Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

273. Memorandum of Discussion at the 466th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1960

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 466th Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, November 7, 1960

Present at the 466th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, Presiding; Mr. Livingston T. Merchant for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Directory, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also attending the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director Bureau of the Budget; and the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency (Item 1). Also present at the Meeting were the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; from the Department of Defense—Deputy Secretary James H. Douglas, Messrs. Haydn Williams, John R. Rubel, Lt. Col. Paul Nadler, and Col. Harvey Shelton; Assistant Secretaries of State Gerard C. Smith and Thomas C. Mann; The Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, CIA (Items 2 and 3); the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Director, NSC Secretariat (Johnson).

There follows a summary of the discussion of the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. OUTER SPACE PROGRAMS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (NSC Action No. 2245)

Mr. Gray described the background of the Defense presentation, noting that the Planning Board recommended that NASA be asked to make a similar presentation on its programs, and then called on Mr. John H. Rubel, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering, to make the presentation. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum. A copy of Mr. Rubel’s presentation is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting).

At the conclusion of Mr. Rubel’s presentation, the President said that he did not know where the money for such programs was going to come from. It seemed to him that we should finally reach the point where these programs were not constantly going up until they absorbed nine-tenths of our research money. We should determine some sort of level of effort and set a dollar ceiling which would be changed only if there were some sort of startling development that should be exploited. If we continued to budget such programs on the basis that we did not know what they would ultimately cost, expenditures would increase constantly and there would be little hope for free government. We would have to be ruthless with respect to other areas of expenditure if we were to continue to support programs of this sort. He said he had watched these programs go up and that he had supported them and believed in them. Programs which offer real promise should be supported, but in the case of others, we should stay closer to basic research. No one, however, was suggesting elimination of important defense programs. Except for the work which they provided, there was nothing productive about these programs. They did not, for example, reduce costs of U.S. exports. He was for getting useful information, but not for spending billions to put a man on the moon.

Secretary Anderson referred to a statement Mr. Rubel had made in his presentation to the effect that the cost of many of these programs depended upon the life of the satellite involved. He wondered what the problems were with respect to ensuring long life for these satellites. Mr. Rubel said that the principal problem in this respect was an adequate power supply. Present systems for recharging batteries by sunlight did not provide an adequately reliable power source. We also did not know enough about the space environment in this connection. Bombardment by particles in space reduced the life of satellites. Another problem derived from the fact that we continue to have to use some tubes in these satellites and these have filaments which burn out. The large number of parts in a satellite limit its reliability. The failure of one part could eliminate the capability of a satellite to accomplish its mission. The sequential operation of mechanical elements in the satellites provide opportunities for failure. Finally, we still know relatively little about the effects of the space environment on various materials involved in the satellites such as plastics.

Secretary Anderson next referred to the statement by Mr. Rubel in his presentation that communications are being bounced off the moon. He wondered whether we could not use the existing planets as a means of relaying communications instead of putting up artificial satellites. In response Mr. Rubel said that this was not feasible, partly because we did not have receivers of sufficient sensitivity to receive messages over such long distances and partly because of the large volume of power that was involved in such transmission.

Secretary Anderson next asked whether there was any agreement on a law of space. In the discussion which followed, Dr. Glennan pointed out that while many articles have been written and much discussion of this subject had occurred, there was no definitive statement on the matter.

The President noted that Mr. Rubel had stated in his presentation that navigational satellites would permit the fixing of the position of a ship within a quarter of a mile. He wondered how this compared with the accuracy of ordinary celestial navigation. In the discussion which followed, Dr. Kistiakowsky said that, while it could be done better, on a typical vessel celestial navigation would give a fix of within one to two miles of the actual position. He also noted that in bad weather, it was impossible use to celestial navigation. The President wondered whether the gain in accuracy that was obtained through such navigational satellites warranted the cost that was involved. Secretary Gates expressed the view that the President’s point was well taken—that it was easy to spend a lot of money to obtain a ten per cent improvement in accuracy. There was then some discussion of the accuracy of inertial navigational systems in the course of which it was pointed out by Dr. Kistiakowsky that really precise inertial systems cost millions of dollars. The President observed that this cost would not be as great as the cost every year of maintaining a navigational satellite system in being. Dr. Kistiakowsky agreed that this was true. He stated that he was not arguing for or against the TRANSIT system, but it would provide a means by which every merchant vessel, without expensive equipment, could get accurate navigational fixes regardless of the weather. Secretary Gates observed that the TRANSIT system had been extremely successful and that its cost had been relatively low. The President asked how long a TRANSIT satellite would stay up. Mr. Rubel said that we did not plan to make the system operational until the reliability problem had been solved. When that problem had been solved, it should be possible to keep such satellites in operation for from three to five years. The President said he had no argument with what was being done. However, if one wanted complete assurance of the destruction of a target, one might expend 20,000 rounds of ammunition, but if on the other hand, all one wanted was reasonable assurance of such destruction, 1000 rounds might be sufficient. He indicated that he felt we could go too far in striving for perfection.

