Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

242. Memorandum of Discussion at the 435th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, February 18, 1960

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 435th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, February 18, 1960

Present at the 435th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding (for Item 1); Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State, presiding (for Items 2, 3 and 4); Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense; and Leo A. Hoegh, Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the Council meeting and participating in the Council actions below were Fred Scribner, Jr., for the Secretary of the Treasury, Maurice A. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget; and John A. McCone, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1); Also attending the meeting were General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; General Thomas S. White, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; George V. Allen, Director, U.S. Information Agency; Maj. General Wilton B. Persons, The Assistant to the President; Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Karl G. Harr, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination; George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; Brig. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, White House Staff Secretary; Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State; from the Department of Defense—Dr. Herbert F. York, John N. Irwin, II, Samuel Clements, and Lt.Col. Edward V. Needels; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Charles Haskins, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NON-LETHAL WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE FOR POSSIBLE USE

(NSC Action No. 2105–d; NSC 5906/1, paragraph 13)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background, recalling the 1950 policy that the US will undertake gas warfare only in retaliation against its use by an enemy and the present policy, dating from 1956, that the US will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces, the decision as to the use of such weapons being made by the President. Mr. Gray also referred to the view of the Director, Bureau of the Budget, expressed during the review of Basic Policy in July 1959, that we were spending too much money on chemical and biological weapons if we did not intend to use them and too little money if we did intend to use them. Mr. Gray noted that NSC Action 2105 adopted at that time called for the presentation which was about to be made by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer.

Dr. York said that one of the important fields of chemical and biological warfare was controlled temporary incapacitation. Research and development in this field might open up a new dimension of warfare in which incapacitating agents would be used in situations short of all-out war and in situations where the use of nuclear weapons was not possible or feasible. In the term controlled temporary incapacitation, the word “controlled” meant that the time of onset, the duration and the severity of incapacitation could be regulated; the word “temporary” meant that persons subjected to incapacitating agents would eventually completely recover from the direct effects, although minor indirect effects might persist permanently; the word “incapacitation” referred to a variety of effects including extreme irritation, black-out, lethargy, paralysis, discoordinated actions, temporary illness and lack of a will to fight. Dr. York then displayed a chart on chemical incapacitating agents indicating that tear gas (CN–CS) was available now, an anesthetic agent (SN) which caused temporary paralysis would be available soon and a discoordinating agent (K), which would make a cat afraid of a mouse, would be available in the future. A chart of biological incapacitating agents was displayed indicating that an agent causing Q-fever (OU) was available now and NU (VEE) agent would be available soon. A Rift Valley fever agent (FA) and tailored variants of the other agents would be available in the future. Dr. York then reported with the aid of a chart that chemical incapacitation agents had about the same efficiency in the field as tactical nuclear weapons inasmuch as a 10,000 pound missile, 5 per cent of which was chemical agent, could cover one square mile. It was hoped that by 1965 a 10,000 pound missile could cover 10 square miles. Dr. York displayed charts on technical advances and potentials of biological warfare agents indicating that agent concentration and agent storage (now one year; soon to become 3 years) would soon be improved. Charts also showed that the biological decay rate was several per cent per minute and the efficiency of dissemination of biological agents depended on the fraction of the munitions which consisted of the agent.

Turning to weapons systems Dr. York indicated that biological and chemical agents might be disseminated by means of manned aircraft sprays, drone aircraft sprays, toxic darts, grenades, tactical rockets, special operations, ballistic missiles, or bomblets prepared for use with aircraft, rockets or ballistic missiles.

The US has a relatively poor posture vis-a-vis the USSR, Dr. York continued, our stockpile of chemical and biological agents being one-fourth that of the USSR. Moreover, most of the Soviet agents are lethal. In addition we have trained in chemical and biological warfare only 1/30 of the troops the USSR has trained and we do less in defense against such agents than the Soviet Union does. In the latter connection Dr. York said that the need for research on defense against chemical and biological agents had been strongly indicated by a recent experiment in which an aircraft flew along a flight line of 230 miles releasing simulated agents. After three days the simulated agents covered 300,000 square miles. If the airplane had released powerful chemical or biological agents instead of the simulant, the area would have sustained casualties of 30 per cent. Dr. York then called on General Lemnitzer to continue the presentation.

General Lemnitzer said that Dr. York had described the characteristics of chemical and biological weapons; he would deal with the doctrinal aspects of these weapons. Chemical and biological agents had been very effectively developed since World War II but the doctrine for their use had not changed very much. General Lemnitzer thought that such agents had a number of advantages. They have important search capabilities for use against dispersed or concealed targets; they are flexible, since they can cause either casualties or incapacitation and the length of the latter can be controlled; coverage of a large area is possible; heavy casualties can be inflicted without physical destruction or property damage. Accordingly, chemical and biological agents might have a great potential in future warfare, especially where friendly civilians may be present in an area occupied by enemy forces. General Lemnitzer said he would give three examples of the possible use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents. The first example concerned trouble in South East Asia. He asked the Council to assume that important areas in North Laos had been seized by Communist forces. The task of friendly forces was to retake key areas, capture or disarm the Communist forces and prevent their re-entry into the country. This assumed situation provided opportunity for the use of NU, which caused a form of encephalitis. A lethal agent could not be used under these conditions because friendly civilians and enemy forces were present in the same area. General Lemnitzer then displayed a map of North Laos showing areas assumed to be held by Communist forces and areas on which bomblets of NU would be dropped or which would be subjected to spray from aircraft. He estimated that two medium bomber loads would incapacitate all the people in the area shown on the map. An entire province of North Laos could be covered by the use of more planes. After this biological agent had had a chance to take effect (three days), parachutists would be flown in to take over the area.

