Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

149. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, March 9, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary McElroy
• Secretary Quarles
• Secretary Murphy
• General Twining
• General LeMay
• General Loper
• General Persons
• General Goodpaster
• General Starbird
• Mr. Vance
• Major Eisenhower
• Colonel Brown (briefer)
• Lieut. Colonel Meade (briefer)

The first part of this meeting was comprised of a briefing on the airborne alert exercises entitled Headstart I and Headstart II. The first of these exercises had been conducted between September and December 1958. The essence of the briefing was as follows:

1. Security of the Strategic Air Command from attack may be attained by any one of a combination of the four following measures:

(a) Ground alert

(b) Dispersal

(c) Hardening

(d) Airborne alert

2. Headstart I had maintained an aircraft airborne for twenty-four hours a day. This had involved four B–52 flights per day, each aircraft carrying two atomic weapons. Each aircraft had received one refueling during the time of flight. The exercise had been based off Loring Air Force Base, and the route chosen had been such that each aircraft would have been effective for an attack on the Soviet Union during most of its route.

3. Headstart I, as an exercise, had been considered 92.5% effective. It had indicated the following conclusions:

(a) Airborne alert is feasible.

(b) It is possible to attain increased alert status with the same number of personnel.

(c) It is possible to increase combat efficiency.

(d) It is possible to maintain aircraft in the air for twenty-four hours a day.

(e) The operation of KC–135s at accelerated rates is feasible.

(f) Command control and weapons safety were proven to be effective.

(g) By conducting lengthy fights at optimum altitude, the B–52 had reached greater efficiency levels cost-wise.

4. The following were not achieved by Headstart I:

(a) Determination of the maximum capability for airborne alert.

(b) Determination of the supply support required.

(c) Adequate crew training.

(d) Firm cost data.

5. Further exercises would accomplish the following:

(a) Determine the maximum capability for airborne alert.

(b) Develop new concepts of operation.

(c) Achieve a greater degree of crew training.

(d) Achieve better cost data.

6. Headstart II, if approved, would be conducted along the following lines:

(a) The test would be conducted over a four-month period, from March to June. In March, there would be eight B–52s and twelve KC–135s aloft per day; in April there would be eleven B–52s and seventeen KC–135s; in May and June, sixteen B–52s and twenty-four KC–135s.

(b) The objectives of Headstart II would be to further investigate manpower and cost figures, to develop an optimum ground and air-borne alert ratio, to develop a manning doctrine, to refine maintenance data, to improve operational readiness, and to improve methods of positive control.

(c) To attain these objectives, the problems of maintenance, material, real facilities, fiscal matters, and operations would be emphasized. The cost of Headstart II would be $20 million over costs for ground alert during this period.

(d) The following flight patterns would be followed:

(1) The 28th Bomb Wing, located at Ellsworth Air Force Base would send one sortie at 2000 hours daily. Its route, generally in the Eastern United States and Canada, would involve support by KC–135s from Loring Air Force Base. Canada has granted overflight permission.

(2) The 92nd Bomb Wing, located at Fairchild Air Force Base, would send three sorties at 1700 hours daily and three sorties at 2300 hours daily. These aircraft would be in the air for twenty-four hours and would receive two refuelings. This route would involve a flight from Fairchild to Kodiak Island in the Aleutians as the initial leg of the journey.

(3) The 4238th Strategic Wing at Barksdale Air Force Base would conduct an exercise involving one of the B–52 squadrons. This would involve one sortie daily, which would receive two refuelings from Westover Air Force Base.

(e) This exercise would be conducted under current manning levels.

7. The briefer then requested approval of the conducting of Headstart II.

* * * *

In discussing the briefing, the President questioned the proposed direction of flight of the 92nd Bomb Wing from Fairchild toward the Aleutians (Headstart II).This, he feels, is a bad direction since it is heading directly toward the USSR. General LeMay said this can be easily fixed. He pointed out that this flight is not within known Soviet radar range nor within an area where Soviet reconnaissance aircraft might be operating. However, Secretary McElroy and Secretary Quarles were of the view that this route should be pulled back closer to the American Continent, and the promise to do so satisfied the President.

The President then questioned the matter of the flight routes. In view of the fact that for a certain portion of each sortie an aircraft would be incapable of diversion to strike the USSR, it appeared to him that our overall capability during this ineffective period would be lessened. He asked why we do not shorten these routes to eliminate the ineffective time. General LeMay answered that the purpose of this exercise is to determine the best flight time. If we do not stretch these flights to the maximum, it will not be possible to determine the optimum. To this Colonel Brown added that the efficiency of the B–52 is increased due to increased length of time in the air. This fact is the result of the greater proportion of time at optimum altitudes per flight. General Lemay also added that another purpose of this test was to determine data on metal fatigue. These answers appeared to satisfy the President.