Mr. Stans referred to recent press reports on an Air Force program for a “space plane”. He had two questions: (a) the relationship of this program to other programs, especially DYNASOAR; and (b) why this was a Department of Defense activity rather than a NASA activity. Mr. Rubel observed that this was one of a series of unauthorized disclosures to the press. The space plane proposal was neither a project nor a program. Last year industry and the Air Force had become interested in the possibility of developing a capability for a special kind of flight. This involved take off from the ground in a conventional manner, then an intake of air into the craft, the liquefication of this air, and the separation of the oxygen from the nitrogen, and the burning of the oxygen with hydrogen. Convair had prepared a “secret” brochure and had attempted to secure funds for further research. Last year and this year the Air Force had supported some related studies. The Air Force had asked for $20 million for FY 1962 for this effort. The Air Force had not yet explained what it wished to do with this money. Mr. Rubel again emphasized that no program had been approved.

Mr. McCone inquired as to the prospects of success of SAINT. In response Mr. Rubel said he had no doubt we could develop satellite intercept capability within a time period of three to four years. His only doubt was whether we could do it for the $61 million which was projected. Mr. McCone suggested that if we could do this, it raised a question of the effectiveness of SAMOS and MIDAS for we had to assume that the USSR could develop a similar capability. Mr. Rubel stated that we did not know enough about the economics of such operations to know whether the development of such a capability by the USSR would be much of a problem in relationship to SAMOS. If a SAMOS satellite were put up over the USSR and if its orbit shifted by 1000 miles on every pass, we did not know how difficult it would be for the Soviets to knock it down. The President asked whether the Russians would not be able to predict its orbit. Mr. Rubel acknowledged that they would be able to predict its orbit on the basis of one or two passes. This was why the possibility of an intercept capability raised serious doubts as to the feasibility of putting weapons in orbit. However, SAMOS could take millions of pictures in one or two passes. Therefore, it was difficult to know whether the Russians would consider it economical to knock it down. MIDAS, on the other hand, had to remain for a long time in the same orbit. It therefore might turn out to be economical to intercept MIDAS satellites. However, such intercepts would themselves constitute warning of possible attack.

Mr. Gray observed that when the President had requested this presentation, he had been concerned about the possibility that space programs were being undertaken without adequate review. Mr. Gray felt that the monitoring of these programs depended upon the mechanism which the President had approved, especially upon Dr. York’s office. His office provided a means by which ideas could be reviewed before they became programs. So long as Dr. York and Dr. Glennan were on top of the situation, we would avoid the possibility that a gleam in someone’s eye might becomes a program before anyone realized that had happened. The President said that he was delighted with the mechanism that he been created. Secretary Gates noted in this connection that the six or eight committees described by Mr. Rubel took the place of eighteen to twenty older coordinating groups. Moreover, this new mechanism had adequate authority behind it.

In connection with a brief discussion that followed of planned space shots which would occur within the next few days, Secretary Gates observed that the miniaturization of equipment which had been accomplished in connection with these various programs was one of the most astounding technical achievements in the history of mankind. It compared favorably with the Russian ability to launch larger payloads.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject, on the basis of an oral presentation by John H. Rubel, Acting Directory, Defense Research and Engineering, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 2245.

b. Noted the President’s request that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration present to the National Security Council at an early date a report on the outer space programs now being conducted under the auspices of NASA, and on the level of effort the United States should devote to non-military outer space activities in the future.

NOTE: the action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Administrator, NASA, for appropriate action.

Robert H. Johnson

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Outer Space Programs Under the Auspices of the Department of Defense. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.