Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

320. Letter From John Foster Dulles to Eisenhower¹

Washington, April 30, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a summary record of the discussion last Saturday with Al Gruenther, Bob Lovett, Jack McCloy and Bedell Smith. I am sending you separately some recommendations about the question of testing.

Faithfully yours

John Foster Dulles

Enclosure

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 26, 1958

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Disarmament Advisors—April 26, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• General Gruenther
• Mr. Robert Lovett
• Mr. John McCloy
• General Walter B. Smith
• Ambassador Wadsworth
• Mr. Philip J. Farley
• Admiral Lewis L. Strauss
• Mr. Donald A. Quarles
• Mr. James Killian

The Secretary said that it was urgent that we do something to erase the picture which people abroad hold of the United States as a militaristic nation. This is a false picture which is belied by the facts. But it is difficult for the United States to change this picture in view of the way in which our press selects and publicizes sensational incidents and statements. In this respect the Soviet Union, with its ability to control what is known about it, has an advantage over a free society like that of the United States. This picture of continued military emphasis in the United States hurts us and probably causes us to lose more than we gain from small technical military advances. While our position is understood by the governments of our most important allies like Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany, these governments are in various respects in a precarious position.

It is thus imperative that actions be taken which will make evident the United States interest in peace and in controlling armaments. A review has been underway by the interested United States agencies. The result to date has been to indicate that generally the familiar major areas of arms control must be considered in examining the possibilities for new initiatives. It does appear possible to break up the disarmament package. Already we have separated out the Arctic Zone and are planning an initiative on this April 29 in the Security Council. We have also recently emphasized the possibility of commencing technical studies of inspection of various disarmament measures as a practical way of making a start.

The Secretary then proceeded to review the position on the various elements of the present disarmament package.

1. Tests—The President’s Science Advisory Committee has recently reached a conclusion that an inspected test suspension at the end of the HARDTACK series would be in the interest of the United States on military technical grounds. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, however, believe that tests should continue. The United Kingdom not only wishes to complete its planned tests this year, but also does not feel able to give up further testing unless the results of United States weapons tests can be made available to the United Kingdom through amendment of the Atomic Energy Act. Paradoxically, Prime Minister MacMillan says agreement on nuclear test suspension is the only foreseeable result of a summit meeting.

2. Nuclear Cut-Off—A suggestion by Admiral Strauss has been given some consideration. This calls for shutting down fissionable material plants in order to ease the inspection problem and require cannibalisation of weapon stockpiles to meet peacetime requirements. However, this was strongly resisted by the United Kingdom which depends on its fissionable material plants for its nuclear electric-power program. Accordingly, no major change in this area is being considered.

3. Surprise Attack Zones—We have already decided to separate out the Arctic Zone of inspection against surprise attack. There is a difference of opinion, between General Norstad on the one hand and Chancellor Adenauer and the Defense Department on the other hand, regarding the desirability of accepting European zones of inspection independent of a zone involving North America, and also regarding the possibility of a small European inspection zone covering only Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

4. Outer Space—The idea that outer space might be used only for peaceful purposes has been viewed hopefully as a possible major United States initiative. Careful studies by Mr. Killian, however, have raised danger signals. The Soviet Union appears to be significantly ahead of us in ballistic missiles development. If we ceased testing ballistic missiles in the near future, the Soviet Union might have an operational ballistic missile capability, while we would not. As for a broader control of missiles, the inspection requirements for elimination of missiles production and stocks appear to exceed by far any inspection system hitherto contemplated. Accordingly, it appears that this proposal should not be pushed and that the most that can be looked for is some cooperation in peaceful exploration of outer space.

5. Armed Forces and Armaments—Some adjustment in our position on this matter will probably be worked out, but the Secretary did not feel that this was an area where we could look for significant or major steps.

The Secretary continued that the inter-agency working group would report shortly. When decisions had been taken, consultations with our allies would then get underway.

He suggested that Admiral Strauss, Mr. Quarles and Mr. Killian expand on the views which he had summarized.

