Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

135. Memorandum of Conference with the President¹

Washington, February 9, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Twining
• Major Eisenhower

General Twining opened by telling the President of the visit of General Norstad, who had been in Washington for the week end. The purpose of his trip had been to testify before the Mahon Subcommittee (Defense) of the House Appropriations Committee. On Saturday morning General Norstad met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The subject at that time had been the current U.S. position on contingency plans for Berlin, which General Norstad had thought was very fine. To this the President added Secretary Dulles had had a successful trip to Europe and had reported that the French are taking a much more positive view on the Berlin question. (The Secretary had pointed out, however, that despite their resolution, the French have very little capability available in Europe itself.)

General Twining then mentioned the idea of a military representative to the tripartite meetings which are being held in Washington between Alphand, Caccia and Murphy. (These are being held in response to De Gaulle’s desire for tripartite discussions within NATO.) Specifically, Admiral Dennison had been present at the first meeting, held recently, to brief on the subject of the Far East. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to terminate this procedure of providing a military representative at first chance, fearing that too many political problems will be pushed off on the military. General Twining promised that he would see Mr. Murphy on the subject. He added, however, that at the meeting between Secretary Dulles and General De Gaulle it had been helpful to the Secretary to be able to state that we provided a military representation to this tripartite meeting. General Twining believes that he has now arrived at an estimate of what De Gaulle wants. Primarily, he desires to have a veto over the use of our Strategic Air Command.

* * *

General Twining then brought up the matter of personnel changes in Europe. General Norstad had voiced the desire to remain in his present job to the end of this Administration; specifically, he feels he should wait until after the 1960 election. General Norstad had pointed out that he desires to retire rather than continue on active duty, since his investment in the European job in so heavy as to practically cut him off from any terms of reference of a job in the U.S.

The President was in general agreement with General Norstad’s desires, although he feels that late summer of 1960 would be a preferable time for the switch. He stated that he would like to make the change about three or four months before the end of the Administration. He would like General Norstad to remain on active duty after his return to the U.S.; but he fully realizes the difficulty in readjusting from a position of SACEUR to any other. He asked General Twining to request General Norstad to come and visit him next time he is in Washington.

As to the timing of a departure by General Norstad, the President sees no problem. General Schuyler’s changeover will occur in June 1959. His replacement will eventually become SACEUR. This will make June 1960 the first time in which General Schuyler’s replacement could take over from General Norstad, since it would require at least a year for an officer in the Chief of Staff position to “sell himself” to the European nations. The President pointed out that he had followed this procedure with General Gruenther, and that only in the case of General Ridgway had an officer been sent in from another area to take over that command.

General Twining then stated that General Norstad would favor General Taylor as his replacement, although they all realize that General Taylor has completed his tour as Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense thinks it unwise to appoint him for a third term. Accordingly, General Twining feels that General Taylor could take over the position of Deputy CINCEUR, now held by General Palmer. On this the President reviewed some names of officers he would nominate for this position. He agrees with the difficulties in the appointment of General Taylor, but feels (and General Twining agrees) that the officer should come from the Army. Specifically, the President mentioned General Decker, General Davidson, and General Lemnitzer. In response to General Twining’s statement that General Lemnitzer is slated to be Chief of Staff, the President answered that that officer should be groomed for General Twining’s position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some discussion of individual officer qualifications then followed, with General Twining expressing the view that if SACEUR is to be an Army officer, then the position of Deputy CINCEUR, presently held by General Palmer, should be held by an Air Force officer. He also stated that General Norstad is making every effort to consolidate some Army headquarters in Europe. To this the President responded with enthusiasm.

* * *

The President then brought up the matter of a recent Air Force promotion list which had been sent to his desk. The promotion of the five officers involved (to three star general) would have resulted in exceeding current vacancies; however, the recommendation had included no notation to that effect.

