Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

223. Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, December 16, 1959

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, December 16, 1959

Present at the 429th NSC Meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Acting Secretary of Defense (Douglas); and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury (Scribner); the Director, Bureau or the Budget; the Attorney General (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 1). Also attending the meeting were General Thomas S. White for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Security Operations Coordination, and for Science and Technology; the Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr. Howard Furnas, Department or State; Mr. Haydn Williams, Department or Defense; Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. EMERGENCY RELOCATION PLAN—NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(NSC 5521; Cabinet Paper 59–98/1, June 12, 1959; NSC 5917)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 5917. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

In connection with Paragraph 3–(b) of the Briefing Note, Mr. Gray referred to inter-agency disagreement as to whether blast protection was to be provided for the State Department relocation site. Mr. Stans said this issue would shortly be resolved. OCDM would soon submit a request to proceed with construction for blast protection at Front Royal and at that time the Bureau of the Budget proposed to get the interested parties together for a discussion.

After reading the Briefing Note, Mr. Gray made some observations on war-gaming. He said that in the last seven years there had been very little “play of the problem” by the National Security Council in OPERATION ALERT. Indeed in the last two years the Council had not met at all during OPERATION ALERT. For very good reasons, such as security and “cover”, the President had dealt with OPERATION ALERT through the Cabinet and had decided not to make it an NSC operation. However, the result is that we have little idea how the NSC mechanisam would function under emergency conditions. We have only a limited idea of the role of the Planning Board in an emergency. OPERATION ALERT in the past had been largely a resources exercise and the participants had been resources agencies which did not deal with the kind of problems that would need to be dealt with by the NSC under the Presidential concept of the Council as a war cabinet. The difficulty of visualizing the exact working of relocation had led to the suggestion that national security policy-making in a crisis be tested by war-gaming, as outlined in the attached paper dated December 16, 1959 which had been placed before the Council. The President, Mr. Gray continued, might or might not want to authorize a war-gaming exercise, but no doubt he would be interested in the views of the Council on the subject. Mr. Gray then summarized the paragraphs of the war-gaming paper dealing with purpose, scope and cover. At the conclusion of his summary, he informed the Council that this problem had been discussed by the Planning Board the day before and that the general feeling of the Board was that it was worth serious consideration and would help answer such questions as, Should Planning Board Members be relocated with their respective agencies or be relocated in a body? Mr. Gray said in the abstract he could support either answer to this question, but felt that a clearer idea could be obtained by war-gaming. In conclusion Mr. Gray suggested that if the Council thought well of the war-gamming proposal, it might wish to await conclusion of the game before recommending to the President changes in the current relocation plan.

Mr. Patterson said he thought a war-gaming exercise would represent a great gain not only to the NSC, but also to other agencies, and noted that OCDM might be taking another look at the OPERATION ALERT exercise. With respect to the issue which had arisen over blast protection at Front Royal, Governor Hoegh intended to confer with the Secretary of State and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at an early date on the principles of blast protection.

Mr. Gray noted that the relocation plans now call for the Secretary of State to be at Front Royal, with other Cabinet Members at various other locations, and asked whether the President in time of emergency would be satisfied to have his principal advisers scattered, in view of transportation difficulties and the danger of repeated attacks. Mr. Gray believed the President might want his principal advisers with him. Concepts of this kind had never really been tested, because relocation heretofore had been based largely on the idea of restoring the country after a nuclear attack. Another concept which might be tested by the war-game would be the condition which would arise if the enemy’s first attack were directed solely at our retaliatory capability, with our population left largely intact, followed by an ultimatum which called upon us to surrender or suffer attack on our population centers. Mr. Gray called attention again to the fact that the war-gaming paper proposed that war-gaming take place under cover of, but not as a part of, OPERATION ALERT. Mr. Patterson felt that this was a correct concept.

Secretary Dillon thought it would be desirable to determine whether a study would be advantageous before jumping straight into a war-game. He was very concerned about the question of “visibility” and, on the basis of past experience, he was inclined to be pessimistic about preventing leaks. It would be particularly unfortunate to have the war-game exercise leak if it dealt with the concept last described by Mr. Gray; that is, a Soviet attack on our rataliatory capability followed by an ultimatum to surrender or suffer attack on population centers. He felt the whole idea of a war-game needed more study and that it would be better not to have such a game until further study was completed. He wondered how much time would be required to conduct the war-game.

