177. Briefing Note for July 9 NSC Meeting1
Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906)
Today we resume consideration of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906) by taking up the military section, which begins with paragraph 10.
One thing which has given me concern is that nowhere in these paragraphs do we refer specifically to control of the seas, although we do talk about our retaliatory power; general war; local aggression; and continental defense.
[Typeset Page 778]Paragraph 10 (page 10) is the general paragraph on deterrence and, as the majority would have it, is unchanged. State and AEC, however, define the term “general war” by adding the words “a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake.”
It is my impression that a large part of State’s concern arises out of the strategic concept which was circulated to the Council in March 1957 in connection with the Mobilization Base Planning. In that document general war is defined as:
“A war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged.”
It would appear that this concern of the State Department could be met by a definition in the Strategic Concept which could describe general war as
“A war in which sizeable numbers of the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged.”
If this is the case there would appear to be no need to change the existing language of paragraph 10. In such an event the statement in NSC 5904/1, “U.S. Policy in the Event of War” (footnote, page 2), that “U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war”, should be changed to incorporate the new definition.
(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER SERCRETARY McELROY (MR. McCONE))
Paragraph 12–a (page 11) presents the issue concerning limited war capabilities in conventional terms and also the extent of our reliance on nuclear weapons in limited war. The majority would continue the language of the existing policy paper, which reads in part:
“It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons;” and “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view. . .”
The State Department has a proposal, in which OCDM joins, to change the policy so that we would
“place main reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons.” [Emphasis supplied]2
It is my understanding that State’s interpretation of this language is not that we should be prepared to fight any war short of general war solely without nuclear weapons. I shall ask Secretary Herter to elaborate on this.
[Typeset Page 779](Call on: SECRETARY HERTER SECRETARY McELROY)
[Facsimile Page 3]Paragraph 13 (page 12) sets forth our policy on chemical and biological weapons. The majority would leave the language of the existing paper unchanged, but Budget and Treasury propose that the President decide on the stockpiling of such weapons, as well as their use.
It is my understanding that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget feels that we are either spending too much or too little on these weapons, and his effort is to clarify our posture with respect to the employment of such weapons.
(Call on: Mr. STANS)
Paragraphs 15 and 16 (pages 12 to 14) were not considered by the Planning Board. There is no issue in the paper before you on paragraph 15. However the Chiefs of Staff of Army and [illegible in the original]. As to paragraph 16 the issue is posed by the State submission which appears in the Annex on page 61.
There are two issues posed by this paragraph. First, shall we consider that the term “limited aggression” (I would hope that we can substitute limited aggression for local aggression) refers only to conflicts in the less developed areas; or is it conceivable that a limited war could be fought in developed areas such as NATO Europe, non-NATO Europe, or Japan? What about Communist China? Could our problem be met by directing our planning against the contingency of limited aggression using the term to refer to conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area?
(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER SECRETARY McELROY)
[Facsimile Page 4]The second issue in this paragraph is this: With respect to local or limited aggression, (a) would U.S. objectives be served by prompt and resolute application of force necessary to defeat such local aggression; or (b) might U.S. interests be served in certain cases by restricting the application of force to that degree necessary to achieve objectives of limiting the area and scope of hostilities and restoring the status quo ante?
It is agreed that with respect to local or limited aggression the use of any U.S. force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.
(Call on: SECRETARY HERTER SECRETARY McELROY)
Paragraph 17 (page 14) deals with the “cold war” contribution which the capabilities of U.S. military forces can make. USIA proposes deleting the clause which uses the term “cold war”. (It may be noted that paragraph 9 sanctions the use of the term “cold war” and is already tentatively agreed to by the Council.)
(Call on: MR. GEORGE ALLEN)
[Typeset Page 780]Paragraph 18 (page 14) deals with U.S. bases overseas. It omits the reference to the possibility of “a small net expansion” of the base system, which was written into basic policy last year. The revised language reads:
[Facsimile Page 5]“The entire overseas base system should continue to be reviewed periodically in order to assure that base requirements are adequately met and are related realistically to developments in weapons technology and other factors.”
The last sentence of paragraph 18 (which is unchanged) deals with the positioning of IRBM’s around the Soviet periphery. While the Planning Board has not as such recommended any change in policy, on my own motion I submit that IRBM’s should be the subject of a separate paragraph and not included in the paragraph on U.S. overseas bases. I therefore propose to the Council the following new paragraph:
“IRBM’s will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the United States to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBM’s outside the NATO areas will be subject to approval by the President.”
Paragraph 19 (page 15) treats generally of strengthening the collective defense system. As revised, it contains the new guidance that the United States should, as practicable, “induce Western European and other allies with well-developed economies to increase their share in collective defense.”
Paragraph 20 (page 15) is amended to say that we should educate not only our allies, but the Free World as a whole as to the importance of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the arsenal of the Free World.