Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

446. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, March 26, 1959

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• • Dept. of State
  • Mr. Herter
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • Mr. Farley—S/AE
  • Mr. Spiers—S/AE
  • Mr. Baker—S/AE
• • White House
  • Dr. Killian
  • Mr. Gray
  • Mr. Keeny
• • AEC
  • Mr. McCone
  • Mr. Foster
• • CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
• • Dept. of Defense
  • Mr. Quarles

Mr. Herter said that the purpose of the meeting was to consider our approach at the April 13 resumption of the Geneva negotiations, in the light particularly of the Macmillan-Eisenhower talks and of the recent technical studies completed by Mr. Killian at State Department request. Mr. Herter said that there had been considerable discussion during the Macmillan visit of the nuclear test negotiations and that this seemed to be, next to the Summit meeting, the problem of greatest interest to the U.K. Macmillan attaches the greatest importance to reaching some agreement on nuclear tests with the Soviet Union, although he appears to be firm with respect to our position on the veto. Mr. Herter said that both Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd had attempted to get our agreement to the idea Macmillan had put to Khrushchev for a ceiling on inspections as a way around the veto problem. Selwyn Lloyd had suggested to Herter the number of 100 inspections per year. However, the U.S. representatives had resisted this suggestion, since adoption of this approach would throw us directly into discussion of the technical issues which would have to be solved before any sound number could be agreed. The second Macmillan suggestion had been that if it proved impossible to get the Soviets to change their position on the veto, the conference would recess after adoption of an agreed report to Governments outlining the areas of agreement and disagreement, with the thought that this subject would be discussed at a Summit conference. Since the U.S. would not accept the idea of an automatic Summit conference, this suggestion has little appeal for us. Accordingly, the only agreement reached was that there would be further scientific and diplomatic discussions prior to the April 13 resumption. Sir William Penny and Sir Edward Bullard would arrive in Washington on April 2 for the scientific discussions on the Berkner and Panofsky reports. We have a stiff deadline which will require early decisions within the U.S. Government on the approach to be taken on April 13. It was agreed that Dr. Killian would bear the responsibility for conducting the scientific discussions with the British representatives and that the Departments of State and Defense and the AEC would have representatives at these discussions.

Mr. Herter then described the views of the Secretary and the President on the future course of the negotiations. The President feels that any detection system that could be devised would be imperfect and that even if there were no agreed threshold, we should be prepared to reach agreement with the Soviets if they give in on the veto. The President feels that we need to be sure only that there is a reasonable level of deterrence. Mr. Herter then read from a memorandum prepared by Mr. Dulles on a subsequent meeting with the President and the Prime Minister, in which Mr. Dulles said that effective mobile inspection would be a sine quo non of agreement. This would be of great political importance. Whereas our scientists can advise us on the size, composition and nature of controls, they are not in a position to make the required judgment as to the over-all value to us of the establishment of mobile control personnel behind the Iron Curtain. Both the President and the Secretary consider this element of the Geneva negotiations of extreme importance for future progress in disarmament. Dr. Killian and Mr. McCone agreed with this and Dr. Killian observed that the problem is how the objective could be accomplished, and what imperfections would be acceptable.

Mr. Herter said that there were two contingencies which must be considered. The first was to consider our position in the event that the Russians stick on the veto. In this case we must decide what our fallback position would be and when it might be presented. The second contingency would arise in the event that the Soviet Union gave in on the veto. In this case we would have to face the question of how much imperfection we could accept and whether it would be necessary to press for a threshold. Dr. Killian said that the British suggestion on the ceiling on inspections would represent a possible approach if it were coupled with a threshold. He said also that we would have to have experimentation in order to test the practical possibilities of concealment by decoupling which were now only theoretical. Mr. Quarles said that we should not drop the possibility of a threshold, although he recognized the validity of the tactics of not taking the initiative in proposing it.