Mr. Gray said two successive days would probably be required for the senior participants in the game. All preparations would be made in advance and would not involve the senior participants. The two days would allow for two different assumed situations, one to be covered each day. The President, Mr. Gray continued, had always requested Cabinet Members to be available for participation in OPERATION ALERT, but many members had not found participation possible. If the President decided to have a war-game, he would have to request the senior participants to devote two days to the exercise.

Mr. Patterson pointed out that Secretaries Herter and Mitchell had participated in the last OPERATION ALERT. Mr. Patterson also thought that a better name than war-geme should be applied to the exercise.

Mr. Gray said he understood the Joint Chiefs of Staff had participated in OPERATION ALERT largely on the logistic side. General White said the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, had participated in other alert exercises. One such exercise, just completed, had involved the Secretary of Defense and the unified commanders.

Secretary Douglas felt that a clearer statement of the questions to be decided in connection with relocation was needed. There were perhaps good reasons for conducting a war-game, but he felt a more detailed proposal was required before the Defense view on the subject could be formulated. Secretary Dillion said his feelings were similar to those of Secretary Douglas.

Mr. Gray asked whether it was not the consensus of the Council that the notion of a war-game to test national security policy-making in a crisis has possibilities, but that the Council wants further information before proceeding.

Mr. Allen, referring to the paper on war-gaming, asked what “freedom of the game” meant? General White said he assumed this phrase referred to whether or not the game was “canned”. Mr. Gray confirmed General White’s view. General White said he wished to make two additional points. First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would like to participate in any military situation assumed as part of the war-game; and secondly, war-gaming would involve a great many people and a great deal of time. Secretary Dillon said State would have problems as to time and personnel if political decisions were involved in the war-game. Mr. Gray said the war-gaming proposal should be discussed further in the Planning Board. He wished to point out, however, that the war-gaming proposal had virtues apart from the relocation paper. The concept of how the NSC night be used under emergency conditions was important. The Planning Board should therefore prepare a report identifying and analyzing problems involved in alternative concepts for the use of the NSC organization in wartime. The Vice President agreed with Mr. Gray that war-gaming should be further discussed by the Planning Board. Mr. Gray said he would also like to have NSC 5917 referred back to the Planning Board.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the draft statement on the subject contained in NSC 5917, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 16, 1959) and a proposal by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs for testing national security policy-making in a crisis by a gaming technique.

b. Directed the NSC Planning Board to prepare a report identifying and analyzing questions and problems involved in alternative concepts of the use of the NSC organization in wartime.

c. Referred NSC 5917 back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion and the report referred to in b above.

[Omitted here are agenda items 2 and 3.]

4. TOPICS FOR FUTURE DISCUSSION OR CONSIDERATION BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Memo for NSC Members and Advisers from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, same subject, dated December 3, 1959; memos for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 14 and 15, 1959)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on each of the topics listed in the NSC Action below and after describing each topic paused to allow opportunity for discussion. (A Copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). With respect to some topics, the Council, without discussion, reached the agreement set forth in the NSC Action below. However, certain other topics elicited discussion as indicated in the following paragraphs.

Cuba. Secretary Dillon said the problem of Cuba was extremely complex and delicate, not only because of action taken with respect to Cuba, but also because of the psychological reaction to any actions which might be taken. Since there had been continuing discussions between the President and the Secretary of State with respect to Cuba, Mr. Dillion believed that the Planning Board should not be hasty about taking up Cuban policy until the President and the Secretary of State returned. In any event, the problem of Cuba should be handled under special security precautions. The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba should be undertaken. Mr. Gray said there was disagreement within the Government on the basic approach to the Cuban problem. The Treasury’s suggestion for a paper on Cuba had been deliberately provocative, that is, intended to elicit discussion. Mr. Gray felt that certain elements in the State Department, particularly Assistant Secretary Rubottom, opposed Planning Board work on Cuba. The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration’s Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican as well as the Democratic members of Congress. In his view a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate. Secretary Dillon said he was concerned that a strong attitude which this Government might assume in order to satisfy public opinion would not achieve basic U.S. objectives with respect to Cuba. The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro. No doubt radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction throughout Latin America, but we needed to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely. The Attorney General remarked that his Department could be either tough or lenient with respect to anti-Castro elements operating in Florida. He needed policy guidance, however, before specific instructions could be given to FBI agents in the Miami area. Mr. Gray said that a discussion of Cuba by the Council would not mean that the policy would be rewritten in detail, but only that the problem would be discussed on the basis of a paper prepared by the Planning Board, which would be seized of the problem only for the purpose of preparing a discussion outline. Mr. Scribner said Treasury had suggested the question of Cuba not necessarily for the purpose of changing the policy or interfering with State’s conduct of our relations with Cuba, but for the purpose of discussing the problem. Secretary Dillon said he had no objection to a discussion of Cuba, but he thought the matter should be handled as a delicate one without wide dissemination of knowledge that it was being discussed. The Vice President felt that Assistant Secretary Rubottom and the Planning Board could probably agree on what matters it would be appropriate to discuss. He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province. Secretary Dillon suggested that the Planning Board might go ahead with the preparation of a Discussion Paper. The Vice President felt this was a good solution and added that we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba as a crisis situation. The Attorney General indicated that from 30 to 40 FBI agents in the Miami area were spending all their time on Cuban affairs, but were having some difficulties because they did not know whether it was our policy to permit anti-Castro activities to continue in Flordia or whether such activities should be stopped. Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba.

