Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

224. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–8–59

Washington, December 23, 1959

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964

NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The complete text will be circulated within five days of this issuance.

• The probable Soviet ICBM force.

• Medium Range Ballestic Missiles

• Long Range Aviation

• Submarine-launched Missiles

SUBJECT

• NIE 11–8–59: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet long-range air and missile weapons systems suitable for strategic attack, through mid-1964.²

FOREWORD

The critical feature of this estimate is our judgment with respect to the force goals of the existing Soviet ICBM program. This judgment is based in part on calculations regarding Soviet ICBM requirements for various defined strategic purposes. These calculations are especially sensitive to possible differences between our assumptions and those actually made by Soviet planners with respect to two important factors:

a. The probable future performance characteristics of the improving Soviet ICBM.

b. The probable future development of the US nuclear retaliatory force.

We have assumed for the Soviet ICBM the performance characteristics estimated for it at various dates in NIE 11–5–59, “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,” dated 3 November 1959. Soviet planners may expect a better performance, in which case their estimates of the numbers required would be lower than ours. However, we would expect them to use conservative assumptions in making so vital a calculation.

With respect to Soviet targeting, we have assumed that existing approved US military programs will be carried out. Explicit information on these programs is presumably not available to Soviet planners, but we believe that they have enough general information from open sources to be able to estimate them with fair accuracy. These US programs are, of course, subject to change—as is the Soviet ICBM program also. The present Soviet ICBM program, however, must be based on the present Soviet estimate of the probable future development of the target system.

It is beyond the scope of this estimate to consider what political or military courses of action the USSR might adopt if the development of its strategic attack capabilities were to be as estimated herein. Such matters will be considered in the forthcoming NIE 11–4–59, “Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959–1964.”

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Soviet rulers probably regard their present strategic attack forces as capable of devastating US and Allied concentrations of population and industry, but incapable of preventing, by military action, the nuclear devastation of the USSR. (Para. 26)

B. The ICBM presents the best prospect of being able to deliver a heavy weight of attack within the least time after a decision to attack, and thereby to prevent the launching or reduce the weight of a US strategic attack on the USSR. Hence, we believe that the future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will be primarily a function of the development, production, and deployment of ICBMs. Soviet ICBM capabilities will be supplemented by the development of a submarine-launched missile capability and by the maintenance of a substantial long-range bomber capability. (Paras. 30–33)

C. Our analysis shows that a crucial question for this estimate is whether the Soviet rulers would consider it feasible to achieve in 1961, through a rapid deployment of operational ICBMs, such a military, political, and psychological advantage over the US as would enable them to impose their will. After 1961 the numbers of semihardened and hardened US ICBM sites programmed to become operational would result in a steep increase in Soviet ICBM requirements. (Para. 36)

D. On the basis of the estimated reliability and accuracy of the Soviet ICBM, a program to provide 400–500 ICBMs on launcher (540–680 in operational inventory) in mid-1961 would give the USSR a very high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC operational air bases and unhardened ICBM sites beyond the range of 1,100 n.m. missiles, or considerably less assurance of being able to inflict such damage on hardened ICBM sites as well as unhardened sites and air bases. If the USSR were to exercise this attack capability, it would still have to expect retaliation from bombers then on airborne alert, from all or some of the few semihardened and hardened ICBM sites then operational, and from aircraft carriers and missile-launching submarines then at sea. We believe that Soviet planners would not regard this as a “decisive military superiority,” although it would certainly be a powerful threat with strong psychological and political effects throughout the world.³ (Paras. 35, 39, and Annex A, Para. 2)

E. Such a force goal could be realized in mid-1961 only through a crash program requiring diversion of resources from other programs to which the Soviet rulers have attached great importance, and a level of activity that would tend to stimulate US countermeasures. There is no indication that such a Soviet effort is now underway. We do not believe that the Soviet rulers would make such a heavy investment in a program unlikely to achieve a “decisive military superiority.”⁴ (Para. 40)

F. Every present indication suggests that the Soviet ICBM program, while not a crash program, is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. The goal of the program is probably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary to provide a substantial deterrent and pre-emptive attack capability. In our view, this would be consistent with the present deliberate and orderly tempo of the Soviet ICBM test-firing program, with current Soviet military doctrine, and with the USSR’s observed policy of maintaining a balance among military capabilities designed to accomplish various missions.⁵ (Para. 41)

G. We conclude that the present Soviet ICBM program would provide on the order of 140–200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. Within this range, there is a difference of view among the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to provide about 140 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as justifying additional effort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 is likely to be towards the high side of the 140–200 range. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, also estimates that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 is likely to be towards the high side of this range, but it should be noted that he estimates the characteristics of the Soviet ICBM to be considerably better than those estimated by the majority. All members of the United States Intelligence Board believe a Soviet force of more than 200 ICBMs on launcher in mid-1961 to be unlikely. (Para. 47)

