Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

438. Memorandum From Beckler to Killian¹

Washington, March 11, 1959

SUBJECT

• Thoughts on Geneva Follow-Up

1. The conclusions of the Panel on Seismic Improvement with respect to the possibility of concealing underground nuclear tests have fundamentally altered the U.S. position in the Geneva conference. For it now appears that even if the Soviets were to accept our conditions for the monitoring of nuclear testing, there is insufficient technical basis for assuming that a reasonable detection network can be devised to assure high confidence in the detection of clandestine tests. One possible exception to this is the fact that automatic detectors in sufficient density in seismic areas might give high probability of detecting intentionally concealed nuclear tests. Although this possibility needs further investigation and study, it is not clear that we would be prepared to seriously advance this system without actual tests of its reliability and non-jammability. Further, such a system may be unacceptable to the Soviets because of the number of inspections required of the detector sites to assure continuous operation of the stations.

Because the conclusion on concealment fundamentally alters the U.S. position at Geneva, it might be well to reinforce the technical conclusion with further examination by other experts. There were only a few members of the Panel who could professionally participate in the conclusion. It would also be well to involve British experts, such as Penney, not only because of his technical competence but because the conclusion on concealment would undermine the British position in Geneva. It may not be possible to improve the technical basis of the conclusion because the imperfectness of the medium involved, i.e. the earth, will undoubtedly require testing under actual environments to check out the theory.

2. This new development seriously weakens the psychological advantage of the U.S. that might otherwise accrue if we were to break on the basis of the veto issue. It can no longer be maintained that the U.S. would be willing to continue the discussions if the Soviets were to capitulate on the veto issue. Hence, the Soviets would have a good chance of convincing world opinion that U.S. distrust of Soviet motives coupled with an insecure technical position prompted the U.S. to break.

3. Nonetheless, it would seem inevitable that the U.S. must now withdraw or recess from further discussions leading to acceptance of a specific control system until further technical information is at hand that will permit definition of capability of the system in the face of possible concealment through underground and outer space testing. Whether the withdrawal is in the form of a break or recess depends upon the political advantages of dwelling on the veto issue as opposed to leaving a grain of hope that the U.S. has not abandoned the possibility of agreement of an adequate safeguarded inspection plan.

4. Despite the negativeness of a withdrawal of the Geneva discussions, I believe that it is possible to counteract this impression to some extent by working toward a positive program:

a. Propose an agreement (possibly through the U.N.) that all nuclear powers restrict future testing of nuclear weapons in such a way as to avoid further build-up of radioactive contamination in the atmosphere, i.e. underground or at a sufficient distance from the earth.
Because of the unresolved differences of technical opinion between Los Alamos and Livermore on the ability to get adequate diagnostic information from underground testing, it would appear desirable to have an early technical examination of this problem before proposing agreement on underground testing.

b. Consideration should be given to proposing a cooperative research and development program, including U.S., U.K., and USSR, which is designed to further determine effects of nuclear weapons under different geophysical environments and the development of improved equipments for detection of nuclear detonations in such environments. There may be military security aspects that would limit such cooperation, i.e. the need to reveal design information in order to determine detectability, but it is believed that there will be adequate opportunity for a cooperative program without serious compromise of security information. If such a cooperative program were to be seriously considered, it would have to be developed in some detail before final decision on such a proposal.

5. I feel that withdrawal from Geneva coupled with the two positive approaches indicated above will avert a good deal of the pessimism that would attend the failure of the Geneva conference. It could be pointed out that although more work needs to be done to establish the capabilities of detection systems, the U.S. would not be willing regardless of the outcome of such tests to accept a veto by the USSR over the right of inspection of unidentified events. However, it could be pointed out that the U.S. believes that some of the Soviet concerns over inspection could be mitigated by improvement of the detection system to reduce the number of on-site inspections required to identify events as natural or artificial. Through a cooperative research and development program it may be possible for the U.S., U.K., and USSR to draw closer together in defining a system that the Soviets would have sufficient confidence in as to overcome their insistence on the right of veto.

DB

1. Source: Mitigating effects of withdrawal from nuclear testing suspension talks. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament-Nuclear Policy.