As a corollary to this matter, the President expressed the opinion that there are too many high ranking slots in all three Services. He told the story of a colonel in North Africa who had recommended his own promotion to brigadier general on the basis that he could not do his job as a colonel. When informed that he could then be sent home, the officer changed his mind. Further, the President pointed out that he had been a three-star general with a five-star British admiral under his command.

General Twining stated that they are working on a study in this connection and will make recommendations in the near future. He recognized that the President had normally been prompt in signing promotions, and had recommended in the strongest terms that under such circumstances any promotion should be accompanied by an analysis of the necessity for exceeding the quotas and a complete presentation for the President. General Twining had stated that the President should not be hit cold on these matters. The President admitted that he had been somewhat shocked by the fact that there had been no indication on this promotion list that the quotas had been exceeded.

* * *

The President now brought up the matter of publicity in connection with our defense posture. Specifically, he has been advised by General Persons that the American public should know more about missiles and armaments. In order to give proper publicity in this matter, General Persons feels that we should do something a little different. Speeches are inadequate. Accordingly, it has been recommended that the President make a trip to a Strategic Air Command base, to Cape Canaveral, and to a NIKE site, and at each location, he should make an appearance to the press and attempt to give some understanding of what our defense structure is all about. Accordingly, he requests a restudy of our public information policies on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to determine what type of facts the President might give out under these circumstances.

General Twining, while he expressed approval of this scheme, pointed out that facts and logic are often wasted when the opposition employs tactics similar to those of Senator Symington on the matter of airborne alert. While testifying before Congress, General Twining had been asked by Senator Symington how many aircraft were on airborne alert that particular day. There had been a recent exercise which involved an airborne alert in SAC, but that exercise having been terminated, General Twining so advised Senator Symington. As a result, Senator Symington had made a great issue of this matter to the effect that it is a shame that none of our aircraft are on airborne alert and blamed the budget for this deplorable fact. Senator Bush had also expressed shock. When General Twining mentioned this later to General Power, he learned that Senator Symington had telephoned General Power that morning and asked how many aircraft were on airborne alert. General Power had given him the facts. As the result, General Twining has received a volume of mail, and in his answers, has cleared the record. In General Twining’s view, we have no need for an airborne alert and our capability to respond with SAC on fifteen minutes warning is adequate for our military posture. General Twining then proceeded to describe the tendency on the part of some people to discount everything but relative ICBM capabilities. He pointed out that our Air Force is four times the size of that of the Soviets and ten times as good. It does execute airborne alert exercises from time to time to keep the Soviets uncertain. General Twining expressed admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before Congress.

The President stated that he had spoken before about self-appointed military experts. He is considering another statement about neurotics—either honest or dishonest neurotics—who are so fearful that they advocate taking the entire SAC into the air and keeping it there. He conceded that these people realized the aircraft must come down occasionally to gas up. General Twining expressed the view that the public must realize that the USSR has a capability to hit the U.S. and to live with this realization. It is a hard fact of life. The President agreed except that he pointed out that our estimates for the last four years have included the Soviet capability to destroy the U.S. 100%. This was first based on one-way bomber missions and is now based on the ICBM. He reiterated his stand for a reasonably adequate program.

General Twining continued the discussion on enemy capabilities by stating that in his testimony before Congress he personally admitted that he had previously fought for more bombers. He had been concerned over the Soviet capability to build BISONS and BEARS. However, as it had turned out, the Soviets had not built these aircraft and now possess only 100–115 heavy bombers. He had further pointed out to Congress that missiles are only as good as their launching sites. We have not as yet obtained any hard intelligence on any launching sites in the Soviet Union.

The President and General Twining then reviewed the concept of a trip by the President to SAC, to a NIKE site, and to Cape Canaveral, and to issue statements at each location. General Twining stated he would open a study on what might be said at these locations. In this connection, he made mention of the successful flight of the TITAN on February third, adding that this is the first missile which had been successful on its first launching. The President observed that manufacturers in Denver had predicted this.