H. The development of the Soviet ICBM force beyond 1961 would be likely to be affected by such considerations as the actual development of the target system to be attacked, the prospects for a greatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects (on both sides) for an effective anti-ICBM, as well as by the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed in the light of such considerations and of evidence on the actual progress of the Soviet ICBM program. Based on our estimate of the USSR’s present program and intentions, we believe that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be in the range of 250–350 in mid-1962, and 350–450 in mid-1963.⁶ (Para. 48)

I. The USSR will have no serious difficulty in meeting its estimated requirements for 700 n.m. and 1,100 n.m. ballistic missiles. (Paras. 50–52)

J. On the basis of the foregoing conclusions, our numerical estimates of Soviet medium and heavy bombers in Long Range Aviation units, long and medium-range ballistic missiles, and missile-launching submarines are as shown in the following table:⁷ ⁸

	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
Bombers
Heavy	135	150	140	130	120
Medium	1,100	1,050	1,000	900	800
Missiles
700 n.m.
In Inventory	250	350	450	450	450
On Launcher	110	150	150	150	150
1,100 n.m.
In Inventory	80	160	240	300	300
On Launcher	50	100	100	100	100
ICBM
In Inventory	50	175–270	325–450	450–560	a
On Launcher	35	140–200	250–350	350–450	b
Submarines
“Z” classc	4	4	4	4	4
“G” classd	9	15	18	18	18
Nucleare	—	2	6	10	14
448

1. Source: “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through Mid-1964.” Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
2. “Strategic attack” as used herein is defined as nuclear attack against retaliatory forces and key war-making strengths in North America, as well as US and Allied retaliatory forces at sea and in overseas areas. The weapons systems primarily considered are heavy and medium bombers assigned to Long Range Aviation, related air-to-surface missiles, ground launched missiles with maximum ranges of 700 nautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles. It is recognized that other delivery systems are available for use against targets at sea and overseas. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. For his position, see his footnote following Conclusion H. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in the last sentence of Conclusion D, Conclusions E and F, and the last sentence of Conclusion H. He does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it, warrents the judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence. At any rate, he does not believe that the economic and physical difficulties involved in attaining “decisive military superiority” would be or are determinative. (See also his footnote to Annex B) Rather, he believes that the Soviet leaders, perceiving the potentialities inherent in ICBMs, are attempting to achieve a capability for decision through exploitation of this force or actual launching, if necessary.
   Assuming the improved reliability, accuracy, and war-head of the Soviet ICBM as he estimates them, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviet leaders will assign a high priority to building an ICBM force which would give the USSR a reasonably high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC operational air bases and at the same time a somewhat lower degree of assurance of similar damage on US ICBM sites. He believes that such an objective could be attained with an operational ICBM force of about 250 (185 on launcher) by mid-1961 and 500 (385 on launcher) by mid-1962. It is generally agreed that the Soviets have both the technical and industrial capability to produce such a force.
   It is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, that Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained a capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by mid-1962, but he believes the long range objective of the Soviet ICBM is “decisive military superiority.” He does not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize the possibility of error in their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western pre-emption of their deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weight the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, to exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western “desperate” acts would induce them to attempt attainment of total deterrence, i.e., “decisive military superiority.”
   In view of the potentialities for military superiority inherent in ICBMs for the period of this estimate, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, concludes that the Soviet program is aimed at attaining an operational inventory of 800 (640 on launcher) by mid-1963 and 1,100 (880 on launcher) by mid-1964.

7. DISSENTING VIEWS

   The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF does not concur in the numbers of heavy bombers and ICBMs estimated, believing they should be:

   	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
   Heavy bombers	135	150	175	200	200
   ICBM
   In Inventory	50	250	500	800	1,100
   On Launcher	35	185	385	640	880

8. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, does not concur in the numbers of heavy bombers estimated. In his view, future Soviet heavy bomber strength will approximate the following:

   	Mid-1960	Mid-1961	Mid-1962	Mid-1963	Mid-1964
   Heavy bombers	125	115	100	75	75

448. EXPLANATORY NOTES

     a At least 450, possibly more.

     b At least 350, possibly more.

     c Each “Z” class submarine would probably carry two missiles.

     d Each “G” class submarine would probably carry about five missiles.

     e The associated missile may not become available until 1963, in which case the missile used in the “G” class might be used in this submarine. Each submarine would probably carry 6–12.