Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

157. Memorandum of Discussion at the 405th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 7, 1959

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 405th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, May 7, 1959

Present at the 405th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; Donald A. Quarles for the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also attending the meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 5); Frederick Mueller for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 5). Also attending the meeting were the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conferance (Item 1); the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Item 1); the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (Jernegan) (Item 5); the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General Curtis E. LeMay for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Under Secretary of State; Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, for Foreign Economic Policy, for Science and Technology, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. PORT SECURITY: Proposed Revision of Paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 on Continental Defense and Paragraph 33–b of NSC 5808/1 on Poland (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5808/1; NSC 5819, Part 9; NSC Action No. 2051; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 8, 21 and 22, 1959)

Mr. Gordon Gray briefed the Council in detail concerning the subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting, and another is attached to this Memorandum.)

Mr. Gray then called on the Secretary of State for comment. Secretary Herter observed that two separate problems were involved in the Port Security problem; the first related to Polish ships and the Second to other Soviet Bloc ships. He indicated that in the case of Polish ships, State considered it of very great importance, in terms of increased peaceful trade and in terms of effecting reciprocal arrangements with Poland, that the U.S. liberalize its policy on the number of Polish vessels permitted entry into the U.S. and on the kind of cargo such vessels were permitted to carry. He said that in the case of Soviet ships, State was very conscious of the threats to our internal security which were inherent in the visits of such vessels to our shores. As regards the threat of clandestine entry of nuclear weapons, however, it was his understanding that the intelligence community had reviewed this problem and had come to the conclusion that this was the least likely method that the Soviets would employ for the purpose of introducing nuclear weapons into this country. He observed that introduction by this means would be unlikely not only because of the possibility of detection but also because the vessel carrying such a bomb would be destroyed at the time the weapon was detonated.

Secretary Herter indicated that only this morning the State Department had received a note from the Canadians saying that a Soviet ship was headed for the St. Lawrence Seaway and expressing the hope that the U.S. would not interfere with it.

Secretary Herter indicated that the Department of State recognized that its proposal posed a most serious problem for the Coast Guard, and hoped that it could accomplish its objective without adding greatly to the burdens of that service. To that end, it was hoped that the present situation could remain substantially as it is until the fall with the Treasury Department, in the interim, exercising a degree of flexibility concerning Soviet Bloc ships attempting to enter our ports. It was also hoped that, in exercising its responsibilities for the Port Security Program, the Treasury Department would take into account the foreign policy implications involved. It was the Department of State’s thought that the whole matter might subsequently be reviewed by the Council when we saw the outcome of the upcoming international conferences.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Scribner, emphasized the difficulties encountered by the Treasury Department in implementing the Port Security Program. He said thus far three exceptions had been made as to entry of Soviet Bloc vessels. He noted that the Treasury Department presently had two programs in effect in the Port Security area; the first involved boarding and searching of vessels, the second involved the checking of such vessels after they tied up at the dock for the purpose of processing suspect materials or suspect persons. He indicated that the proposal before the Council did not envisage doing away with the second program pertaining to the processing of persons and materials.

Mr. Scribner concurred in the view that it was unlikely that the Bloc would utilize vessels for the introduction of nuclear weapons when it would be more logical to introduce them by aircraft.

Mr. Scribner asked that the Treasury Department not be given the difficult task of determining, from a foreign policy standpoint, whether a particular ship should be granted or denied entry. He did not feel that the Treasury Department was either prepared or qualified to fulfill such an assignment. He said it was the Treasury Department’s view that the present Port Security Program should continue until the fall, at which time it should be re-examined.

Secretary Herter noted that it was present policy to step up exchanges with the Bloc; that the Russians were planning to send larger groups to the U.S.; and that Soviet or other Bloc vessels might be used to bring such groups to this country. Accordingly, the Department of State felt that some additional flexibility should be exercised in arriving at decisions to permit or deny entry to such vessels.

The President thought that the Department of State was asking the Treasury Department to take on a heavy responsibility which it seemed to the President should continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State.

Secretary Herter commented that under existing arrangements, the Secretary of the Treasury was responsible for determining which vessels would be permitted to enter by way of exception to the Port Security Policy, but that the Department of State would be happy to take on as much responsibility in this area as the President wished to assign.

Mr. Scribner, in response to the President’s inquiry, explained the consultative procedure which is now in effect whereby the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, determines the circumstances justifying the granting or denial of entry of suspect vessels.