Turning to Example No. 2, General Lemnitzer asked the Council to assume that the Communists had organized a movement in Panama designed to take over the Panama Canal. Stimulated by Communist agitation, mobs had marched on the Canal and had halted operations at two of the locks. It had been decided to disperse the crowd by ordering helicopters to spread tear gas. All persons subjected to the tear gas would eventually recover after breathing fresh air for a sufficient length of time, but immediately on being subjected to tear gas they would be impelled to seek fresh air in the shortest time possible. One helicopter could cover a circle of a thousand yards in diameter in this manner. The apparatus necessary for this use of chemical agents was under development and would soon be available. This procedure would enable friendly forces to regain and maintain control of the Panama Canal locks without bloodshed.

Example No. 3 concerned the Kuwait area. It was assumed that strong insurgent guerrilla forces had seized the oil facilities in the area and had rounded up as hostages several thousand US and UK civilians. Friendly forces were required to regain control of the area before the oil facilities were destroyed and to recapture the hostages before they were executed. A chemical agent sprayed from an aircraft could within five minutes prostrate all personnel in the area for twelve hours, during which time friendly forces could move in and regain control. 2600 pounds of the agent would cover a square mile and there would be no physical damage.

General Lemnitzer said his examples had been confined to incapacitating agents but lethal agents could be used in the same way. The examples had also been examples of catching the enemy by surprise. He had illustrated only an offensive use of chemical and biological agents; however, before using such agents offensively it was necessary to develop a strong capability to defend against them.

Dr. York, concluding the presentation, said that he had been impressed by the development of possibilities in the field of controlled temporary incapacitation over the last several years. He thought it was possible the researchers were on the trail of something revolutionary. The use of chemical and biological incapacitating agents extended from mild control up to effects comparable to those of tactical atomic weapons. The Defense Department proposed to expand the budget for chemical and biological warfare, which was now $50 million a year, by a factor of three by 1965.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that the Science Advisory Committee about a year ago had looked into the question of chemical and biological warfare and had concluded that research and development in this field should be continued since the prospects were definitely bright. He reported that he had independently made his own study of incapacitating agents and had come to the same conclusion. The Science Advisory Committee had recommended that research and development in the field be strenghened. The President said he concurred.

Mr. Stans noted that a year ago he had been told that the US had a $300 million inventory in chemical and biological agents. He wondered whether this inventory was being reevaluated in the light of recent developments. General Lemnitzer thought the inventory referred to by Mr. Stans was an inventory carried over from World War II. There had been little production of chemical and biological agents since World War II. Mr. Stans asked whether he was correct in understanding that there would be no substantial stockpiling of chemical and biological agents during the research and development period. General Lemnitzer confirmed Mr. Stans’ understanding. The President said that since chemical and biological agents could be manufactured at a reasonably rapid rate, capacity for manufacturing rather than a stockpile would be needed. Secretary Gates, referring to public and world opinion on the use of chemical and biological weapons, wondered whether such use should not be put in the same category as the use of atomic weapons; that is, use should be made subject to decision by the President. Mr. Gray read Paragraph 13 of NSC 5906/1 indicating that under present policy Presidential decision is required for the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The President said one great difficulty occurred to him in connection with the use of incapacitating agents. While the use of such agents was a splendid idea, if we tried to use them in a humane manner, our enemy would probably charge us with germ warfare and then would proceed in retaliation to use lethal chemical and biological weapons. He understood that some of these lethal weapons, particularly nerve gas, were quite terrible. Before we used chemical and biological weapons, we would need to have proper defensive equipment. He understood that at the present time US gas masks would not protect against all types of lethal agents. Dr. York said present masks protected against all agents except those absorbed by the skin. He added that we had no protection against bullets and therefore would be in no worse position in chemical warfare than we were in now in other forms of warfare. The President said chemical and biological weapons had considerably less discrimination than a bullet. Dr. York felt that at the very least chemical and biological weapons were no worse than atomic weapons.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that a sharp distinction should be made between chemical warfare and biological warfare. Chemical warfare, e.g., the use of tear gas, had been accepted throughout the world in police actions, but biological warfare had not been so accepted. Mr. Dulles strongly agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky, saying that we ought to assimilate our use of incapacitating agents to the use of tear gas. He felt we needed some incapacitating agent which we could use respectably.

General Twining agreed with the President that if we began the use of chemical or biological agents, our enemy would retaliate with lethal agents. If we intend to use incapacitating agents we should publicize their non-lethal effects to the greatest possible extent.

At this point the President left the meeting and the remainder of the meeting was presided over by Secretary Herter.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral presentation on the subject by the Department of Defense, prepared pursuent to NSC Action No. 2105–d, as presented by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

[Omitted here are pages 7–12.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Technological Developments in Non-Lethal Weapons and Doctrine for Possible Use. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.