Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

156. Briefing Note for the 405th NSC Meeting¹

Washington, May 6, 1959

SUBJECT

• Port Security (Proposed Revisions of Par. 19 of NSC 5802/1 and Par. 33–b of NSC 5808/1)

1. The first item for consideration by the Council grows out of recommendations made to the Planning Board by the State member, who proposed that revisions be made in our Port Security policies and programs, with a view to permitting freer access to U.S. ports by Soviet Bloc and other flag vessels which are presently denied entry to our ports in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

2. The Port Security Program which is currently in operation under responsibility of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Coast Guard is governed by the following:

a. U.S. Policy on Continental Defense, in Par. 19 on the subject of Port Security, calls for measures to be applied by Treasury to protect U.S. port areas against sabotage, espionage and clandestine introduction of persons and things inimical to U.S. security, including measures, on a selective basis as appropriate, for (1) the denial of entry to vessels, and (2) the boarding, searching and surveillance of vessels (NSC 5802/1, Par. 19, p. 2). State and Treasury, propose that the Port Security paragraph of Continental Defense Policy be revised by deleting provisions for the denial, boarding, searching, and surveillance of Bloc vessels. The majority of the Planning Board recommend that Par. 19 of Continental Defense Policy should not be revised at this time, and the JCS, and IIC and ICIS, excepting the State member, concur in this view.

b. U.S. Policy Toward Poland also deals with Port Security in Par. 33 which provides that Polish flag vessels are to be treated in the same manner as Soviet Bloc flag vessels, except that Polish flag passenger vessels may enter at New York, and Polish flag cargo vessels may be permitted entry at designated U.S. ports for the specific purpose of taking on cargo for Poland under U.S.-Polish economic arrangements (NSC 5808/1, Par. 33, p. 11). All members of the Planning Board recommend that this policy be revised so as to permit Polish cargo vessels to enter designated U.S. ports for purposes of normal trade, not necessarily limited to the taking on of cargoes under a U.S.-Polish economic agreement. The JCS do not concur.

c. Pursuant to NSC Action, Treasury submitted a detailed Port Security Program to carry out the previously mentioned policies governing the denial and control of Sino-Soviet Bloc and Polish vessels. This program prescribes specific measures to be taken by Treasury and Coast Guard, with respect to: (1) the admission of Polish vessels at designated ports, after boarding and search, when taking on cargo under an economic agreement, and Polish passenger vessels at New York after boarding and search; (2) the denial of entry to Sino-Soviet bloc flag vessels, and any other flag vessel which is suspected of being under Bloc control; and (3) the boarding and search of other flag vessels which are suspected of being under Bloc control or which have touched at a Bloc port during the preceding four months. It is also provided that any vessel otherwise excludable from U.S. ports under this policy may be admitted under circumstances as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. (It should be noted that this Presidentially approved program would in effect be rescinded should there be approval of the State-Treasury proposal to amend present policy by eliminating requirements for the denial, boarding, search, and surveillance of Bloc and other suspect vessels.)

3. In support of the State-Treasury proposal The following points were advanced: to revise the Port Security provisions of Par. 19 of Continental Defense Policy, are the points made in the State Department memorandum previously circulated to the Council. The State position was summed up at the Planning Board as follows:

a. The risk of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into U.S. ports via merchant vessels is less than it once might have been, in view of developments which have taken place subsequent to the adoption of the Port Security Program during the Korean crisis.

b. Some of the broader objectives of over-all national security policy, particularly with respect to increased peaceful trade with the Soviet Bloc, are being made difficult of achievement as the result of our present Port Security Policy which should, therefore, be relaxed.

c. Although internal security is an important element of national security, it is but one segment of over-all policy and must be viewed in focus.

4. Considerations in opposition to the State-Treasury proposal were raised in the Planning Board discussion as follows:

a. No basis has been produced for considering that there has been any reduction in the threat of clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons via vessels entering U.S. ports—a threat which is recognized in our present Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1, Par. 44).

b. Rescission of the present denial policy and removal of the requirement for the boarding and searching of suspect vessels, will withdraw our only defense (the Commandant of the Coast Guard states that it is a minimum defense) which we now have against the destruction of U.S. ports by means of nuclear weapons clandestinely introduced via vessels. If the policy is revoked, the Coast Guard would not feel justified in continuing harbor patrols.

c. In view of the forthcoming international conferences it is argued that this is probably not a propitious time for the United States to indicate a relaxation of policy toward the Soviet Bloc by removing Port Security controls.

5. CALL ON: Secretary of State

Secretary of the Treasury

Chairman, IIC (Mr. J. Edgar Hoover)

Chairman, ICIS (Mr. J. Walter Yeagley).

6. With regard to the proposed change in our Polish policy, I am committed to inform the Council as to the following: Subsequent to agreeing on this recommendation, Commerce directed to the Planning Board’s attention a CIA report to the effect that a number of vessels flying the Polish flag are actually under the joint ownership and control of Poland and the Government of Communist China. Commerce believed that this situation would make more difficult the enforcement of Export Control and Foreign Assets Control regulations. Treasury and State, however, have informed the Planning Board that (1) these controls rest on authorities other than Port Security denial policy, (2) any Chinese Communist–owned vessels entering U.S. ports would be controlled under the Trading with the Enemy Act which prevents trade or financial transactions in which Communist China has any beneficial interest, and (3) State will warn the Poles that action will be taken under the Trading with the Enemy Act if any ship in which Communist China has ownership or interest visits U.S. ports. (In any case, the Council’s attention is invited to the fact that the Port Security restrictions on Polish vessels, as now set forth in our Polish policy, would become inoperative if approval is given to the State-Treasury proposal to drop our present Port denial program.)

1. Source: Port security program. Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.