Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

191. Presentation by Kistiakowsky to the President¹

Washington, August 4, 1959

MR. PRESIDENT:

With your permission I will report to you on three subjects: the progress in global military communications; the problem of ICBM bases; and the problem of nuclear test suspension negotiations.

I.

As you know, the three Services are involved in planning global communications systems of a most advanced nature which are not closely coordinated. A panel, headed by Dr. W. O. Baker of your Science Advisory Committee, has been looking into the problems of present and future military; communications and especially into the CRITICOMM System. The main emphasis of its findings is that a great deal of improvement is possible with the present type of communications, by making limited technical changes and additions, and simultaneously aiming toward maximum possible sharing of the facilities by the Services. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics also have been emphasizing the advantages which may result from the improvements in present facilities over focusing of attention on the as yet unproven future developments. Due to these efforts, there has been a gratifying improvement in the handling of critical messages. For instance, the median-average-time for handling such messages is down to 13 minutes this June as contrasted with 52 minutes from June to December 1958. [text not declassified] It appears, Mr. President, that the concerted efforts to make the best possible use of the present facilities are bearing fruit and further improvements are definitely to be hoped for.

II.

In response to Dr. Killian’s memorandum of last winter concerning the cost and complexity of missile bases, the Office of the Secretary of Defense undertook a study of this problem, and General Betts, who conducted the inquiry, just told me informally about his findings. In essence they are these:

The complexity of earliest missile bases will be almost beyond imagination. An example is that under the floor of the Command Post at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, controlling only three Atlas missiles, there are 30,000 relays. The Air Force, however, has made earnest efforts to reduce the complexity in the design of later squadrons, while at the same time improving dispersion and hardening. The result is that the fully dispersed and hardened squadrons are expected to cost less than the early installations. The high cost and complexity of the early installations must be largely blamed on lack of experience and the speeded up program, which allowed little time for testing of base designs.

Even in the later installations, there appears to remain some goldplating. Starting now, changes could be profitably made only in Atlas squadrons after the 8th, and in Titan squadrons after the 6th, since the detailed base designs are already too advanced on the others. The OSD has now directed inquires to the Air Force as to why certain items couldn’t be eliminated or a simplified in the late squadrons, but these are not the major items.

The complexity of the ground installations is very largely due to a high degree of automation. This, in turn, is an unavoidable consequence of the requirement to have a 15 minute response time. Unfortunately, nothing much in the way of simplicity is gained by changing from 15 to, say, 20–25 minutes. To simplify base design drastically one needs to go to manual operations, and that probably means 1 to 2 hours response time.

The fully dispersed and hardened squadrons of 9 missiles each are expected to cost in the neighborhood of $130 million each. The costs may be higher, however, because the estimates of the cost of hook-up and check-out of ground equipment have been rising from 5 to 15 million dollars per squadron and some people are pessimistic enough to think that they may actually turn out to be some $30 millions. This part of the program may become the time-controlling factor for achieving operational ICBM force, as it is for Thors in England, because of shortage of competent engineers to do the job.

III.

Since July 23, when Mr. Dillon presented to you a plan for changing the objectives of our Geneva negotiations on nuclear test suspension, I have been trying to analyze the technical aspects of the plan and have discussed the matter with selected members of your Science Advisory Committee, including Dr. Killian.

Recently I presented my considerations to Mr. Dillon and with his knowledge would like to present them now to you. Mr. Dillon wished me to tell you that because of the British reaction to his message and the coming end of the Foreign Ministers Conference, the urgency of talking to Gromyko has been reduced.

As you recall, Mr. President, the plan presented by Mr. Dillon involves approaching Gromyko with the proposal that a treaty be negotiated for the cessation of atmospheric and outer space nuclear tests, with a complete Geneva monitoring system, except for on-site inspections. There is to be also a joint test program to study seismic monitoring, including tests in big holes. Pending the outcome of such study, the parties to the treaty retain freedom of weapons development by means of underground nuclear tests.

A point to note is that purely theoretical considerations about tests in outer space and underground indicate that in both instances evasion could be achieved by the use of elaborate and costly procedures. The plan which proposes a monitored ban on space tests but postpones a ban on underground tests in therefore technically not self-consistent. The plan calls for a billion dollar monitoring organization, which could not be technically justified for monitoring atmospheric tests, and which provides no complete protection against outer space tests. Moreover, it does not prevent weapons development because of uncontrolled underground tests.

The proposal to undertake jointly with the Soviets the study of seismic monitoring and of means to control evasion involving shots in big holes suffers from another technical weakness. It is impossible to predict how long the investigation will take. Intuitively it seems probable that a sort of a race will develop between improved means of detection and of evasion, and so the operation may drag on for years without conclusive results.

One alternative to the State Department plan is to propose cessation of atmospheric tests, but of no others. Since this measure would involve virtually no aspects of arms limitation, and the monitoring of atmospheric tests can be done from outside USSR, technical arguments for a monitoring organization inside USSR would be weak. We might thus lose the advantages of an organization within the USSR and of a beginning toward arms limitation measures.

Another alternative might be to continue with negotiations for a treaty based on the original Geneva monitoring system, insisting on a sufficiently large on-site inspection quota that an adequate deterrent against invasion by underground tests would result, except by the use of the big holes.

Judging by the past Soviet reaction, they are not likely to accept a hundred or so on-site inspections, and hence the result of such a move might be a suspension of negotiations due to their unwillingness to accept reasonably effective monitoring.

However, they might accept. The question as to whether a treaty which may then result would safeguard our security, cannot be answered on a technical basis, although some technical factors have an important bearing on the over-all conclusion.

The treaty would define a monitoring system which would be admittedly not fully effective. Evasion with up to megaton weapons, but at extremely high cost, would be theoretically possible in outer space. For somewhat smaller weapons, and at somewhat lower but still rather high cost, the evasion would also be theoretically possible underground by using large holes. Both techniques would require major development programs on the part of the Soviets to make them practical and detection proof. The underground technique with its large earth-works would be very sensitive to our presently planned advanced reconnaissance systems.

The technical requirements and uncertainties of clandestine testing underground and in outer space, together with the attendant risk of disclosure by the diverse intelligence sources available to the United States, could constitute an adequate deterrent to USSR evasion—particularly if the Soviets conclude that the technical gains possible through continued testing under these conditions are limited. Whether this adds up to an adequate safeguard for us is consequently not a technical question.

These, Mr. President, are the considerations involved, which I thought might be useful to you if the result of the impending discussions with the British is a change in our tactics at the Geneva negotiations.

1. Source: Global military communications; ICBM basing; Geneva disarmament negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.