Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

228. Briefing Note for the January 7 NSC Meeting¹

Washington, January 7, 1960

CARGO AIR LIFT (NSC 5919)

Our first item this morning, Mr. President, is a draft policy paper on the development of cargo air lift.

Last August I was asked to put this subject, which was then at issue between various agencies (notably Defense and FAA), through the NSC machinery and in that way bring it to you for resolution. The paper before you is the product of a number of Planning Board meetings in which Justice, Commerce and FAA participated. Today we have with us for this item the Secretary of Commerce, General Quesada and Chairman Durfee of the CAB.

However, before we go into this paper, the Defense Department has recently submitted to the President a study entitled “The Role of MATS in Peace and War” containing, among other things, a series of recommendations, which, I understand, are not inconsistent with the Defense position in the paper before us, with one possible exception which has to do with whether the Department of Defense will be restricted to the use of certificated air carriers for cargo air lift purposes. The Defense Department report, which has been given no distribution up to this time, is not up for consideration by the Council or decision by the President today. However, I believe it will be useful for the Council to know the report’s recommendations before it considers the draft policy paper. Therefore, I have asked the Secretary of Defense to summarize the recommendations which he has submitted to the President in this study.

(PRESENTATION BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE)

The general considerations of this paper state the desirability of an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet, outline the conditions which have limited the development of such a fleet, and spell out the conditions which would stimulate the development of such a fleet. Briefly, we do not have an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet today for several reasons. In the commercial field, long preoccupation with the more profitable passenger business and with constant passenger aircraft modernization has resulted in a lack of emphasis on the development of the cargo business and of uncompromised all-cargo aircraft. In the last several years the Department of Defense has had a higher priority requirement for the development of convertible (troop-cargo) aircraft than for the development of all-cargo aircraft. Finally, the U.S. Government maintains a substantial military cargo airlift capability and has not fully utilized in peacetime available civil cargo airlift.

The first split occurs in paragraph 1. The majority would say that it is in the national security interest of the U.S. to have available an efficient and effective civil air cargo fleet, and that such a fleet could also serve as an instrument of other national policies. Treasury and Budget prefer to say simply that such a fleet would be in the interest of the U.S. I understand that there has been some negotiation on this language between General Quesada and Budget end Treasury.

CALL ON GENERAL QUESADA

(others?)

The next split occurs in paragraph 10–b, at the top of page 6. The majority believe that a combination of four things would stimulate development of a modern air cargo fleet. These four things are the progressive transfer of MATS business, appropriate reductions in average rates, the enactment of legislation offering U.S. guarantee loans for the purchase of new all-cargo aircraft, and a continued rapid growth of commercial demands for air cargo service. Treasury and Budget propose that the purchase loan guarantee legislation be deleted from the list. It should be noted that this draft policy paper does not recommend a decision to the President on this legislation, which will be coordinated through the usual Budget Bureau process. Normally a question of this kind would not be discussed by the NSC, but the legislation is part of General Quesada’s recommended plan for expanding civil cargo air lift. The question, Mr. President, is therefore whether you want to discuss the legislation at this time.

IF PRESIDENT’S ANSWER IS AFFIRMATIVE, CALL ON

SECRETARY SCRIBNER

MR. STANS

MR. QUESADA

SECRETARY MUELLER

Turning to the statement of objective, paragraph 15 on page 9, I should like to read this agreed language.

READ PARAGRAPH 15

The first policy guidance paragraph (par. 16, pages 10–11) is divided into three parts. 16–a deals with the first stage of transfer of MATS business to civil carriers. 16–b deals with a further transfer as civil carriers equip themselves with uncompromised cargo aircraft. 16–c sets limits on the transfer provided for in a and b.

In the first split in 16–a, the majority would make the transfer of MATS cargo business to civil carriers dependent on the availability in the civil fleet of modern types of aircraft, such as DC–7F and L–1049H. The Budget Bureau proposes deletion of this condition on the grounds that it would be inconsistent with the general policy of the Federal Government, referred to in par. 11, not to carry on any commercial activity to provide a service for its own use if such service can be procured from private enterprise. I understand that Budget is now willing to withdraw from proposing the deletion of this condition. The JCS want to delete, here and in paragraph 10–c, references to specific aircraft because it is not desirable to site any illustrative examples which, by implication, suggest that the need for a modern cargo transport can be satisfied by aircraft which are essentially converted passenger types. This raises the question as to whether the JCS would support any transfer of business to presently available aircraft.

CALL ON MR. STANS

SECRETARY GATES

GENERAL TWINING

MR. QUESADA

The second split in 16–a involves the preference to be given, in contracting out cargo business to the civil carriers, to those carriers which demonstrate a willingness and ability to acquire uncompromised cargo aircaft. Defense and JCS propose that such a preference be given to the extent feasible. Treasury, Commerce, Budget and FAA propose stronger wording: that such a preference be given wherever possible.

CALL ON SECRETARY GATES

GENERAL TWINING

MR. QUESADA

SECRETARY MUELLER

Turning to 16–c, we have another important split. There is agreement on the minimum posture of MATS to be maintained. The split occurs because Defense, JCS, OCDM and State would have MATS “productively utilize during peacetime the capability so maintained”. The JCS have made a comment on this, which reads as follows:

If the MATS operation and capability is adjusted toward meeting its wartime “hard-core” mission considerable airlift no doubt will be transferred to commercial air carriers. The peacetime airlift capability of MATS generated during peacetime should be fully utilized by the Services. It is considered unsound and uneconomical to procure airlift from commercial sources and at the same time not utilize that airlift capability generated in realistic training of the military air transport forces.

I believe those opposing this provision fear that it would authorize MATS to continue to carry considerable non-hard-core cargo which would otherwise be transferred to civil carriers under 16–a and b.

CALL ON SECRETARY GATES

GENERAL TWINING

MR. QUESADA

MR. STANS

(other?)

On paragraph 16–c–(2), the JCS want to add the following language: “Assure, by appropriate contracts and agreements backed by necessary legislation, that the civil aircraft” etc. Although I don’t believe that there would be any objection to the additional language, the Planning Board proposed that this paragraph be given to Defense for coordination and assumed that Defense would do whatever it felt necessary to implement it.

Paragraph 17, an agreed paragraph, was put in because there is a strong difference of view within the Executive Branch as to whether the Government does now have immediate availability of the civil air cargo fleet to meet military and mobilization requirements and as to whether present arrangements under which the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is on call are adequate. The JCS suggest a language change that would make the paragraph applicable to the entire fleet, passenger as well as cargo. Even though this is a paper on cargo air lift, I don’t believe there will be any objection to this change.

Paragraph 18 is also an agreed paragraph. As I stated before, this paper does not attempt to recommend a decision on purchase loan guarantee/legislation. This paragraph simply says that, if such legislation is proposed, it should contain provisions to ensure the immediate availability of the cargo aircraft involved. The JCS suggest some language changes which seem to be purely editorial in nature. Would you care to speak to them, General Twining?

Finally, I would like to call the Council’s attention to the unusual proposal for assigning coordinating responsibility. Instead of assigning the whole paper to one agency, Defense would have coordinating responsibility for paragraph 16, OCDM for 17, and FAA for 18.

1. Source: Cargo air lift (NSC 5919). Confidential. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.