* * *

General Twining then completed his report on the Congressional hearings by describing the question on the subject of the missile gap. When asked how to remedy the missile gap, he had answered that we should merely produce lots of big ATLAS missiles. However, he does not advocate this: The ATLAS is not the weapon that we would ultimately like, and, therefore, large quantities of this weapon would be obsolete soon. He does not believe the USSR is in a mood for general war, particularly in view of the pride that they take in having rebuilt their cities from World War II. He repeated the desires on the part of fearful people, stating that if we bought everything they advocated we would wind up spending $70 billion for defense alone. Finally, he had suggested to the Congress that they employ the word “operational” when discussing missile sites. He pointed out that there is no glamor to the subject of base building, only to the production of missiles. The President suggested we might mention to the Congress that every missile site near a city makes that city a prime target. General Twining now reiterated his admiration for the performance of the Secretary of Defense before these hearings. In this connection, the President expressed the view that Secretary McElroy, while he should not be made to look too partisan, possesses talents which are such that he should not be lost to Government service when this particular job is terminated.

* * *

As a matter of interest, General Twining then mentioned the attitude of the Congress relative to jurisdiction, which had caused considerable disturbance for a couple of days during the hearings. Primarily, Congress fears that the Executive is taking over prerogatives which are provided theoretically by the Constitution to them. In particular, the prerogative of raising and maintaining “armies.” The main problem is that of personnel strengths of the Army, the Marines, and the Reserve components. In the course of these discussions, General Twining mentioned that the Secretary of Defense had been grilled extensively. Finally, he had stated flatly that he did not pretend to be a lawyer, but that whatever the President had done in this matter he concurred in and thought it was right. Although the President had not been aware that the prerogatives question had been a major issue recently, he was quite familiar with the pattern. The Army, Marines, and Reserve components would be, in his view, the only logical areas in which the politicians would be concerned, primarily because these are the areas in which the Administration is cutting back. When an installation is cut out it does injury to some locality.

This resulted in some discussion of the motives of individual Congressmen, particularly in the matter of interfering with Administration plans for projected force structures. In this connection, General Twining mentioned that Representative Arends had come and hit hard on the side of the Administration, stating that it is not the function of the Congress to interfere in military strategy. Even Mr. Vinson had added some words of help in this regard. Here the President stated that he was not overly concerned with this particular item since he felt he could handle it. He digressed to point up that in the matters of housing and depressed areas, where the Congress appears determined to expend large sums in excess of those recommended, he must win. If not, he fears the most serious consequences to the value of the dollar. He pointed out an article he had read today in the New York Times financial section which indicated a movement of U.S. capital overseas which is reaching the proportion of a “flight from the dollar.” Apparently private investors are convinced that the Europeans are building a more viable economy than ours and will overtake us.

* * *

General Twining then mentioned a matter pertaining to command structure of Unified Commands. In the old law the term “operational control” had been employed, implying only the vaguest type of command. The new law has undergone a change in wording which now substitutes the term “operational command.” In the course of the proceedings, the term of operational command had been defined the same as the old operational control. Based on this, the Marines have complained to the Congress about the definition of operational command as employed by the Department of Defense, and which, by the President’s desires, gives the Unified Commanders complete command responsibility except for technical administrative matters. In the course of the hearings, Mr. Vinson had asked General Twining for the Department of Defense definition. General Twining had explained the difference. Mr. Vinson had then requested that the new definition be incorporated into the Congressional Record. This has been done. In this matter, the President stated he was not concerned, for he is the Commander-in-Chief and can construe the wording as he sees fit. He can be called to account for this matter only by the courts.

* * *

As General Twining was departing, the President asked that he take a check into the matter of comparative grades and position vacancies among the three Services. This had come to the President’s attention primarily through briefings that had been held by the Navy requesting new legislation to overcome their rather considerable World War II hump. He cited certain cases with relation to promotion inequities within and among Services. General Twining said he would check into the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Senior military personnel appointments, publicizing defense efforts; Congressional hearings. Top Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Drafted on February 10.