The President observed that it must be most difficult to search effectively a ship for the purpose of determining whether it was carrying a nuclear weapon. He noted, for example, that the weapon could be located in a false bottom constructed in the ship.

Mr. Scribner concurred with the President’s observation, noting that many people think that more safeguarding is being done in this area than is actually the case.

Secretary Quarles indicated the view of the Department of Defense that there was sufficient flexibility in the present Port Security Program; that there was no need for amending the existing policy in that regard. He said that the Department of Defense would defer to the Department of State as to the degree of relaxation which should be exercised with respect to the Polish vessels. While agreeing with the President and with Secretary Scribner that the searches made for clandestine nuclear weapons in such vessels could only be partially effective, Secretary Quarles thought, nonetheless, that they served as a deterrent to attempted introductions through such means.

The Director of the FBI, when called on for comment by the President, indicated that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference concurred in the view that the present Port Security Policy and Program should not be modified until after the completion of the Geneva Conference. [text not declassified] Mr. Hoover said that the present policy and program served to some degree as a deterrent to the introduction of nuclear weapons and to the introduction of large numbers of intelligence agents. He emphasized that the present policy included an arrangement which permitted exceptions in particular cases and he concluded that from an internal security point of view, the present policy and program should not be modified at this time.

The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, when called upon by Mr. Gray, concurred in the view that review of existing policy should be deferred until the fall. He added that while it was recognized that there may be over-riding considerations which suggested a liberalization of policy on Polish vessels, it was his view that the Poles, as well as the Soviets, constituted a threat to the U.S.

General LeMay, on behalf of the JCS, noted that no information has been brought to the attention of the JCS which would reflect that there has been a change in the threat since the present Port Security Policy was adopted. It was the JCS view that the Port Security Committee had been working satisfactorily and consequently the present policy should be left as is.

The President asked General LeMay if it was the view of the JCS that the policy as regards the Polish vessels should likewise remain unchanged and General LeMay replied in the affirmative.

Mr. Mueller of the Department of Commerce, directed the Council’s attention to the recent CIA report indicating that a number of vessels flying the Polish flag were actually under the ownership or control of the Government of Communist China. He observed that these Chinese Communist-controlled ships were probably sailing under the Polish flag to deceive the Free World and particularly to deceive the Chinese Nationalists. He said that the Chinese Communists now owned nine or ten such ships and that they propose to achieve ownership of an additional number of such vessels. He thought that this could cause a problem for the U.S. if such vessels appeared in our ports. He also thought that an arrangement of this kind raised serious doubt regarding the honesty and integrity of the Poles.

Mr. Herter indicated that the Department of State has already notified the Polish Government of the U.S. position in this regard. He said that the Poles have been warned that action would be taken against any vessel entering the United States under the Polish flag which was in fact owned by Communist China.

The President asked if one could always prove such ownership, and the Secretary of State indicated this was not always possible. He said that someone would have to give evidence to the Department of State that such Polish flag vessels are actually owned by the Chinese Communists.

The Director of Central Intelligence elaborated on the aforementioned point, as raised by the Department of Commerce, by giving the Council an oral summary of the CIA report which was circulated to the Council on the Chinese Communist vessels. Thereafter, Secretary Herter emphasized that whenever the Department of State received evidence that a Polish flag vessel entering one of our ports was actually owned by the Chinese Communists, such vessel would be excluded.

Mr. Gray indicated that the points raised by the Commerce Department had been discussed by the Planning Board and he briefly summarized that discussion. The President indicated that he was not clear why any change in our present port security program was being suggested at this particular moment and Secretary Herter indicated that this was being done now because of difficulties encountered by the Treasury Department in applying the port security program in particular situations. He indicated that while we were trying to normalize our situation as regards the Poles, based on our policy of increased trade and increased exchanges, the port security program sometimes militated against the accomplishments of those objectives. He cited, by way of example, the case of the Polish ship which carried its passengers to a Canadian port rather than the port of New York, for reasons relating in part to our port security policy.

Mr. Scribner stated that the Treasury Department wished to urge no change in the policy at this time except in the case of the Polish vessels. He wished to make clear, however, that if the policy on Polish vessels were liberalized, such vessels would continue to be boarded and searched. It was the Treasury Department view that the general port security policy should be continued in its present form rather than to leave it in some indefinite status.

