Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

164. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, June 9, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

• The Vice President, Acting Secretary Dillon, Secretary McElroy, Deputy Secretary Gates, Budget Director Stans, General Lemnitzer, Admiral Burke, General White, Mr. Holaday, General Persons, Dr. Killian, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster

Mr. McElroy said the group had come in to talk about the air defense problem and specifically the issue of the BOMARC and NIKE–HERCULES. He gave the President a paper on basic principles in the evaluation of the continental air defense plan. Before beginning the discussion, he told the President that Defense has decided to procure no fighter aircraft in FY–60. At his request, Mr. Holaday then displayed, on a map of the United States, deployments presently in effect, as previously planned, and as now planned for the NIKE–HERCULES. In addition to deployments presently programmed, a certain number of additional SAC bases are to be protected. He then showed the deployments now proposed for the BOMARC; these lie along the eastern, northern, and western segments of the periphery of the continental United States, with the BOMARC A generally in the northeastern United States and the BOMARC B to be used for the remainder.

The President asked why the BOMARCs along northern sector were not moved further north into Canada. He asked whether the Canadians would like to have them there. Mr. McElroy said he would like to put them there if the Canadians would. General White said he feels that we have pushed the Canadians about as far as we can on bases for military activities. Admiral Burke added there would probably be great resistance by the Canadians to taking these on. The President then spoke, indicating that he does not believe in forcing weapons on other countries. What he wanted to know was whether we had ever asked them “Do you want us to deploy BOMARCS further north so as to give you additional protection?”

Mr. McElroy said that the money implications of the decision being proposed were essentially that there would be a saving of $75 million from the FY–59 program, $60 million from the FY–60 program, and $418 million from the FY–61 and 62 programs. He went on to say that the over-all saving would be in the order of $1,300,000,000, arising from a reduction of total program from $3.8 to $2.5 billion. The President said he understood that this action is being proposed on the basis that beyond the programs being recommended additions would not be very useful. Mr. McElroy confirmed this, stating that since we prepared these programs the threat has changed. We now visualize that enemy bombers, if they attack, would do so after we had been hit by long-range missiles.

Dr. Killian asked whether the proposals reflect an acceleration of the BOMARC B program. Mr. Holaday said that they did not because the SAGE system and the bases would not be ready in time. He added that the program includes a recommendation to spend an additional $250 million to bring the peripheral SAGE areas up to “high grade SAGE” capabilities through the addition of radars, gap fillers, etc. In the interior, SAGE would be cut back to “minimum capability SAGE.” Mr. McElroy added that the decision not to deploy the BOMARC in the central areas of the United States reduces the requirement for high-grade SAGE. The minimum that is being proposed is needed to guide interceptors, SAC bombers, etc. He added that the FAA will make use of the minimum SAGE system in its peacetime operations.

Dr. Killian commented that in order to put the BOMARC bases in Canada it would be necessary to extend the SAGE system and the base support structure up into that area. Mr. McElroy said what the Canadians principally need is to modernize the interceptors in their Air Force. The President asked whether we do not think that the BOMARC is an improvement on interceptors—otherwise why would we have gone to the BOMARC. The President asked if the problem of identification had been solved—whether we have perfected the IFF. General White said that we had not, and do not have a solution to the problem. We continue to work on it.

The President asked General Lemnitzer whether he thought this plan was reasonable. General Lemnitzer said that it involved a cut-back in previously planned programs but that he did think it was a reasonable solution to the problem; he commented that the threat is changing as had been previously mentioned.

At this point the President said that he feels there must be one great, over-all operational command to which the air defense weapons, regardless of the service providing them, must be assigned. He said it made little difference to him which service provided the forces; some one commander must be in full control, however. Admiral Burke said that General Partridge has the command but wants a great deal more in resources than can be provided. General White disagreed as to the adequacy of General Partridge’s command authority; he commented that he does not believe that General Partridge has the authority he needs. The President stated strongly “then he should have it.” Admiral Burke said that General Partridge has command over the forces but cannot move them about and does not have control of the budget.

The President noted that an additional $250 million is being proposed for the SAGE system. He asked whether any other additions were being proposed. Mr. McElroy said there is a proposal to put $150 million additional into NIKE–ZEUS. This would be added to $300 million now budgeted for research and development on NIKE–ZEUS and $250 million for “novel” defense means. Mr. McElroy said, in relation to NIKE–ZEUS, that he wants to do anything that makes sense as a defense against missiles. He said the NIKE–HERCULES would have some small capability against a missile similar to the Hound Dog.

