Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

284. Memorandum of Discussion at the 472d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 29, 1960

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 472nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, December 29, 1960

Present at the 472nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Merchant); the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Mr. Julian Paird for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; and the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Alan H. Belmont for the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (Items 1 and 2); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the Naval Aide to the President (Items 1 and 2); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. ATTACK WARNING CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVILIANS

(NSC 5513/1; NSC Action No. 1565; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated February 20, 1957, December 3, 1959, December 14 and 28, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced this subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray called upon Captain Aurand, Chairman of the Special NSC Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures, to summarize briefly the changes which the Committee proposes, with particular attention to revisions considered to be of a policy nature.

Captain Aurand referred to the chart now contained in NSC 5513/1 and to the proposed new chart as circulated to the Council on December 14. He said the Committee proposed two changes in attack warning channels and procedures which involved policy considerations. The first change involved the use of the CINCONAD DEFCONs as triggers for action, replacing strategic warnings, defense emergencies, and air defense readiness. The DEFCON system was a new system established by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a uniform alert mechanism. In the process of adapting the old chart to the DEFCON system, the Committee had noted the DEFCON–3 called by Secretary Gates from Paris last spring. Some of the actions taken by the military as a result of the DEFCON came to the attention of the public and the press and a certain amount of public confusion resulted. The Committee believed that steps should be taken to prevent public confusion or panic when a DEFCON is declared.

The President asked what was meant by the term DEFCON. Captain Aurand replied that DEFCON stood for “defense readiness condition”. DEFCON–1 and DEFCON–2 (the most serious DEFCONs) cannot be declared without public knowledge. The DEFCON–3 called from Paris last spring resulted in an excess amount of telephoning in some cities such as Denver with the result that the switchboards were jammed. Captain Aurand then turned to the second policy recommendation by the Committee, namely, a recommendation that the President delegate authority to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM jointly to make public announcements when DEFCONs are declared in order to avoid public speculation and confusion. DEFCONs would be declared with such speed that the matter would not come to the attention of the President before announcements were made locally.

Mr. Gray said the Planning Board had generally concurred in the recommendations of the Special Committee as summarized by Captain Aurand. However, the Chairman of the Planning Board (Mr. Gray) did not fully agree with these recommendations. He believed that there should be a clear delegation of authority to make only local, not national, announcements upon the declaration of a DEFCON. He feared that panic might be stimulated by a public announcement made at any level of government lower than that of the President. The President asked what kind of an announcement would be made. Captain Aurand replied that the local OCDM Director would state that the Air Defense Command had declared a state of readiness, that people should continue their normal conduct, that telephones should not be used excessively, and that the public should listen for further announcements on the radio. There would be no reference in the local announcement to the reason for declaring a DEFCON; any such statement of reasons would be reserved for the national announcement by the President. Announcements of this kind would apply to the declaration of DEFCONs 1 and 2 and conditionally as indicated in the chart to the declaration of DEFCON–3.

The President wondered how the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM could coordinate with each other more rapidly than they could consult the President. Captain Aurand said that identical situations would obtain in many DEFCONs so that the proposed public announcements could be planned and “packaged” in advance. Captain Aurand added that there was a conditional [text not declassified]. The President asked how the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM would consult regarding the public announcements. Mr. Gray said he presumed the two officials would consult in advance. The President wondered how authority could be given to local officials to make an announcement of the kind contemplated.

Secretary Gates felt that a public announcement would have to be made at the national level quite frequently when DEFCONs were declared. He expected that a DEFCON–3 would be declared every month or so as a drill and he hoped there would not be a public announcement on each such occasion. Captain Aurand said no public announcement would be made in the case of drills. Governor Hoegh added that no public announcement would be made on DEFCON–3 unless the public had already obtained information concerning the alert; and then the announcement would be for the purpose of putting the activity into a lower key. Mr. Hoegh recalled that in the case of last spring’s DEFCON–3, OCDM had announced in Denver that the activity was a test exercise. The President wondered why it could not be announced in most cases that a test exercise was underway. Governor Hoegh thought such an announcement would still require advance coordination. The President thought some of the difficulties in this field would be avoided if we could announce that a drill was underway. Secretary Gates believed inquiries would still be directed to the Pentagon. Captain Aurand pointed out that the DEFCON–3 called last spring was not a drill. The President said that the DEFCON was really a drill. Captain Aurand said it was not called a drill. Mr. Gray pointed out that the chart proposed by the Special Committee was designed for the actual situation, not for a drill. The President believed there should be some way of calling an alert without frightening everyone.

