321. Memorandum From Twining to McElroy1
SUBJECT
- Nuclear Testing (U)
1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 13 March 1958, subject as above, and to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Test Cessation, dated 21 March 1958, subject: “The Effects of Total Suspension or Cessation of Nuclear Testing.”
2. In these memoranda the effect of a cessation of nuclear testing on the United States relative to the USSR was analyzed. Based on this analysis these memoranda reflected the belief that, unless considered only as a part of a larger disarmament proposal to include suspension in the production of weapons and weapons material and an effective inspection system the over-all long-range effects of a test cessation will be to the distinct disadvantage of the United States. In view of recent increased pressures for the cessation of tests the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider a reiteration and amplification of their views on this subject necessary.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that an adequate military position for the United States will not be attained until there is available a complete spectrum of weapons compatible with modern delivery systems, which will make it possible to apply selectively adequate force against any threat. Among the programs of weapon development for which future testing will be essential in order to provide this flexibility are: [Facsimile Page 2]
- a.
- Small, low-yield, highly mobile weapons for tactical and ASW uses.
- b.
- Modern, light-weight, and instantly ready weapons of sophisticated design for use against hostile aircraft.
- c.
- Warheads for anti-missile use.
- d.
- Deterrent and retaliatory weapons, including warheads for second generation IRBM, ICBM, and FBM missiles.
- e.
- A family of clean weapons.
4. The HARDTACK test series now underway, including the scheduled firing at Johnston Island prior to 1 September, is vital to the defense of the United States. Certain key shots, particularly those essential to the design and operational employment of the anti-missile missile, are crucial in the weapons development program. As past tests bear out, it cannot be presumed that this test series will be a total success or will [Typeset Page 1343] in fact provide all of the much needed answers for presently foreseen military applications. Even if the HARDTACK tests are a complete success, there will be a continuing requirement for additional testing. Cessation of testing by us at any time in the foreseeable future would freeze our weapons research at a point far short of the objectives cited above. Moreover, if the USSR continued testing on a clandestine basis, both offensive and defensive weapons in our stockpile could quickly become obsolete. Further, it is believed that the matter of parity with, or supremacy over, the USSR may have been accorded undue emphasis in past considerations of test cessation. It is fallacious to assume that a present superiority in either numbers or types of atomic weapons would be maintained or that numerical superiority would in itself provide the free world with the capability to cope with all future situations.
[Facsimile Page 3]5. In light of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to emphasize their great concern over the numerous proposals for cessation of weapons tests, especially when this cessation is divorced from a larger disarmament proposal which would provide also for complete suspension of the production of weapons and weapons materials, keyed to an effective system of inspection and verification.
6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you convey these views to the President.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Source: Views of the JCS on suspension of nuclear testing. Top Secret. 3 pp. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Twining Papers, Chairman’s Files.↩