136. Memorandum of Conference with the President1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary McElroy
- Secretary Quarles
- General Twining
- General Goodpaster
- Major Eisenhower
The President called this meeting to discuss the 1968 projection of our atomic weapons requirements. In particular, he is concerned, in making our long-term estimates, over the use of the actual term “requirements.” He feels that when we deal with numbers in these circumstances we should call them “estimates under bad conditions.”
The President stated that he is not addressing right now the matter of $145 million for a plutonium reactor with a convertible feature. We are far enough down the road now that he is not going to fight that project. He dislikes, however, the process in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff state so-called “requirements” to the Congress, causing the figures so listed to practically govern our future actions.
The President emphasized that in this meeting he is merely desirous of expressing his doubts and is not issuing a directive. He fears that we have developed a shibboleth which we are then required to live by. In short, we are not being governed by common sense.
Mr. McElroy agreed that the difference between “requirement” and “estimate” is a technical question. However, the President pointed out that the use of the term “requirement” invites demagogues to treat these figures with the sanctity of the psalms and parables.
Mr. McElroy expressed general agreement with this approach and pointed out that the figures ultimately used in this connection were greatly reduced from the original service submissions and were indeed considerably reduced from the requirements as stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President, however, continued by recalling to mind a graph on our 1968 atomic weapons figures which indicated a stockpile which he considered astronomical. These figures as the President recalled, would be attained by July 1, 1958, if a certain new plant were installed. Without that plant, the figures would be reached by January 1, 1969. Some of these days, in [Facsimile Page 2] his view, we are going to realize how ridiculous we have been and at that time we will try to retrench. In particular, the President [Typeset Page 649] pointed out that the Executive Branch itself has been fairly sensible, but has been pushed by demagogues and special interests.
The President expressed understanding of the problems of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in testifying before a hostile Congress. He agreed with Mr. McElroy that the best way for a hostile Congress under these circumstances to attack the Administration is to attack it for not fulfilling its military requirements. Mr. McElroy pointed out that the concept of efficiency in government represents the “hard sell” rather than the “easy sell.”
Mr. Quarles then offered certain background in this area. He stated that the Department of Defense had resisted the AEC on the matter of forecast of requirements so far in advance as ten years. The AEC feels, however, that it is necessary to forecast requirements this far in order to plan efficiently the construction of our production capacity. Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had taken the initial position that our plutonium supply is adequate. However, this position had been overtaken by service requirements for the DAVY CROCKETT and for small nuclear warheads for air defense. These two programs require much plutonium. The second position then taken by Mr. Quarles and Admiral Radford had been that a certain amount of additional plutonium was needed, but not in large quantity since we would have the opportunity to increase efficiency by continued testing. Upon the implementation of the current test suspension, the Department of Defense could not see any further position beyond that of moderate increases in plutonium.
Mr. McElroy then outlined the tack which the Department of Defense follows on these matters. Since the estimated requirements of the Department of Defense always exceed the amount of available plutonium by large amounts, the Secretary of Defense had estimated that in order to obtain a small bite we must raise our estimated requirements considerably. He pointed out the relationship between requirements and time. If we are given a few more years, our annual production can be considerably reduced. He added, however, he realizes that the term “requirements” is a poor word.
The President again focused on the term “requirements” with a thought that the number of weapons actually required in 1968 is probably required [Facsimile Page 3] in 1961. Therefore, a statement of figures as 1968 requirements would invite an emergency mobilization in order to produce them quickly.
Mr. Quarles, in this connection, pointed out that the progression from 1963 to 1968 does not represent significant increase in the number of weapons or in yield; what it does represent is an increase in tactical weapons. This progression is more expensive in terms of plutonium. He admits we would like to reach these levels in 1963 but reasonable production rates require a stretch-out to 1968.
[Typeset Page 650]In connection with small weapons, Mr. Quarles continued, the military has stated before Congress that we need a figure much higher than that submitted by the Department of Defense. This has made the Joint Committee highly critical of us.
The President again repeated his concern with the impact on Congress. If we state that we have a requirement now which will not become available until 1968, Congress will be tempted to spend $20 billion this year in this field alone. The President understands the need for small weapons in air defense and missile defense, although he pointed out that the three scientists who had visited him the day before (Drs. Land, Purcell and Killian) had shown less enthusiasm than he has heard at other times in this area. The President continued that when we come to supplying small yield weapons for the Infantry and the Marines we are getting in to the area of marginal utility. He does not visualize great stockpiles of these weapons around the periphery of the USSR. He pointed out further that our total current megaton capability is estimated so high that if we should employ this quantity of atomic weapons, the fallout from our own weapons could destroy our own country, and indeed the entire Northern Hemisphere. He further expressed the view that we are taking council of our fears. He reiterated that we should push atomic weapons for air defense but be more moderate in development of tactical atomic weapons. He suggested that we indoctrinate ourselves that there is such a thing as common sense. Mr. McElroy agreed and stated that the Department of Defense had fought this line of reasoning when they cut service requests.
The discussion then turned to the subject of military experts, with the President expressing the view that if you try to fight a war with a Board of Political Directors, you will soon find all military commanders being [Facsimile Page 4] told by Congress exactly what they need. Mr. McElroy also pointed out the number of military “experts” available in Congress. The President illustrated the types of difficulties under which the military works in wartime, citing anecdotes from his own experiences in the Operations Division of the War Department right after Pearl Harbor.
- Source: Projected nuclear weapons requirements for 1968. Top Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.↩