General Lemnitzer thought that DEFCONs should be called regularly. The appropriate commanders should be informed that these DEFCONs are drills and if the public becomes aware of the DEFCONs, it should be announced publicly that drills are underway. The President agreed that if drills were called frequently, the public would become accustomed to them. Governor Hoegh pointed out that DEFCONs–1 and 2 probably indicated that strategic warning had been received. He felt a great deal of weight should be given to warning under conditions of nuclear war. When DEFCON–1 was called, the people should be warned so that they can help prepare themselves for attack. Secretary Gates said that under DEFCON–1 conditions, all planes would take to the air and the President would make a public announcement. Mr. Gray pointed out that the chart proposed by the Special Committee did not require Presidential participation. The President said the chart did not require Presidential participation but, nevertheless, he said such participation would be desirable.

Mr. Gray then called on Governor Hoegh to indicate the significant non-military actions which would be taken by OCDM in DEFCON situations. Governor Hoegh said that DEFCONs–5, –4 and –3 primarily required only staff action. Under DEFCON–2 OCDM would verify conditions with its Regional Directors, notify the heads of agencies, advise on public information releases, notify the governors, brief the staff, update recommendations regarding the relocation site, recall key officials from leave, inform and notify the White House of the OCDM readiness status. Under DEFCON–l OCDM would issue a public announcement urging that readiness measures be taken, would recall all officials from leave, would order 50 percent of the pre-designated emergency personnel to occupy the relocation site, would call up the Executive Reserve, would assure the immediate availability of Presidential Action Documents, and would initiate twenty-four hour operations at the relocation site.

The President said that there ought to be among the President’s Action Documents a draft of the President’s broadcast for use in DEFCON–1. When conditions became this serious, the President had a duty to inform the public right away. He felt a draft Presidential announcement of about 150 words with some blanks left to be filled in at the last minute was a necessity. Governor Hoegh pointed out that that conditions varied a great deal from one DEFCON situation to another. The President said the thermonuclear bomb did not vary very much and was the bomb which made all these preparations necessary. He believed it was desirable to tell the people what to do. In response to a question from Governor Hoegh, the President said the draft broadcast should be kept secret and would be a part of the Presidential Emergency Documents.

Mr. Gray then pointed out that the Planning Board proposed to amend Footnote No. 3 of the chart to include CINCLANT as one of the commands which can declare DEFCONs outside the continental U.S. He went on to indicate that Dr. Kistiakowsky’s representative on the Planning Board had raised the question whether warnings Yellow and Red would be transmitted directly to the White House from CINCONAD instead of being routed through the Joint War Room. The President said extra time was consumed by having additional people transmitting messages. General Lemnitzer said no delay resulted from routing the warning through the Joint War Room. Transmission of the message to the White House was only a matter of pushing the button which caused a prepared tape to be played. Secretary Gates, however, saw no objection to transmitting these warnings directly to the White House if this proved to be feasible. Mr. Gray said he would have this matter looked into.

Mr. Gray then pointed out that Dr. Kistiakowsky’s representative in the Planning Board had felt that Warning Yellow as described in the proposed chart should be based on “warning indications” rather than on “intelligence” that hostile aircraft or missiles are suspected of being enroute to the U.S. Secretary Gates felt the word “intelligence” was correctly used in the chart proposed by the Committee.

The President said that every war started under unexpected conditions. Therefore, he wished to place a caveat on all delegations of Presidential authority, that the President should he consulted if feasible. Such consultation might require better communications, for example, a telephone line direct from the War Room to the White House. Mr. Gray said he would ask the Committee to examine this matter. The President said he had no serious quarrel with the procedures described in the chart but he believed if the President could be reached, he should be consulted. Secretary Gates pointed out that the President was on the command line. As soon as command conferences are set up, the President would be consulted. General Lemnitzer said the President could be in various places at various time. The important communication was the message from the War Room to the White House Communications Center, which knows where the President is at all times and is able to get word to him. The President said it might be possible to get through to the President directly without going through intermediaries 80 per cent of the time. Captain Aurand said a direct message to the President would save only two to three seconds. The President said it was not worth initiating some special procedure in order to save that amount of time. General Goodpaster said that any report of such significance as to warrant bringing it to the attention of the President was given to the President without awaiting evaluation and would be accompanied by a statement that it had not been evaluated. The President agreed that any information of great significance coming to the attention of the War Room must be passed on to the President. Mr. Dulles said there was a regular procedure for giving the President important information through intelligence channels. The President said that any warning of any great significance on BMEWS would automatically cause a warning to be flashed on the White House board. He was referring not to the responsibilities of individuals but to an automatic mechanism.

