Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

283. Memorandum of Discussion at the 470th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 20, 1960

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 470th Meeting of the National Security Council, December 20, 1960

Present at the 470th meeting were The President of the United States, Presiding; the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Administration. Also present were Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, National Science Foundation (Item 1); the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Item 1); the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Deputy Director, OCDM; Mr. Gerard C. Smith and Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretaries of State; the Deputy Administrator, NASA (Item 1); the Associate Administrator, NASA (Item 1); Mr. Franklyn W. Philllips, NASA (Item 1); Mr. Herbert York and Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense; Mr. Douglas R. Lord, Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Item 1); Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 1); the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. OUTER SPACE PROGRAMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF NASA

(NSC Action No. 2328)

Mr. Gray introduced Dr. Glennan’s presentation on the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.

Dr. Glennan said the NASA presentation would fall into two parts: (1) a long-range identification of NASA objectives, which he would discuss; and (2) a more detailed examination of the NASA program now under way or planned for FY 1962, which Dr. Dryden would discuss.

Dr. Glennan began his part of the presentation by noting that a year ago NASA had developed its first long-range plan establishing space objectives for eight to ten years in the future. NASA had just completed a revision of this first long-range plan. Dr. Glennan believed the revised plan, as well as its funding, was more realistic than the first plan. He also noted that the funds required for space activities tended to increase rather than diminish.

Dr. Glennan then displayed a chart indicating that in 1960 NASA had accomplished first launchings of a meteorological satellite, a passive reflector communications satellite, a SCOUT vehicle, a THOR-DELTA vehicle, and an AGENA–B vehicle. A suborbital flight of an astronaut had failed. In addition, a scientific satellite (PIONEER 5) had been launched into a sub orbit to demonstrate long-distance communications.

Dr. Glennan displayed a large chart showing the major target dates for NASA missions from 1961 through 1970. This chart indicated that in 1961 such missions as the following would be attempted: the suborbital flight of an astronaut, an ATLAS-CENTAUR firing, the firing of the first stage of SATURN, and so on. The program would continue with an impact landing of instruments on the moon and a test of the planetary space craft in 1962; the firing of the second and third stages of SATURN and a soft instrument landing on the moon in 1963; the orbiting of an astronomical observer, a MARS-VENUS probe, and the qualification of the C–2 SATURN engine in 1964; the qualification of a very large rocket engine and the testing of a prototype of the main space capsule beyond MERCURY in 1965; the flight test of a nuclear rocket and the landing of mobile instruments on the moon in 1966 or 1967; the sending of a space craft in orbit around another planet in 1968 to 1970; and a man landing on the moon after 1970.

Dr. Glennan said that NASA anticipated 25 to 30 major space flights per year, ranging from JUNO–2, ATLAS-ABLE and THOR-DELTA to NOVA in 1968.

Dr. Glennan then turned to present and projected NASA budgets. He displayed a chart indicating that expenditures for most purposes would continue to rise, on the assumption that projected programs would continue. He noted that the NASA long-range-plan provided for making decisions at certain specified dates—for example, 1963 would be the time to decide whether to proceed with the expensive NOVA concept. Dr. Glennan said that NASA has now been in business 27 months, and was just beginning to carry out its own program. Up to the present time, most of the program had been inherited from the Military Services. At the end of FY 1959, NASA had had just over 9000 employees; at the end of FY 1961, it had 18,900. Dr. Glennan said that less than 2000 NASA employees were net additions to the Federal payroll; the remainder came to NASA as transfers from the Military Services.

Dr. Dryden then presented the NASA obligational authority as follows: FY 1959, $338.9 million; FY 1960, $523.6 million; FY 1961, $915.0 million; and FY 1952, $1,159.2 million. Dr. Dryden then displayed a chart breaking the research and development item in the FY 1962 NASA budget into 10 main and 14 subheadings. He then discussed NASA’s immediate flight schedule, and commented in greater detail on the MERCURY program. He said that in 1961 two MERCURY flights per month would be made until August. Other flights would be made to check after body heating on the capsule of the type which recently blew up, to carry a chimpanzee into space, to test maximum dynamic pressure, to check re-entry just below satellite speed, and to check the ground system. After that, the first manned flight would be made in a MERCURY vehicle, with a REDSTONE vehicle providing the propulsion. Continued manned flights would follow until in July of 1962 a manned orbital flight would be attempted for the first time. The FY 1966 budget provided $74 million for the MERCURY man-in-space program.

