Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

163. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, June 8, 1959

OTHERS PRESENT

• Dr. Killian
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• General Goodpaster

Dr. Killian said he had asked for the opportunity to place before the President a few of the issues that will arise when the President considers the Defense Department presentation relating to NIKE–HERCULES and BOMARC tomorrow.

He said that as he understands the Defense thinking, it is to continue the NIKE–HERCULES as now programmed, concentrating its use on the defense of cities in the northeastern region of the United States and SAC bases. The prime consideration is that it is a proven weapon now available and already in an operational condition. The BOMARC will not be available until later, particularly the BOMARC B which is the version we are interested in. (It has a low altitude capability and 250-mile range; the BOMARC A does not appear to be worth further consideration.) The Defense plan will call for a substantial cutting back of the BOMARC program, deploying it on the northern, eastern, and western segments of the perimeter of the United States. A cutback in the SAGE system is also contemplated, with hardening of the control centers retained. There remain significant questions concerning the ground environment for each of the two systems, NIKE–HERCULES and BOMARC.

The use of the term “master plan” for air defense to describe the Defense position is open to question, since this position does not include consideration of other factors in the problem such as the F–108 and other interceptors. If decision is taken to use BOMARC simply on the periphery as indicated above, the question of the F–108 should also be resolved; and there would appear to be strong reason to drop the project, which is a $5 billion projected program. The relationship of the F–108 to the B–70 should also be considered, inasmuch as the F–108 was being designed to have the dual capability of use for defense or for high performance attack.

Dr. Killian said a further point is that this master plan should in no way interfere with the carrying forward of the comprehensive study of air defense being prepared at the President’s request on the basis of a letter from Gordon Gray.

The President said it is to him an indication of weakness in the top leadership of the Defense Department when a choice between two weapons systems comes to the President for resolution. He felt that this type of problem should be settled in the Defense Department.

Dr. Killian said there are certain other questions involved. Admiral Radford, he understands, feels that the whole air defense program should be cut back in a very major way, using the resources to increase offensive forces. A further question is as to the validity of our estimates of the Soviet aircraft threat, which is evidently considerably smaller than had been estimated at earlier times.

A further issue is the organizational problem. In Dr. Killian’s judgment the operation of the total system of defense missiles, BMEWS, the DEW line, SAGE, etc., will not be effective until NORAD has been made effective. There is need for centralized operational direction to tie all these together. The President strongly agreed, saying that this is the whole theory of the unified commands, and the role of the services should simply be to prepare the forces and turn them over to NORAD for operational employment.

A.J. Goodpaster
Brigadier General, USA

Enclosure

Washington, undated

BASIC PRINCIPLES IN THE EVALUATION OF THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE PLAN

1. We expect a continued bomber threat.

2. We expect the ballistic missile—ICBM or submarine-launched—to be the increasing and ultimately the principal threat.

3. We recognize we cannot destroy all incoming bombers in a mass attack so we should have enough anti-bomber defense to increase the cost to the enemy and reduce his assurance of success.

4. We should continue to accelerate the development of anti-missile defense to the maximum justifiable extent.

5. We should re-appraise the character of the threat each year and consider defense in the light of the threat as then appraised.

6. We should push the defensive engagement of enemy bombers as far from our borders as possible.

7. We should gradually reduce the number of our interceptor squadrons.

8. We should continue the NIKE on a buy-out basis.

9. We should continue the BOMARC–A now on a buy-out basis; the BOMARC–B on a minimum basis for peripheral deployment.

10. BOMARC should not be deployed in the interior of the continental United States.

Enclosure

Handwritten Note to Goodpaster From the Army Chief of Staff

Washington, May 20, 1959

Gen. Goodpaster,

We were very disturbed to hear the report that Mr. McElroy informed the President that the Stennis action revoking last years authorization for the const. of Hercules sites was not in the Bill now before the Senate.

Unfortunately it is, as Section 105 therein. As we understand it the President was informed that it was only in the Comm. report and not in the Bill.

Mike Michaelis has sent this attached Memo to Bryce Harlow—

Tick

1. Source: Continental air and missile defense. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, Bomarc. Drafted on June 9.