any tests which can be effectively controlled.
It is now understood that agreement on the above concepts, as presented in the Working Group by Department of Defense representatives, is not reflected in the Working Group’s evaluation of possible fall-back positions. If the Department of Defense is correct in understanding that these concepts were accepted by the principals at the 26 February meeting, it is considered that the Working Group should be so informed. If that assumption by the Department of Defense is incorrect, then it is recommended that the principals meet at an early date to determine policy concepts for guidance of the Working Group in their consideration of possible fall-back positions.
It is also recommended that our fall-back position be resolved before the end of the present recess on 13 April, in view of possible termination of the Geneva Conference soon thereafter.
Sincerely yours,
SIGNED
Acting
Copies to:
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Director, Central intelligence Agency
Special Assistant to The President for Science and Technology
Special Assistant to The President for National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy
- Source: U.S. position at resumed nuclear test suspension talks. Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.↩