Admiral Strauss said that he thought the nuclear test matter was a false issue. The danger to humanity lies in nuclear war not in nuclear tests. If we were to freeze testing, the Soviet Union would have proven nuclear warheads in sizes up to four megatons, together with offensive delivery systems. The United States would not have defensive systems. And the United States will need clean warheads since defensive missiles would be exploded over the heads of us and our allies.

Mr. Quarles agreed with Admiral Strauss. Even though the United States is ahead qualitatively in warhead development, our needs are different from those of the Soviet Union and there is not a reciprocal situation. So the JCS and the Defense Department after careful study believe it is not to our advantage to stop nuclear tests unless there are important compensating gains in other arms control areas. Admiral Strauss added that he doubted that agreeing to a test suspension would help us significantly with world opinion. He pointed out that even our gains from a positive move like “Atoms for Peace” had been evanescent.

Mr. Killian said that his ad hoc panel had looked at the testing question from the technical point of view and had found that the United States would, as Admiral Strauss and Mr. Quarles agreed, have a lead in nuclear warhead development over the Soviet Union at the end of HARDTACK. They had also found that an adequate inspection system to monitor a test suspension agreement could be devised. Another ad hoc group had studied the missiles situation and had reached the conclusion summarized by Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Killian continued that the Science Advisory Committee had then studied these matters from a broader military and technical point of view. They had a very great concern over the possibility that the USSR might in the near future call for a unilateral missiles test ban. They had reached the conclusion that, if the United States could act soon on nuclear test suspension, it might be more difficult for the Soviet Union to couple a suspension of both nuclear tests and missiles tests.

His Committee had then looked at the overall defense picture. They had concluded that not only would the United States have a lead in nuclear warheads over a wide range of sizes and types, [text not declassified]. The Committee felt that it was valid to question the need for five more years of testing just in order to make marginal improvements and to clean up these weapons.

Mr. Dulles asked whether further small testing could be done underground. Admiral Strauss said that it could, but that the information obtained would be reduced as a result. He remarked that there would be gaps in the warheads available after HARDTACK; for example, we would have [text not declassified] less than 1600 pounds. Mr. Killian pointed out that we would have the Nike-Zeus warhead. Admiral Strauss said that this would not be clean and his medical advisors considered too many air bursts would be dangerous. Mr. Killian said that his Committee had studied this question and had found that even if all the warheads of our estimated anti-ICBM requirements were fired, the danger point in radiation would not be reached. He pointed out also that we would have a polaris warhead and thus have warheads for solid fuel missiles.

Mr. Dulles said that in considering these various technical judgments it must be remembered that unless in the next few months we do something to show that we are for reducing arms, we may over the next few years lose Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. Do we want further refinement of nuclear weapons at the cost of moral isolation of the United States? He pointed out that action on nuclear testing was the only real possibility in the areas that he had reviewed earlier. If there were other new ideas with the appeal of “Atoms for Peace” or “Open Skies” he would welcome them. We can push the surprise attack zones, but there are limits to what these can do for us especially in Europe. The outer space proposal was imaginative, but it appears now that the possible loss to United States national security would be greater than the psychological gains would justify.

Mr. Lovett said that he thought United States agreement to suspend nuclear testing would have a doubtful effect. We want an adequately inspected test agreement. Whatever the Russians may have said, they will not agree to what we consider adequate inspection. We will thus lead into another argument about how much inspection is needed, in which we may well not gain in world opinion, which will think we are putting obstacles. He thought also that the first question was not disarmament but whether there should be a summit meeting. General Smith said that he did not think we could avoid a summit meeting. Mr. Lovett thought that the foreign ministers meeting would be crucial and that the western position on an agenda should be carefully worked out and the intentions of the Soviet Union tested there.

General Gruenther suggested that an authoritative scientific study be obtained establishing conclusively that test fallout was not a danger to health. Admiral Strauss and Mr. Killian pointed out that the National Academy of Sciences and United Kingdom Medical Research Council had already done this. Ambassador Wadsworth said that a report on radiation by the United Nations Scientific Committee would be forthcoming shortly. While it was overwhelmingly reassuring, the one or two sentences about the genetic danger would in his opinion get all the headlines, and be used against us.