The President asked, in light of the foregoing, whether there was any need for any more squadrons of interceptors. General White thought this question should be deferred until the next programming period.

The President then asked if what had been presented to him is the decision of the Defense Department. Mr. McElroy said that it is the best decision in his judgment. He had not been able to get unanimous agreement on it, however. Nevertheless, it had been thoroughly discussed and he was satisfied with it for the present.

The President recalled that the strength of the Soviet Air Forces was apparently greatly overestimated a couple of years ago. Now we are more certain of our estimates, and they are much lower. The bomber threat is therefore not so serious as had been thought. He understood that the Defense proposal involved pushing the NIKE–ZEUS and the SAGE harder, while cutting back in other areas. Mr. McElroy said that there is a change occurring in the balance between Soviet bombers and Soviet missiles and that this change may go either faster or slower than we estimate. Accordingly, it will be necessary to review the situation frequently. The President said he thought that funds in this whole area ought to be made available in a lump sum so that the Secretary of Defense could shift funds as revised estimates are developed. He noted that our program has changed materially between last January and the present. He had the impression that the change in our estimate of Soviet strength has been relatively slight.

Mr. Stans then said he hoped it would remain possible to raise questions regarding the budgetary coverage of these programs for FY–61. Mr. McElroy agreed but said there is one point to be made concerning BOMARC. An alternative considered was to cancel it now. He felt if we do less than is now proposed we should cancel it. The President said he felt that the program should not be expressed in specific sums for specific years. The total program should be expressed instead in terms of trends. Mr. McElroy pointed out that Defense thinking is for the program to decline from $900 million in FY–59 to $619 million in FY–60, and $500 million in FY–61, these figures representing substantial reductions over previous planning.

Dr. Killian asked whether there has been any thought of giving the NIKE–ZEUS a capability against aircraft. General Lemnitzer said that, within resources available, it has been thought best to concentrate on the main goal, which is anti-missile use. The President said he did not see why a missile that could shoot down another missile could not shoot down an incoming airplane.

Mr. Stans spoke about budgetary trends. Under existing Defense programs, he could foresee budgetary expenditures in the range of $43½ billion to $44 billion coming in FY–61. Although reductions in program were being discussed, these were reductions in programs that had not yet been approved by funding, and he was desirous that action should not imply funding approval. He suggested that an over-all study of air defense later this year might result in knocking the BOMARC out entirely, as an item of very low priority. The President commented that the process of concentration upon the things that are most useful might lead us to eliminate a good deal now included in the programs to which Mr. Stans referred.

Dr. Killian said he understood that the current discussion in no way precludes another thoroughgoing look later on, on a more comprehensive basis, including consideration of the F–108, hardening, concealment, and other features. Mr. McElroy said he thinks that the F–108 is a very vulnerable proposition, i.e., he doubts that it can be justified for continuation. He recognized the Air Force might not agree with this and said he is not prejudging the matter at this time.

Mr. Nixon asked whether this presentation would tend to commit the Administration to these air defense programs for FY–61. Mr. Gates said it would be difficult to cancel these programs later this year if the presentation is made as now proposed; therefore this decision does commit us somewhat. General White said that in his opinion this should be a firm decision as of the present, but that each segment would of course be re-examined each fiscal year. Mr. Nixon stressed the need for an “escape hatch” of some kind, perhaps a statement that we are watching developments so as to revise the program from time to time.

The President asked how much the Soviets are exercising their bomber aircraft at the present time. General White said that our information is that they are conducting an extensive training effort. The President said there is reason not to get complacent over the fact that the estimate of Soviet bombers has been cut back.

Mr. McElroy commented that if we were to go out of the BOMARC program, he did not think we could live with the Canadians, who just recently, after long joint discussions, adopted it in preference to interceptors for their air defense. The President asked why we do not give the Canadians the equipment for six or so BOMARC squadrons. General White said instead that he has been thinking of giving them interceptors. The President asked Mr. McElroy to make an approach to the Canadian Defense Minister to see if they would like to have the BOMARCs moved up into Canada.

Mr. McElroy said there would soon be another question on which the group would wish to meet with the President. This is the nuclear powered aircraft. The President said he had the impression from Mr. McCone that the latter thought it should be taken out of Defense for the moment and that no crash program should be attempted. After discussion, Mr. Gates said he thought what Mr. McCone probably had in mind was to take the proposal out of a weapons system approach and put it on a “test bed” basis. There was some uncertainty as to whether Mr. McCone favored accelerating or decelerating the program.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

1. Source: Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc. Drafted on June 10.