Disarmament. With respect to disarmament, Secretary Dillon remarked that this Government would be faced with decisions earlier than planned. The Secretary of State and Mr. Lloyd had agreed that detailed planning was necessary.

Outer Space. With respect to U.S. policy on Outer Space, the Vice President said he would be very much interested in reading the proposed revision of our Outer Space policy. He felt there would be a great deal of discussion of Outer Space soon after Congress convenes.

The Attorney General felt that the Administration should be prepared to present a good case to Congress, not only on Outer Space, but on other matters also. We should think in terms of a persuasive presentation and not permit various segments of the Administration to appear before Congress and talk in different voices. The Vice President agreed that when the President returned from his trip he will have the greatest prestige of any President since Roosevelt. That prestige, properly used and used positively, could have quite an effect. The Attorney General recalled that before 1956 the Administration had had a liaison group which cleared and coordinated presentations to Congress. The Attorney General felt that sometimes the Administration reacted in a frightened manner to Congressional requests; he believed that such reaction was a poor tactic. The Vice President felt the Administration would need a well-understood, affirmative policy with respect to such things as the National Security Council, Cuban Policy, Outer Space, nuclear testing, disarmament, and nuclear power, all of which would probably be investigated by the Congress next year. Mr. Gray recalled that the Outer Space budget was already set for the next fiscal year and suggested that a summary of this discussion might be communicated to General Persons for legislative liaison purposes. The Acting Director, OCDM, Mr. Patterson, said the subject of legislative liaison was perhaps a proper one for Cabinet consideration. The Vice President noted that the subject would be considered by the Cabinet on Friday.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities. Secretary Dillon remarked that this subject should by all means be studied because of its serious implications.

Nuclear Weapons. Mr. McCone remarked that the question of sharing nuclear weapons with our allies would come up immediately when Congress reconvened because of the State-Defense suggestion that GENIE be used by the U.K. under emergency conditions. The Joint Committee was so concerned about this suggestion that it wanted to have a special session to look into the matter, but was finally persuaded to discuss the problem in regular session. The question of other weapons will no doubt be brought up in a general review of our whole policy on sharing nuclear weapons. Mr. McCone felt that this problem was really one to be handled by State and Defense. It was a difficult one because some members of the Joint Committee had previously stated publicly that our policy on sharing nuclear weapons involved no actual U.K. custody of nuclear weapons; contrary to this view, it now appeared that we were about to turn custody of some weapons over to the U.K. He suggested that sharing of nuclear weapons with allies was a topic deserving urgent consideration by the Council.

Basic Organization of the Government for National Security. The Vice President said one subject was missing from the Planning Board’s consolidated list of topics, namely, the question of the basic organization of the Government for national security. After seven years of experience with the National Security Council in this Administration and four years’ experience with the OCB, he felt national security organization might be a proper topic for Council consideration. A Council discussion of the subject might also be advantageous because the Council is under study by the Jackson Sub-Committee. The Vice President therefore suggested that, subject to approval by the President, the Council examine the operation of the NSC and OCB machinery and consider suggestions which have been made for changes in the present system.

Africa. Mr. Dulles said he did not see any subject related to Africa in the list of topics. Mr. Gray said the Planning Board was already engaged in revising Africa South of the Sahara (NSC 5818).

