Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

178. Memorandum of Meeting with the President¹

Washington, July 15, 1959

Present

• General Goodpaster

1. I indicated to the President that I wished to talk with him further about paragraph 12 a of Basic National Security Policy. I reported that the Planning Board had spent some further time on this paragraph on July 14. I said I felt we were pretty well narrowing the issues down to two questions which I showed him on the attached sheet.

I said that it seemed to me now clear that at the Planning Board level the State Department view was that we do not now have an adequate conventional limited war capability and that the State Department effort would be to enlarge our present capabilities. I said that one way to “smoke out” this issue would be insert the words “continue to” in the fifth line if the redraft of paragraph 12 a, marked “NSC”, attached.

I then pointed out to him that the Defense Department felt that the only criteria that should govern the use of nuclear weapons were military criteria and that the Defense Department would want 12 a to read: “Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives . . .”

The President said that he felt that this definition was too narrow and agreed that the insertion of the word, “deemed” before “appropriate” in the eighth line would more nearly meet his views.

I also pointed out to the President that the JCS had objected to the phrase, “organized units” and had proposed a substitution therefor of the phrase “designated commanders.” I suggested to the President that this probably was not quite what he had in mind and offered the language “combatant forces” which he thought well of.

The President expressed his displeasure at not being able to find language which was clear and decisive and would communicate to everyone concerned his clear intention. I pointed out to him that it would be unlikely that he would wish to change this language next year and that a new administration would likely not rush in with major changes in basic policy at the beginning and that therefore we were writing language for the next two or three years, or possibly more. Therefore, it was necessary that the language be clear and definitive and understood and accepted by all.

Attached are redrafts of the paragraph reflecting JCS, Defense and other views.

2. I then said to the President that I had read and considered Mr. C. D. Jackson’s letter and that I thought well of his suggestion. I also indicated I felt that he should be present. The President agreed and said he had already written Mr. Jackson a letter agreeing to the meeting, adding a couple of names to the list and saying that the timing would depend only upon whether it was important to have Mr. Herter present.

3. I referred to the conservation I had had with the President on July 13 relative to the Defense Department concern about State Department position papers for the Geneva Conference. I said that I had had a long talk with Mr. Murphy and he had also talked with Mr. McElroy and I felt that the matter was substantially straightened out. The difficulty had been that the State Department had released to Defense a staff working paper which purported having departmental concurrence, which Mr. Murphy said did not indeed have departmental concurrence. He said some of the individual concurrence shown on the paper had not in fact been given. I said to the President that he need not at the moment concern himself any further with this problem.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

Attachment

Washington, undated

1. Do we now have the necessary conventional capabilities for meeting limited war requirements?

(State, Army, Navy say “No”)

2. Will the use of nuclear weapons be based solely on military criteria; that is to say, are there situations where political considerations could override military desirability?

(Defense seems to say “Yes” to the first, “No” to the second)

Attachment

NSC Draft

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should continue to contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor deemed appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed combatant forces will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment

JCS Draft

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All designated commanders will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment

Defense Draft

Washington, July 9, 1959

REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor militarily appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

Attachment

Others Draft

Washington, July 9, 1959

OTHERS REDRAFT OF PARAGRAPH 12–a

It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. However we should be prepared to cope with situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main elements of Soviet and Chinese Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use of nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.

1. Source: Discussion of proposed changes to paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906, basic national security policy. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Drafted on July 17.