The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Mr. Stassen’s latest
disarmament proposal, transmitted by the reference memorandum, are
transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security
Council in connection with its preliminary consideration of this
proposal at its meeting on Monday, January 6, 1958.
cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosure
Memorandum From Twining to McElroy
Washington,
December 31,
1957
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SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (U)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Mr. Stassen’s latest
disarmament proposal, which is to be submitted for preliminary
consideration by the National Security Council on 6 January 1958.
They feel that from a military point of view, and also from a
political viewpoint, the position they have taken on the Four Power
Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 is still sound. However, they are
aware that the political climate has changed to some extent since
the submission of those proposals. The best evidence of this change
lies in the feelings expressed by several countries at the last
meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris that we must continue,
especially with our NATO
neighbors, to attempt to reach an understanding with the Soviet
Union on disarmament, and must not evince an intransigent
position.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the most recent
disarmament proposal is an effort on the part of Mr. Stassen to meet these aims, and to
advance a U.S. position which will lead to the reopening of fruitful
discussions on disarmament with the USSR. However, there are three points in the proposal
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe to be dangerous to the
United States.
a. The major change that Mr. Stassen has made to the Four Power
Joint Proposals of 29 August 1957 is the abandonment of the
provision for inseparability of the individual items of the
proposals. From a security viewpoint, there has been no improvement
in the international situation since 29 August 1957 to warrant such
a critical departure from the joint western position rejected by the
Soviets. On the contrary, the apparent advances in Soviet missile
technology disclosed since that date, coupled with the boastful and
belligerent attitude of the Soviet Union with respect to these
events, have aggravated the international situation. In addition,
the Soviets have withdrawn from the present UN Disarmament Commission. The inseparability provision
of the 29 August Proposals made these proposals barely acceptable to
the United States in meeting the minimum requirements for the
security of the United States and the other NATO powers. Abandoning this
essential provision would present the Soviets with the opportunity
of accepting only those proposals compatible with their national
interests—for example, the suspension of nuclear testing—to the
detriment of the U.S. and NATO
interests.
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b. The former provision for the control of
fissionable material, both for peaceful and weapon purposes, which
goes to the heart of the disarmament problem, is no longer a
prerequisite. It has been included only for discussion and possible
agreement at some future date. It has
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not been high-lighted, as it
should be, and could be lost entirely in any future negotiations
with the Soviets. It is this provision which would assist
significantly in diminishing the threat of nuclear warfare. The
cessation of nuclear testing, per se, need
not contribute at all to the effective control of nuclear weapons.
This fact was recently emphasized in the Eisenhower cablegram to
Nehru, dated 15 December 1957, in which President Eisenhower said,
“. . . however, I do not believe that we can accept a proposal to
stop nuclear experiments as an isolated step, unaccompanied by any
assurance that measures—which would go to the heart of the
problem—would follow.”
c. The new inspection zones proposed by Mr.
Stassen are weighted
heavily in favor of the Soviet Union. The Western USSR-Central Europe zone includes the
great majority of NATO
installations and troop disposition while it covers only the East
European satellites and a small portion of western USSR. The second zone proposed in
Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern United States, and Western
Canada includes a sizable portion of the United States with many
important military and industrial installations in exchange for a
negligible coverage of comparable Soviet territory and military
installations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not object to the
establishment of inspection zones in the general areas mentioned,
but they take serious exception to the inequality in military and
industrial significance of the zones proposed by Mr. Stassen.
3. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while
recognizing the desirability of maintaining a reasonable position in
the eyes of the world, recommend:
a. Against the adoption of Mr. Stassen’s
proposal.
b. Adherence to the basic principles of the
Four Power Proposals of 29 August 1957, while maintaining
flexibility in stating our positions.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
N.F.
Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