Mr. Killian said that he was concerned that the fallout from HARDTACK, even though not dangerous in itself, will aggravate the situation and will give our opponents a chance to play up the health hazard.

Mr. McCloy said that he was concerned also about reaching a test suspension agreement at the summit. The Soviet Union has made it clear that it will not talk about changing the status quo in Germany or Eastern Europe. And test suspension is a Soviet proposal; it would be better to take our action unilaterally rather than merely to say yes to a Soviet proposal. If the only agreement at a summit meeting is nuclear test suspension and Central Europe problems are not discussed, we will effectively have abrogated our position on German reunification and Eastern Europe, despite our protestations.

Mr. Dulles said that he agreed with Mr. McCloy’s concern but our allies do not. Chancellor Adenauer wants disarmament as the sole agenda item for the summit. He will not insist on including German reunification for fear he will be charged with using that as an excuse to evade disarmament.

Mr. Lovett said that he was strongly opposed to a summit meeting leading to agreement only on test suspension. If the United States was going to take this step it should be announced now. If some form of agreement is required that should be worked out at a foreign ministers meeting. General Gruenther recalled the difficulties arising from the attitude of the British and French toward nuclear tests and the British and German toward the need for a summit meeting. Mr. Dulles said that his point about German attitudes was to illustrate the popular pressure for disarmament in Germany. He remarked that the United States would insist on raising the question of German reunification even if no Europe ally did.

Mr. Lovett and Mr. McCloy said that our agreement to suspend nuclear tests should be announced unilaterally, and thus taking the steam out of the pressure for a summit meeting. Mr. Dulles observed that this would make sense—it would then be absurd to have a summit meeting just to talk about the control posts and similar technical details. General Smith said that a summit meeting was probably unavoidable, but the danger would be greater if it occurred and led only to a test suspension agreement.

Mr. Quarles said that he was skeptical that the United States would get any cold war gain from stating willingness to agree to test suspension on condition of adequate inspection. He thought that the United States faced a basic dilemma. We cannot escape from our responsibility to maintain adequate devastating striking forces in the face of Soviet power—until a fundamental solution is reached embracing inspection and world order. What we should say at a summit meeting is that we will take any step which will make progress toward such a fundamental solution. Mr. Killian remarked that inspection of a nuclear test suspension would be a step toward such a solution.

General Gruenther commented that the recent United Nations Security Council meeting was a defeat for the Soviet Union. Mr. Dulles said that we handled the meeting well, but that the Soviet Union certainly had expected the result. They took this step as the kick-off of an intensive propaganda campaign. Khrushchev has referred since to the danger of American bombers in his latest letter. Now the satellite governments are sending protest notes.

Mr. Dulles said that it appeared the right course of action would be for the United States to take action now on the nuclear test matter—perhaps by announcing readiness to stop nuclear tests for 12, 18 or 24 months. We would resume testing if an effective inspection system was not operating by the end of the period. He asked the reactions of the advisors.

Mr. Lovett said that he would favor this move if it would reduce the prospects of a summit meeting. Mr. McCloy agreed; he felt that in this way we could avoid jeopardizing our position on Central Europe at a summit meeting. General Gruenther expressed concern at the unilateral element. It would be hard for us to resume testing once we stopped, and accordingly the precise way in which the announcement was put would be very important. Mr. Dulles said that of course the United Kingdom would have to join in such a statement. As for the manner of putting it there could be a call for several stages: an initial agreement on an inspected suspension, a check point after a year on progress in installing the inspection system, and then the full operation of the inspection system. General Gruenther said that this kind of approach would meet his concern.

General Smith said that he favored such a move, but thought that we should not delude ourselves that the Soviet Union will accept adequate inspection. Admiral Strauss said that he foresaw that we will gradually be whittled down from 70 stations to 50 stations then 25, 10 and perhaps less. Mr. McCloy said that he thought even 10 stations would be worthwhile in view of the political gain of Soviet acceptance of inspection.

Mr. Dulles thanked the advisors for joining him and giving him the benefit of their counsel.

1. Source: Transmits a record of Dulles’ meeting with disarmament advisory panel. Top Secret. 9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series, Disarmament.