Dr. Dryden noted that the SATURN program would require $7 billion over nine years. Major decisions would be necessary before attempting a landing on the moon. Somewhere around the period of 1964 to 1966, the United States would have to decide (1) whether to spend large sums of money to put a man on the moon, and (2) if a manned landing on the moon were to be attempted, what vehicle should be developed for the purpose? Dr. Dryden pointed out that a nuclear rocket having less weight than chemical rockets had been considered, and that there were also possibilities for rendezvous and electronic propulsion systems.

At the conclusion of the presentation, Mr. Gray asked if the members of the Council had any questions. The President said he had a thousand questions. Laymen could understand the curiosity of scientists, but perhaps could not as readily understand the haste with which scientists sought to satisfy their curiosity. In the space field there appeared to be no practical test of the immediate usefulness of a program. The President wondered how to segregate those elements of the program which would be useful from those elements which would not be so useful. He said he did not care whether the man landed on the moon soft or hard. He was anxious to do whatever was necessary for security, but wished to avoid the development of a SPUTNIK complex. He felt we must be concerned with developing a gauge with which to measure the value of space programs. He noted that the cost of space programs was still rising when Dr. Glennan’s chart ended in 1970. He was not prepared to say that he would support a program of $2.4 billion for space activities in 1970.

Dr. Glennan said he did not disagree fundamentally with the President’s views. However, in developing a long-range plan he assumed that programs already started would continue. He had been careful to point out that at various specific dates in the future decisions should be made as to the continuance of various programs. This year had been one point of decision. He had already decided not to embark on a full-scale man-in-space program beyond MERCURY. Dr. Glennan also pointed out that a substantial portion of the funds going into the development of vehicles would result in the ability to launch satellites or to engage in manned space flight.

The President recalled that two years ago $1 billion was spoken of as the upper limit of the space program. Now it appears that the $1 billion ceiling will be breached in 1962. The President said he was reluctant to spend sums of this magnitude on space activities. He had no hesitation in supporting vast programs for the security of the country, or programs designed to acquire specific scientific information, or programs which were necessary for psychological reasons; but he believed the $1.9 billion which he had seen on the chart should be cut back.

Mr. Gray then called on Dr. Kistiakowsky to present a report by a panel of the Science Advisory Committee on “Man in Space”. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he wanted to estimate the cost of landing a man on the moon. He assured the Council that what he had to say was very unpleasant, particularly to Mr. Stans’ ears. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that to land a man on the moon after 1970, we needed to develop a rocket bigger than the SATURN rocket. A panel of the Science Advisory Committee, consisting of industry men as well as long-haired scientists, had concluded that the man-in-space program cannot now be justified on scientific grounds, but can only be justified on the basis of an emotional urge for exploration such as the urge which motivated Columbus. The President said that, like Isabella, we were hocking our jewels for this purpose. Dr. Kistiakowsky, continuing, said that the man-in-space program could also be justified on the political ground of prestige. He noted that no money could be saved by eliminating instrumented flights and going directly to manned flights because development of the instruments was an essential prerequisite of man’s flight into space. After this introduction, Dr. Kistiakowsky displayed charts showing that the total cost, 1961–1975, would be $3 billion for SATURN, and from $25.5 to $53 billion for NOVA. The composite expenditures for SATURN and NOVA, 1961–1975, would be from $33.5 billion to $46 billion. Dr. Kistiakowsky concluded by saying he would not attempt to estimate the cost of landing a man on Mars, but he knew it would be several times as great as the cost of a moon landing.

Mr. Scribner asked about the cost of landing a man on the moon versus the cost of bringing him back to earth again. Dr. Kistiakowsky replied that a man could be landed on the moon without a return trip for the cost of SATURN—that is, $8 to $9 billion.