The President then questioned the effect of this exercise on the calendar life of the aircraft involved. Mr. McElroy added that we will probably discard most of these aircraft before they are worn out.

The President inquired of General LeMay whether provisions are made for the crew to be rested while airborne, and General LeMay answered in the affirmative. The crew is organized so as to allow adequate rest.

The President now turned to a political question which is of some concern to him. In the light of the pressures from Congress to maintain an “air-borne alert,” the President dislikes that name. He is concerned over the possibility that once this exercise is conducted, it will establish a requirement for its continuance; and the implication will be that at the end of the test we will no longer be alert. The President pointed out his mentioning in press conference that a continuous airborne alert may become essential during certain phases of the missile age, but it is not essential now. He therefore desires that a training name be placed on this exercise, in order to alleviate the effect of possible leaks. A training name would emphasize that we are only preparing to do what we need to do in the future. Mr. McElroy pointed out that this will go under the code name of Headstart II; but this did not satisfy the President in itself. He desired that we have a name in case we are asked for a description of this exercise. Mr. McElroy voiced his agreement that there is no current military need for an airborne alert.

(The President then digressed for a moment to tell of an episode reported by Macmillan on his recent trip to Moscow. Khrushchev had apparently dropped the thought that the Soviets have no interest in small bombs. Further, their large bombs have now been developed satisfactorily and they have adequate weapons in the megaton class in their stockpiles. Consequently, the Soviets claim they have little interest in conducting tests and are actually shutting down some nuclear reactors. Mr. Quarles stated that recent Soviet tests have verified that their main interest lies in large bombs.)

In conclusion, the President approved the conducting of exercise Headstart II. In describing this operation, he directed that it be called “advance training” rather than an “airborne alert exercise.” Further, he understood that the route of the 92nd Bomb Wing from Fairchild to the Aleutians would be modified so as to avoid frightening the Soviets in the event they picked it up.

* * * *

The President then questioned Secretary Murphy about political aspects of this exercise with the Canadians. Mr. Murphy pointed out that although the Canadians had granted permission for overflights, they had done so in a somewhat negative fashion. They had denied having a right to withdraw their approval for such an exercise if it involved the efficiency of SAC. However, they had expressed some fears and had desired no publicity and no tie-in to Berlin. They also expressed the view that in the light of their cooperation in military matters, the United States should see fit to improve its cooperation with them on the matter of oil quotas. According to Mr. McElroy, the military side of the Canadian Government seems easier about this exercise than the civilian side. (General LeMay here indicated that the Canadian Government has been briefed on this exercise.) In connection with the oil quotas, however, the Canadians are, at the appropriate time, going to “explode.”

This latter fact diverted the discussion briefly to the matter of oil quotas. The President expressed the desire that advanced information be delivered to Diefenbaker on this subject. He pointed out that these oil quotas are not injurious to Canada. It is important that the Canadian Government know this in the light of the quid pro quo (which approaches blackmail) which they are apparently attempting to implement in this matter.

Mr. Murphy confirmed that the planned oil quotas will result rather favorably for the Canadians; it will be the Venezuelans who will be hurt. Here Mr. Quarles stated that Canada’s fears are not for the present but for the future. Mr. Murphy agreed, stating that the principle of a quota is what disturbs the Canadians. They have announced that any restriction on oil imports from Canada will create such surplus in their Western Provinces as to necessitate their constructing a pipeline from West to East. This the President considers highly undesirable. Accordingly, he requested Secretary Quarles to get together with Secretary Seaton to devise some scheme to insure that it does not become necessary for Canada to build a pipeline. He feels that such construction would be a waste of resources and should be avoided. He further requested Mr. Murphy to designate an official to visit Diefenbaker as a personal representative of the President to explain the real facts of the oil import quotas.

* * * *

The President then brought the meeting back to the subject of Headstart II with a warning that if this exercise is leaked, it will probably have to be stopped, due primarily to the political impact in Canada and other nations. General LeMay pointed out here that the only thing new in this exercise is the regularity of dispatch of the aircraft, but the President pointed further to the magnitude and scope of this exercise.

Mr. Murphy pointed out a peculiarity of the Canadian requirements. Whereas the clearance of these flights is normally on a service-to-service basis (USAF to RCAF), the Canadians have specified that the RCAF is responsible for obtaining “ministerial clearance.” Secretary Quarles expressed considerable doubt as to the significance of this wording. He does not feel that the Canadians are going to require any exceptional clearance for this exercise. General LeMay concurred in Mr. Quarles’ view, stating that the other test had required no change from normal clearance procedures. The President remarked that the greatest danger to the entire exercise lay with the politicians—in this case the Canadian politicians.

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: SAC airborne alert exercises. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.