The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Mr. Stassen’s latest
disarmament proposal, transmitted by the reference memorandum, are
transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in
connection with its preliminary consideration of this proposal at its
meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosure
Memorandum From Twining to McElroy
Washington, December 31,
1957
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SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Mr. Stassen’s latest
disarmament proposal, which is to be submitted for preliminary
consideration by the National Security Council on 6 January 1958. They
feel that from a military point of view, and also from a political
viewpoint, the position they have taken on the Four Power Joint
Proposals of 29 August 1957 is still sound. However, they are aware that
the political climate has changed to some extent since the submission of
those proposals. The best evidence of this change lies in the feelings
expressed by several countries at the last meeting of the Heads of
Government in Paris that we must continue, especially with our NATO neighbors, to attempt to reach an
understanding with the Soviet Union on disarmament, and must not evince
an intransigent position.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the most recent disarmament
proposal is an effort on the part of Mr. Stassen to meet these aims, and to advance a U.S.
position which will lead to the reopening of fruitful discussions on
disarmament with the USSR. However,
there are three points in the proposal which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
believe to be dangerous to the United States.
a. The major change that Mr. Stassen has made to the Four Power
Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 is the abandonment of the provision
for inseparability of the individual items of the proposals. From a
security viewpoint, there has been no improvement in the international
situation since 29 August 1957 to warrant such a critical departure from
the joint western position rejected by the Soviets. On the contrary, the
apparent advances in Soviet missile technology disclosed since that
date, coupled with the boastful and belligerent attitude of the Soviet
Union with respect to these events, have aggravated the international
situation. In addition, the Soviets have withdrawn from the present
UN Disarmament Commission. The
inseparability provision of the 29 August Proposals made these proposals
barely acceptable to the United States in meeting the minimum
requirements for the security of the United States and the other NATO powers. Abandoning this essential
provision would present the Soviets with the opportunity of accepting
only those proposals compatible with their national interests—for
example, the suspension of nuclear testing—to the detriment of the U.S.
and NATO interests.
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b. The former provision for the control of
fissionable material, both for peaceful and weapon purposes, which goes
to the heart of the disarmament problem, is no longer a prerequisite. It
has been included only for discussion and possible agreement at some
future date. It has
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not been high-lighted, as it should be, and could
be lost entirely in any future negotiations with the Soviets. It is this
provision which would assist significantly in diminishing the threat of
nuclear warfare. The cessation of nuclear testing, per
se, need not contribute at all to the effective control of
nuclear weapons. This fact was recently emphasized in the Eisenhower
cablegram to Nehru, dated 15 December 1957, in which President
Eisenhower said, “. . . however, I do not believe that we can accept a
proposal to stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied
by any assurance that measures—which would go to the heart of the
problem—would follow.”
c. The new inspection zones proposed by Mr.
Stassen are weighted heavily
in favor of the Soviet Union. The Western USSR-Central Europe zone includes the great majority of
NATO installations and troop
disposition while it covers only the East European satellites and a
small portion of western USSR. The
second zone proposed in Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United
States, and Western Canada includes a sizable portion of the United
States with many important military and industrial installations in
exchange for a negligible coverage of comparable Soviet territory and
military installations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the
establishment of inspection zones in the general areas mentioned, but
they take serious exception to the inequality in military and industrial
significance of the zones proposed by Mr. Stassen.
3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while recognizing
the desirability of maintaining a reasonable position in the eyes of the
world, recommend:
a. Against the adoption of Mr. Stassen’s
proposal.
b. Adherence to the basic principles of the Four
Power Proposals of 29 August 1957, while maintaining flexibility in
stating our positions.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F.
Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
