124. Memorandum of Conversation Between Eisenhower and Gray1
1. I discussed the Record of Actions of the December 18 NSC meeting with particular reference to the Status of the Military Mobilization Base Program. I reminded the President that he had indicated that he wished the Department of Defense to keep under study the question of whether its mobilization base planning should continue to assume a mobilization period of six months prior to D-Day. The President said that he felt that it should be studied but that his guess was that planning had to assume both such a period and no period whatsoever. I also pointed out to the President that he had indicated that the Department of Defense should continue its efforts to find a means of taking bomb damage into account in its mobilization base planning while not making damage assumptions so extravagant that no planning is feasible. I indicated to the President that Assistant Secretary McGuire felt that it would be helpful to be asked to report back to the NSC on developments arising out of this study and I asked the President’s approval for inclusion of a directive to this effect in the Record of Action. The President approved such a directive.
2. I discussed the Record of Actions of the December 23 NSC meeting with particular reference to the intelligence briefing with respect to Cuba. I indicated to the President that I was a little concerned as to what should be reflected in the Record of Actions in view of the indeterminate discussion. I suggested to him that the Record should reflect the statement that “responsible departments and agencies, particularly the Departments of State, Defense and Justice and the CIA are keeping the situation in Cuba under continuing scrutiny with a view to taking appropriate actions in U.S. security interests, and to making necessary contingency plans.” The President felt that this would be satisfactory with the addition of a clause reading, “on the initiative of the Secretary of State.”
With further reference to the intelligence item with respect to Cuba, I pointed out to the President that I had not been informed as to what was going on but that I had not pressed for any kind of directive in the meeting because it was not clear to me whether there were [Typeset Page 424] not some programs which he had approved. The President indicated that whereas [Facsimile Page 2] General Goodpaster and Major Eisenhower kept him well informed as to intelligence reports, he had not known until the NSC meeting that the view of the U.S. Government was that of wishing to oppose Fidel Castro in any event. He then said that he felt the situation had been allowed to slip somewhat.
He then said, in the light of the Hull Board meeting with him on December 16, and in view of what I had told him with respect to the inadequacies of the 5412 Group and its procedures, he wished to discuss this matter with Allen Dulles and me as a matter of urgency and that he particularly had in mind an effort to regularize the 5412 procedures. He instructed me to get Allen Dulles at the earliest opportunity (this meeting was set up for Friday morning, December 26 at 9:00 a.m.).
3. I then discussed in general terms with the President further preparations for the Geneva conferences on test suspension and on surprise attack in the light of reports that he had received at the NSC from Ambassador Wadsworth and Mr. William C. Foster. I pointed out to him that some time ago he had instructed me to suggest to the Secretary of State that he have one committee which might deal with both conferences but that no formal action had been taken. I pointed out that the Secretary of State for one reason or another had been out of his office for an extended period of time. I recommended to the President that the continued preparations be lodged in an interdepartmental committee under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of State and composed additionally of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence and Dr. Killian. The President approved this suggestion and indicated that he saw no reason now to continue Secretary Anderson as a member of this committee working on this problem. He also said that he wished George Allen brought in to the deliberations whenever his advice would be helpful and his official responsibilities were involved. He instructed me to follow the course of these matters and to continue to “needle” for action where necessary and to report to him when desirable.
- Source: Military mobilization base, situation in Cuba, intelligence procedures, Geneva conferences on test suspension and surprise attack. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President. Drafted on December 30.↩