Mr. McCone said that he was disturbed by the idea of “deterrence” and thought that this was a new concept which had not been previously discussed. Ambassador Wadsworth said that this had been an integral part of our approach from the beginning. Mr. Farley said that it had become apparent in his appearances before the Joint Committee and the Humphrey Subcommittee that the inability to achieve 100 percent perfection was recognized. He described the approach presently set forth in the U.S. Annex to the Treaty which involved inspection of only 20% of the unidentified events below five kilotons. The question was not whether the principle of deterrence was acceptable, but what constituted adequate deterrence. Mr. Herter said that a decision on the degree of deterrence which we could accept would need to be made only in the event of a change in the Soviet position on the veto. Ambassador Wadsworth said that such a change was a distinct possibility in view of the adoption by the conference of a duration article which made withdrawal easy.

Referring to the two contingencies he had described, Mr. Herter said that in the event of Soviet sticking on the veto he would prefer to have President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan propose by letter an agreement limited initially to atmospheric tests. He did not personally believe this should be proposed during the course of the present negotiations, but that it should be done immediately after a recess in the negotiations. Ambassador Wadsworth said it might be possible after the return of the Delegation to Geneva, when it become apparent that the Soviet position had not changed, to recess the negotiations for this purpose. In any event he did not believe that we should seek an abrupt break in the negotiations, since it would be easy for the Soviets to make it appear that we were responsible for such a break.

Mr. Herter then raised the question of whether we should move to a unilateral cessation of atmospheric tests if the Soviets turned this proposal down. Dr. Killian said that this would mean giving up the chance to make a beginning step in arms control. He felt this point was of overwhelming importance since new technological developments in the weapons field will increase the uncertainties and instabilities of the present world situation, and with it the hazards of war. The only way out of this dangerous situation was through some monitored armaments accommodation with the Soviets, and we should not give up this important objective lightly. Mr. Quarles said that he agreed with this view. Dr. Killian went on to say that the changing situation with regard to the technical aspects of detection and the possibilities of evading detection created a situation which perhaps led to the desirability of seeking an agreement on atmospheric tests first. This initial step could be done, he felt, without giving up the ultimate objective of an agreement with the Soviet Union to end all tests. This loss might be the consequence of moving to a unilateral proposal. Mr. Herter agreed that we could propose to continue negotiations towards the ending of all tests, along with an offer to stop atmospheric tests as the first part of a package. Dr. Killian felt that we should not let insistence on mobile inspection hold up whatever progress was possible on limited measures where it was not required. We should do whatever we could on the basis of what was now feasible and should seek an evolutionary development of an inspection system which would extend to cover all tests. Mr. McCone said that the AEC would support such an approach. Ambassador Wadsworth suggested that the objective should be to seek cessation of all tests as agreement was reached on the appropriate inspection provisions. As part of this approach we could suggest collaboration on a program of underground tests to test improvements in the detection system.

Dr. Killian said that we should arrange for an urgent analysis of whether underground tests would really be useful to the U.S. or to anybody. There was a serious difference of opinion in the scientific community on this point. Another technical problem in connection with ending atmospheric tests was to obtain a definition of where the atmosphere ended, since fallout could result from tests at very high altitudes. Mr. McCone said that the AEC was looking into this latter question urgently at State Department request.

After a discussion of whether mobile inspection, even on a very limited basis, would be needed as a part of an atmospheric test agreement, Dr. Killian said that the uncertainties without mobile inspection would be minor, and that we should not let the genuine USSR fear of inspection as an instrument of espionage prevent us from getting agreement on atmospheric testing. Mr. Herter said that we would be right back where we started if we insisted on mobile inspection in this connection.

The meeting concluded with a discussion about whether the information in the Berkner and Panofsky panel reports should be made public or available to the Congress. It was agreed that the information would be kept classified and that it would be preferable to make available the Panofsky report, which contained Restricted Data, only to the Joint Committee. Consideration should be given to making available the Berkner report and the non-Restricted Data parts of the Panofsky report to the Humphrey Subcommittee on a private basis.

1. Source: Negotiating tactics for nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret; Limit Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.