Mr. Hoover, referring to Secretary Herter’s comments on the Polish passenger vessel calling at a Canadian port rather than at the port of New York, noted that the vessel in question was the Batory. He said that when the Batory earlier called at our ports, it was used to get Gerhard Eisler out of the country; that when its master defected to the British, he reported that his entire crew was under the direction of the Polish Intelligence Service which, in turn, was supervised by the Soviet Intelligence Service; that the master of the crew had no control over his men except for purposes of operating the ship. [text not declassified]

The President asked whether, if the Polish policy were liberalized, such vessels would be limited to our major port areas and whether they would continue to be boarded and searched. Mr. Scribner replied in the affirmative saying that such vessels would only be permitted to enter where we have boarding and searching crews and that they would in fact be boarded and searched. The President asked if they would be permitted entry only at specified ports, and Mr. Scribner replied in the affirmative. [text not declassified]

[text not declassified]

The President said at this point that the only change being recommended related to a limited increase in the number of Polish vessels with the understanding that those vessels could come in only at specified ports; that they would be boarded and searched; and that they would be permitted to engage in some general trade rather than be limited to carrying only cargo specified by the U.S.-Polish economic agreements. Secretary Herter concurred in the foregoing, stating that the number of ports of entry would not be enlarged. Mr. Scribner confirmed the foregoing, stating that entry would be limited to the ten major port areas.

The President observed that this came down to the matter of our general policy wherein we were trying to get the Poles to feel a little better toward us, and in the process we were trying to drive a wedge between the Poles and the Soviets.

The Vice President observed that underlying another aspect of the proposal was the realization that it would be more profitable for the Poles to bring their vessels here if they could take out cargo additional to that specified in the economic agreements, and that an increase in the number of such vessels entering our ports would make for some increased problems for our security and intelligence services.

The President said he did not believe that by itself an increase in the number of Polish vessels would be critical unless the increase became so great that the Treasury people could not handle the boarding and searching of such vessels and the processing of the people thereon. The President then asked if the FBI engaged in such searches, and Mr. Scribner replied in the negative. Mr. Scribner added, however, that apart form the boarding and searching, other services engaged in various kinds of personnel processing. Mr. Scribner cited the Immigration Service as an example.

The President thought it best to leave the policy as it was for the moment, except to take a liberalized outlook as to the kind of goods which might be carried in Polish vessels. He thought also that if there was a great increase in the number of such vessels, occasioning problems for the Treasury Department, the Treasury Department could come back and report that fact to the Council.

Secretary Herter inquired whether any internal security problems had been encountered with respect to the several ships which have been permitted entry thus far, and Mr. Hoover responded that in the case of the Polish ships the FBI had found six intelligence agents. He added that in the case of the British, they had reported the discovery of forty such agents.

The Attorney General observed that there was another aspect of the problem which had not as yet been discussed, and he referred specifically to the matter of trying to keep track of the crews of these vessels once the ships had docked at our ports. The President asked if such crews were permitted to go ashore, and the Attorney General replied in the affirmative, noting that it was most difficult, in fact impossible, to surveill all the members of such crews. He noted that other correlative problems arose, such as the question of ascertaining whether defectees were bona fide in character. He said the last mentioned problem sometimes required drawn-out processes in our courts to determine whether they would be sent back to their country of origin. The Attorney General said that he agreed with the suggestion that the present program be continued with a view to re-examining it in the fall.

The President again referred to U.S. attempts to try to open up certain areas with the Poles in an endeavor to drive a wedge between them and the Soviets. He said underlying such efforts was the desire to get some of these countries to appreciate that we have not abandoned them. He noted that these efforts sometimes caused differences between the Soviets and the satellite countries involved, and that we ought to continue to try to exploit such differences. The President did not see, however, why it was necessary to alter the policy under discussion in order to accomplish this purpose.

Secretary Herter referred to our continuing efforts to keep the Poles from complete submission to the Soviets, and he indicated that a number of these efforts were involved in the proposal made to the Council by the Department of State.

The President inquired whether there would be any advantage to telling the Poles that we would permit a specific number of additional Polish vessels to enter our ports, and by way of example he cited the number six. Secretary Herter thought that this could be done.

The President said he did not wish to give up completely on Poland, though at times, after reading Gomulka’s speeches, he wondered what we were accomplishing by our efforts with the Poles.

The Commerce representative, referring to the President’s inquiry about increasing the number of Polish vessels by six, asked if it would not be well to limit the number of such vessels on a strict reciprocity basis to the number of U.S. vessels permitted into Polish ports.