Changes in the Character of the Cold War. The Vice President said he had had some very helpful discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence on changes in the character of the Cold War. He wondered whether the Intelligence Community might not be asked to give its reactions on this subject. Secretary Dillon said some very difficult concrete problems had arisen in this field. For example, he had found the Belgians were getting ready to do less rather than more with regard to NATO because of what they regarded as a detente in East-West relations. In this connection the Vice President felt it might be useful for us to think of our own attitudes: The question was whether we were going to allow Khrushchev, by talking about peace and co-existence, to silence all criticism of past and present Soviet actions.

Long-Range U.S. Policy toward the USSR and its Satellites. With respect to this subject, the Vice President felt we needed to develop a proper policy line on liberation of the Satellites and on all the concepts which had been talked about when the Administration first came into office and which had been modified some what since. He pointed out that we now rule out revolution but say the satellite peoples should have freedom to choose their governments. He felt this would be a very good subject for Council discussion.

Utilization of Non-Military Technological Advances: International Scientific Cooperation. Dr. Kistiakowsky said he would be happy to prepare terms of reference on utilization of non-military technological advances, but he hoped someone else would prepare the paper. Dr. Kistiakowsky then suggested that the Council might also discuss an intensification of efforts to achieve international scientific cooperation which would enhance our leadership among Free World nations and relax tensions by cooperation with the Soviet Union in certain areas. This topic, of course, had less urgency than some of the others mentioned at this meeting.

U.S. Bases Overseas. The Vice President felt that any new report on U.S. bases overseas should take into account the effect of missile developments through about 1965 on our base system. According to his recollection, the Nash Report had dealt with aircraft and had not taken missiles into account.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the subject in the light of a list of suggestions by NSC Members and Advisers, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 15, 1959.

b. Agreed, subject to consideration by the President, that:

(1) A Discussion Paper on Cuba should be prepared by the Department of State and discussed in the Planning Board under special security precautions prior to its submission to the NSC.

(2) Discussion of the means by which the U.S. can best obtain the cooperation of De Gaulle in political, economic and military matters should be deferred until after the NATO and Western Summit meetings.

(3) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the U.S. Attitude toward Nasser and on Poland should be deferred to a later date.

(4) Further discussion of Disarmament should be deferred pending completion of the study in preparation by the Director, Joint Disarmament Study.

(5) The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be asked to undertake the initial review of Economic Defense Policy (NSC 5704/3).

(6) The Planning Board should give further consideration to development of a paper on Long-Range National Strategies.

(7) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the future of NATO should be deferred until after the NATO meeting.

(8) The Planning Board should develop Discussion Papers on U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Capabilities, on Implications of the Development of Additional World Power Centers, and on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of Delivery Systems.

(9) The Planning Board should undertake the immediate preparation of a Discussion Paper on the Implications of Sharing of Nuclear Weapons with Allies.

(10) The Council should discuss the basic organization of the National Security Council, including the Operations Coordinating Board, by examining how it has operated over the years and recent suggestions for changes in the current organization.

(11) The Planning Board should prepare a Discussion Paper on Effects of Change in the Character of the Cold War.

(12) Consideration of a Discussion Paper on the Economic Threat Posed by the USSR and Communist China should be deferred, pending preparation of a study agreed upon by the Planning Board on an Examination of the Principal Factors affecting the Future Power Positions of the Free World and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(13) The NSC Planning Board should prepare Discussion Papers on Long-Range U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union and the European Satellites and on Long-Range U.S. Policy toward Communist China.

(14) The Council on Foreign Economic Policy should be asked to give initial consideration to a Discussion Paper on Trade Competition Between the U.S. and Europe.

(15) The Planning Board should give further consideration to Discussion Papers on Utilization of Non-Military Technological Advances and on International Scientific Cooperation.

c. Noted that:

(1) A proposed revision of Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814/1) is scheduled for consideration at a Joint Meeting of the National Security Council and the National Aeronautics and Space Council on December 29.

(2) The Planning Board is currently reviewing and revising U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara (NSC 5818).

(3) The current review by the Department of Defense of the findings and recommendations of the Nash Report on Overseas Bases, pursuant to NSC Action No. 2142, should provide a basis for Council discussion of U.S. Bases Overseas, with special emphasis on the implications of developments in the missiles field.

NOTE: The above actions (NSC Actions Nos. 2163, 2164, 2165 and 2166) subsequently submitted to and approved by the President.

NSC Action No. 2166–b–(1) subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.

NSC Action No. 2166–b–(5) and –(14) subsequently transmitted to the Chairman, CFEP, for appropriate action.

NSC Action No. 2166–c–(3) subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action.

Marion W. Boggs

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Emergency Relocation Plan—National Security Council; Agenda item 4: Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—13 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.