Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

243. Memorandum From Burke to Gates¹

Washington, March 12, 1960

SUBJECT

• Survivability of soft bases in United States after Russian missile attack

1. There have been quite a few presentations recently concerning the survivability of important soft targets in Continental United States after a Russian ballistic missile attack. These studies are concerned with the number of missiles which Russia would have to have on launchers to destroy a large number of soft targets in the United States. The conclusions are not exactly alike because they are very dependent upon assumptions which include variables such as:

a. The number of missiles on launchers available to the Russians at various times

b. CEP—The Probable Circular Error of the missiles

c. Missile reliability both on launchers and in flight

d. Whether missile launching submarines would be used

e. If missile launching submarines are used—how many

f. The degree of destruction which the Soviets might determine they should inflict (estimates range from 70% probability of destroying all soft targets through 90% to 99%)

g. The actual targeting which the Russians might choose, i.e., would they concentrate first on all aircraft bases, next on soft missile sites, and then on hardened missile sites, or would they choose some other order of destruction?

2. Nevertheless, nearly all of the studies show that all soft targets (bases and soft missile sites) could be destroyed by a comparatively few Russian missiles and indicate that our retaliatory capability, when the Russians achieve a significant number of missiles on launchers, is dependent upon getting Polaris submarines and hardened ICBM sites operational as soon as possible—before 1963. These studies show that after some conceivable attacks by the Russians, very few SAC aircraft on United States bases would be available.

3. The presentations indicate that only the capability within the United States is considered, and that the retaliatory capability of the attack carrier striking forces was not included. The exclusion was not because they were unimportant, but because they did not lend themselves readily to mathematical analysis. It is submitted that the Russians, perhaps, would have the same difficulty in correctly appraising the capabilities of such forces. Still the possible actions that are usually recommended are confined to what can be done to achieve a greater retaliatory capability from these forces in the United States after an attack. No statements have been made as to how to increase the retaliatory capabilities which are not subject to Russian ballistic missile attack, i.e., carriers at sea.

4. To get an increase in surviving aircraft at bases in the United States, requires under some circumstances, considerable funds and effort. I believe that we may be overlooking a comparatively inexpensive way of increasing our retaliatory capability during the next few years by increasing the number of attack planes available after an attack by increasing the number of attack carriers at sea.

5. Normally there are about 200 attack aircraft in the 6th and 7th fleets. The carriers and these aircraft are not subject to ballistic missile attack when at sea. If an air attack is launched against any of these carriers we will have considerable warning, much more than any 10 or 15 minutes. This is because timing of an air attack against carriers in an unknown location could not be coordinated with an all-out missile attack for a predetermined specific time.

6. The 200 aircraft mentioned above are near the Soviet Union and, consequently, could attack quickly. There would be attrition in the carrier aircraft during the attacks, of course, but many of them will return to their carriers for use in succeeding attacks. Furthermore, in addition to the carriers of the 6th and 7th fleets at least an equal number of carriers are available for deployment from United States waters.

7. During the period in which Russia might have a significant ICBM-launching capability and in which we might have neither sufficient numbers of Polaris submarines at sea nor hardened missile sites in the United States, our capability could be significantly increased by increasing the numbers of carriers and carrier aircraft. This could be accomplished by keeping in commission our older attack carriers (those now scheduled to be replaced) and by augmenting the number of attack aircraft. The older carriers kept in commission could continue their usefulness until ’63 or ’64. When sufficient hardened ICBM and Polaris missiles are operational the attack carrier force could then be returned to present strength.

8. It is recommended, therefore, that consideration be given to increasing the number of carriers and carrier combat aircraft during the next few years if it is determined that an increase in the aircraft surviving capability during this period is necessary.

Arleigh Burke

Note on Op–07 copy:

Please get this to Dr. Kistiakowsky and any other people who can use it.

Note on Op–61 copy:

Please get this to State.

1. Source: Survivability of soft bases in United States after Soviet missile attack. Top Secret. 3 pp. Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.