Secretary Herter called on Mr. Dillon for comment and Mr. Dillon indicated that the Poles might not be conscious of the fact that they were under limitations insofar as we were concerned. He said that it might complicate things if we were to advise the Poles that they would be permitted to bring in a specified number of additional vessels. Mr. Dillon also commented upon the cargo aspect of the problem, noting that the policy as stated permitted them to take out only such cargo as came under the terms of economic agreements made between the United States and Poland. He said that if we were to suggest that they bring in additional ships but that that cargo be limited to aid-type cargo, we might have a serious problem on our hands.

The Attorney General thought that in view of the comments made by Mr. Dillon it would be best not to change our present policy but possibly to be a bit more flexible, as circumstances permitted.

The President said in the light of the discussion he thought it best to let the present policy and program stand as is for a while, recognizing that there is a procedure available for making limited exceptions in certain instances. Mr. Scribner concurred, suggesting that the matter be re-examined in three months or so.

The Vice President also expressed the view that the present policy should be left unchanged with the understanding that there would be a more liberalized interpretation thereof in terms of the number of Polish ships permitted entry. He thought it best to let the matter be played by ear for the time being rather than to amend our policy.

The President asked if it would be possible or wise to let the Poles know that they are on their honor insofar as we are concerned, and if they violate, as in the matter of Communist-controlled vessels, they will be treated accordingly. Mr. Herter said he thought that this could be done.

Mr. Dillon mentioned that the Moore-McCormack Lines and the Lykes Service were running ships into Poland. Based thereon the Poles had indicated to us that they were considering inaugurating similar service to the United States. In giving this indication Mr. Dillon did not think that the Poles were aware of the port security limitations which we had applied to them. He said there was a danger that if we acquainted the Poles with these limitations, they might prohibit Moore-McCormack and others from running ships to Poland with the result that this could aggravate the U.S.-Polish situation in terms of economic warfare. Mr. Dillon indicated that the Poles had not made a formal request to establish services similar to Moore-McCormack, but that they had said that, as a matter of reciprocity, they might wish to make an application along these lines at a later time.

Mr. Gordon Gray suggested that in the light of the discussion it appears that there was no need to change the language in the paper under discussion; that it appeared that a limited number of additional Polish vessels could be permitted to enter our major port areas under a liberalized interpretation of the policy; and that if this number exceeded reasonable proportions, the policy could be re-examined.

The President concluded the discussion by noting that if we did not have a better answer than the one proposed, it was best not to make mistakes in a hurry and accordingly we should keep the present policy, utilizing the exception procedure sparingly as regards the entry of Polish vessels.

The National Security Council:

a. Discussed the recommendations submitted by the NSC Planning Board on the subject, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 8, 1959; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 22, 1959.

b. Agreed that, subject to review following the conclusion of the forthcoming negotiations with the USSR, paragraph 19 of NSC 5802/1 and paragraph 33 of NSC 5808/1 and the operations of the exceptions procedure thereunder should not be revised; with the understanding, however, that the exceptions procedure for Polish flag vessels may be interpreted liberally unless undue numbers of Polish flag vessels take advantage of such procedure, in which case this procedure shall be subject to review.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5802/1 and NSC 5808/1.

• J. Patrick Coyne
  NSC Representative on Internal Security

[Omitted here are agenda items 2–4.]

5. OVERSEAS INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, dated April 2 and December 1, 1958; NSC 5810/1; NSC 5819, Part 2; NSC Action No. 2012; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, dated April 10, 1959).

In making his summary of the report Mr. Harr related the conclusions of the report to certain paragraphs in the Basic National Security Policy. When Mr. Harr had finished the President inquired whether the NSC Planning Board would take the conclusions of the report into consideration in the course of its review of Basic National Security Policy. Mr. Gray replied that the Planning Board had already considered the matter and would do so further.

Mr. Allen Dulles stated his conviction that the Overseas Internal Security Program had proved extremely useful. The real issue underlying the OCB report was that the International Cooperation Administration people did not like to find themselves in the position of providing arms. [text not declassified] Likewise the Department of Defense and our military people did not want to get into the business of supplying arms to police forces.

Secretary Quarles pointed out that the Defense Department was by no means opposed in principle to providing arms for police purposes but that the Defense Department itself was simply not in a position to do so.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2012–b, transmitted by the reference memorandum of April 10, 1959.

b. Noted that the NSC Planning Board is taking the OCB report into account in its current review of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1)

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Port Security; Agenda item 5: Overseas Internal Security Program. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Drafted on May 8.