In response to a question from Captain Aurand, Mr. Gray said that the Special Committee would be asked to review the chart in the light of the discussion, including an insertion of language indicating that the announcements called for would be local announcements.

Mr. Stans said January 20 or January 21, from the enemy point of view, would be an ideal date for an attack on the U.S. The President said he had asked representatives of the new Administration to get in touch with Captain Aurand and General Goodpaster. Mr. Stans said he was concerned about civil defense activities since no successor to Governor Hoegh had been designated. The President said he shared the concern expressed by Mr. Stans. For instance, he might have to issue sudden orders to the fleet in view of the explosive situation in Laos. However, he had been unable to get the incoming Administration to realize the importance of this area of activity. General Persons said he was urging Mr. Clifford to have the new Administration put officials in touch with officials of the present Administration in these key fields.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the enclosures to the reference memorandum of December 14, 1960; in the light of an oral presentation by the Chairman, NSC Special Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 28, 1960).

b. Noted the President’s view that, in the event of receipt of information which might require the declaration of DEFCON 1, 2, 3 or 4, the President should be immediately advised and consulted if at all feasible, to include specific comment as to whether the information has been evaluated. The President also suggested that consideration be given to preparing in advance a draft of a possible Presidential announcement in the event of a declaration of DEFCON 1. In addition, the President stated that tests of action to be taken under DEFCON 3, 4 or 5 should be clearly identified as routine drills or exercises to the responsible commanders or officials and, when necessary, to the public.

c. Requested the NSC Special Committee on Attack Warning Channels and Procedures for Civilians to revise the chart enclosed with the reference memorandum of December 14, 1960, in the light of the discussion at this meeting, and submit it for consideration by the Council by Memorandum Action.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM.

The actions in b and c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, NSC Special Committee, for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here are pages 7–10.]

4. EVACUATION AND PROTECTION OF U.S. CITIZENS IN DANGER AREAS ABROAD

(NSC 106/3; NSC Action No. 2259–b–(1); Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated August 8, 1960; Executive Order 10893, dated November 8, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 29, 1960; NSC 6019; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 15, 1960)

Mr. Gray presented NSC 6019 to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray referred to the three changes in the agreed Planning Board paper proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and called upon General Lemnitzer.

General Lemnitzer said one suggestion offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was designed to meet the problem that was always arising in planning, i.e., how to divide military forces between the missions of (1) evacuation and (2) military action. In his view the commander in the field was the only one who could properly decide how to divide his forces to meet competing requirements. Mr. Merchant said the first change proposed by the JCS was acceptable to the State Department.

General Lemnitzer, turning to the second JCS proposal, said he believed the word “coordinating” was preferable to the phrase “acting under the general supervision of the Ambassador.” The President said that, in his view, the Department of State should approve the policy of evacuating U.S. citizens from danger areas but from that point on evacuation operations were almost entirely a military matter. It would be wrong to designate the Ambassador as the official in charge of operations which were approaching a condition of hostilities. Mr. Merchant said that the interim guidance on this subject approved by the President on August 25 contained the phrase “acting under the general supervision of the Ambassador.” However, Mr. Merchant believed that the military operation should not be conducted under the general supervision of the Ambassador but that the evacuation operation should be under the Ambassador’s supervision. The President believed one difficulty lay in deciding where supervision begins and ends. He had frequently insisted that the Chief of Mission must be the principal U.S. authority in a foreign country. The question was, at what point does our chief diplomatic official cease to have overall authority and responsibility. Of one thing he was sure, namely, that we would need both a good Ambassador and a good military commander in the event evacuation operations were necessary. General Lemnitzer said the JCS were not raising any question as to the overall authority of the Ambassador but they did question the extent to which he should become involved in military operations. The President, with an assist from Mr. Merchant, then proposed the language in Paragraph 5–c–(1) of NSC 6019 which appears in the action below.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6019; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 15, 1960.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6019, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Pages 5 and 6, subparagraph 5–c–(1): Add at the end of the first sentence the clause “who will respond to the extent which they consider militarily feasible”; and revise the second sentence to read as follows: “Responsibility for the conduct of such evacuation operations by military forces rests wholly with the military commander, acting in coordination with, and under evacuation policies established by, the principal U.S. diplomatic or consular representative.”

(2) Page 6, paragraph 6: Revise the first line to read as follows: “6. In implementing this policy, the”.

NOTE: NSC 6019, as amended by the action in b above, subsequently approved by the President; circulated as NSC 6019/1 for implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Attack warning channels and procedures for civilians; Agenda item 4: Evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens in danger areas abroad. Top Secret. Extracts—9 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.