Dr. Waterman said he wished to endorse Dr. Kistiakowsky’s statements about the general attitude of scientists toward the man-in-space program. He believed scientific observation was important, but thought there was no need to send a man into space if scientific observation could be made by means of instruments alone.

The President raised the question of the rate at which space activities were developing. He said the SPUTNIK complex impelled us to do everything yesterday. He noted that the first time a man was lost in an attempted space flight we would be compelled to start over again and spend twice as much. He agreed with the remarks of Dr. Waterman. He had to think about the country as a whole, the economy, and the other demands on the budget. He believed it might be necessary to establish an annual budgetary ceiling for space activities. Dr. Dryden said the total cost of space activities would not be reduced by spreading the program over a longer period of years. The President agreed, but pointed out that not as great a sum would have to be spent in any one year.

Secretary Gates wondered why it would not be desirable to spend more money on getting scientists to work in laboratories and less on hardware. He believed our space programs, as well as our defense programs, might advance more rapidly if more time was spent thinking and working on the drawing boards instead of building hardware which might not function when it was completed. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that there was a human urge to build a prototype soon after it had been conceived.

Mr. Stans said the NASA budget was the most difficult one on which he had worked, except for the Defense budget. The Bureau of the Budget had worked very closely with Dr. Glennan, and was convinced that the figures presented by Dr. Glennan were about as low as any that could be achieved short of the cancellation of major programs such as SATURN. The figures in the NASA budget were in effect the result of program decisions made some time ago. The President noted that NASA had over 18,000 employees. He wondered whether money couldn’t be saved if the number of employees could be reduced to say, 15,000. Dr. Dryden said the really large expenditures in the NASA program would not be reduced by reducing the payroll. The President said he was concerned about the pace of accomplishment. He wondered why a particular flight had to be made in 1963 instead of in 1965. He felt that our scientific knowledge of space depended on the gradual accumulation of data.

Dr. Kistiakowsky felt that to a large extent the extent the objectives of the space program must be charged to the cold war. The Soviets had succeeded by propaganda in instilling the idea that achievements in space were an accurate over-all measure of a country’s scientific and technological potential. Perhaps it was necessary to re-educate people here and abroad to the fact that there are other measures of scientific achievement besides space activities. After such re-education, the space program could be slowed down without adverse political effects. The President believed that he could use $1 billion to better advantage on some other aspect of the cold war. Secretary Gates thought the cold war argument had been refuted. The President added that $500 million more spent on our information services might have more effect than the same amount spent on space. Dr. Waterman said that if space exploration could be internationalized the competitive aspects of the space race would disappear.

Secretary Herter noted that at the Tehran and Istanbul meetings last year we had made a presentation to our allies on our space programs. Our allies had been very encouraged by this presentation because up to that time they had been concerned with propaganda about the Soviet achievements. Secretary Herter asked whether the Soviets had not already tried and failed to put a man in space. Mr. Dulles said the Soviets may have made such an attempt.

Mr. Gray said he had the impression that Drs. Glennan and Waterman and Kistiakowsky all took a dim view of the man-in-space program. He had not heretofore realized that this was the feeling of scientists. The President said he was ready to say that he saw no scientific or psychological reason for carrying the man-in-space program beyond the MERCURY program. He thought the idea of a man on the moon was sheer Buck Rogers fiction. Dr. Glennan said his most difficult job was keeping the space program on a sensible basis. He believed that as solid scientific achievements were recorded from earlier space programs, the urge for putting man in space would disappear. The President said we were facing a difficult fiscal problem because our rate of expenditure was increasing faster than our economic growth.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed a presentation on the subject by the Administrator and Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, based primarily on the first annual revision of the NASA long-range plan.

b. Noted and discussed a presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology of a report by a panel of the Science Advisory Committee on “Man in Space”.

c. Agreed that further testing and experimentation will be necessary to establish whether there are any valid scientific reasons for extending manned space flight beyond the MERCURY program.

NOTE: The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Administrator, NASA.

[Omitted here are pages 7–15.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of NASA. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on December 21.