I enclose for your personal information a copy of a letter from the Prime
Minister which I have delivered to the President.
Enclosure
Message From Macmillan to
Eisenhower
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TEXT OF MESSAGE
Dear Friend,
I promised to send you an answer as soon as possible to your message
of March 9 about the Nuclear Tests Conference.
I have thought over your suggestion carefully. While I would prefer
the Conference to carry on with its work, I am prepared to agree
that it might recess for a while. I entirely support your view that
it must not be a sharp or complete break, and in arranging for any
recess, I feel we must take great care to ensure that it is not
misinterpreted by the public (and is incapable of being
misrepresented by the Russians) as revealing a desire on the part of
our two Governments to break off negotiations. I think we both feel
that if we can get agreement with the Russians at Geneva on
acceptable conditions it would be of real advantage to us all.
I think that in order to prevent our purposes from being
misunderstood the recess should occur at a time when it would seem
natural. Easter would provide such an occasion, and this suggests a
break from March 26.
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However, I would like to suggest instead that
we should aim at a recess from March 20. This would not strain too
much the use of Easter as the occasion, but would have the advantage
that I should not yet be back from my visit to you. Thus the
Russians would have no
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reason to expect before the recess a formal
proposal on the lines of the idea which as I told you in my message
of February 24 I had discussed very tentatively and non-committally
with Khrushchev, for they
must know that I shall want to discuss it with you. A recess
beginning only just before Easter and after I am back from
Washington would be more awkward.
I suggest therefore that we plan for a recess of three weeks starting
from March 20. I think it is most important that at the time of
recess we should announce the date of re-assembly, although we might
have it in mind to considerably reduce the tempo of the negotiations
when they start again. The case would then be an exact parallel to
the Christmas recess, when as you remember no anxiety was expressed
in any quarter that we might be working for a break.
No doubt you are aware of articles now appearing in the press and
suggesting that the Western powers do not want an agreement at
Geneva. If we were to recess without a date for re-assembly this
speculation would inevitably
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increase, and we should find
ourselves in a bad public position. We do not want people to draw a
parallel with the Surprise Attack Conference, which recessed before
Christmas without setting a time for its re-assembly; I think the
public concludes that the Conference has not died.
Your delegation in Geneva has no doubt reported to you that the
Russians there have been making tentative enquiries about the
possibilities of a recess. So far our delegation has not had similar
enquiries. But I conclude that it might be possible for a recess to
be arranged by the three delegations at Geneva. I think this would
be a better way to arrange it than by our writing to Khrushchev, because I fear that if
we did so he would seize the opportunity to publish a propaganda
reply misrepresenting our proposal.
I agree with you that we could profit by a recess to make plain to
the world at large the principle which is essential to a sound and
acceptable agreement: “an effective international control system not
subject to veto or obstruction”, as you rightly put it. But I doubt
whether it would be wise to have the status of the negotiations
discussed in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As our
Embassy has told your officials, we are not sure that neutral
nations will be so easily convinced
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of the rightness of the whole
of our present position as it stands on the record of the
Conference. At any rate, even if we were to secure a favourable
verdict in the Disarmament Commission I do not see how, that would
help us at Geneva. I think it would on the contrary be likely to
make the Russians more difficult and obstinate.
Finally, I must mention a point in your letter with which I do not
altogether agree. I do not think that the tentative suggestions
which I made to Khrushchev
have led the Russians at Geneva to show any
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sign that they think we are
weakening on the idea of the veto or on the question of controls. I
made it clear that we could not accept a veto on the despatch of
inspection teams, and that my ideas were designed to do away with
the veto on inspection. We attach the utmost importance to control
in disarmament matters, and I think that the suggestions I made on
inspections do not in any way compromise the principles for further
disarmament agreements.
I agree that our suspension of testing should be maintained during
the recess. But perhaps the point need not be made to the Russians
unless they ask.
I look forward to having your comments soon. If we are to secure a
recess from March 20 we shall need to send instructions to our
delegations in Geneva promptly.
With warm regards,
As ever,
Attachment
Message From Eisenhower to Macmillan
March 11, 1959
Dear Harold:
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Thank you very much for your informative note after your Paris
meeting. The only disagreement that I would have with your
description as Eighteenth Century is that I place the period in the
“Early Nineteenth.”
From what you said I feel there must be some hope of getting a little
better expression of intention with respect to De Gaulle’s
participation in NATO and the use
of his Fleet.
I am eagerly looking forward to your arrival, and I only wish that I
could take you to a sunny climate rather than to ask you to endure
some more of the winter weather that you have encountered during
your many travels.
With warm regard,
As ever,
