99. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower0

OTHERS PRESENT

  • Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Long, General Persons, General Goodpaster

Dr. Kistiakowsky said he and Dr. Long had come in to present the results of an inquiry they had made into the Minuteman program in response to a request by the President. Dr. Long gave the presentation, stating that the scheduling is extremely tight with regard to the projected 150 missiles in mid-1963. Dr. Kistiakowsky thought that this objective had been moved up from 1964 quite arbitrarily as an offset to the Polaris, and no one really thought it could be met. Dr. Long said he is not so sure as that, but considers it will be extremely tight. Although major design problems have been solved, there are still significant problem areas. These relate chiefly to the three-stage engines and to guidance and control questions. Although the first and second stages have been fired, there has been no wholly successful test. There have been partial successes. With regard to guidance and control, in order to attain the thirty-second firing time objective, it is necessary to keep the guidance (gyroscopes, etc.) in full operation, turning at full speed for years on end. Dr. Long mentioned that the schedule for attainment of equipment that will measure up to this requirement has already slipped six weeks. The President questioned the thirty-second time objective. He thought it might be best to have a “program” as regards readiness, with some missile instantly ready to fire and others prepared to fire after a longer [Page 406] period. Dr. Long said that this idea conformed to his own suggestions. In this manner some gyroscopes could be kept up to full speed, with others idling at one-tenth speed, and taking ten minutes or so to come up to full speed.

The President said this goes back to the question of need. There is need for some of these to be ready to get off instantly. He noted that the fixed missiles will be in underground silos highly protected. The big thing is simply to dissuade the Soviets from taking any adventure.

Dr. Long said another problem relates to fire control. The Air Force plan is to provide for volley or ripple only, firing off all fifty of the missiles in a squadron. He thought there should be a means of cutting off the firing after a few had been fired. The President commented on this, adding that if we indoctrinate our people on a 30-second response basis, we allow no margin for error, and raise the chances of starting a war that no one wanted. The President thought it is better to take a few extra minutes, to give someone high up in authority the decision.

Dr. Long them commented that each missile has one target set into its guidance system. He thought there could be extra tapes which would give more flexibility to the use of these weapons. This is a matter that he suggested should be studied. The President agreed.

Dr. Long next raised the topic of priorities. He said there is some question that we may be overloading the Aerojet Company with missile requirements. They are to produce the Skybolt, and he is not yet persuaded that Skybolt should have the same priority as the Minuteman. He would not want it to prejudice the Minuteman, since the latter can do anything Skybolt can do, and more.

The President suggested that Dr. Long and Dr. Kistiakowsky present the results of their study to Mr. Gates, and Dr. Kistiakowsky said he had made arrangements to present it to both Dr. York and Mr. Gates.

Dr. Long suggested it might be best to give top priority to the fixed Minuteman as against the mobile concept. This is true if we aim to have a lot of these—something like half as many as we estimate the Soviets might have. If we have fewer than this, the mobile system may be better, in order to keep up the deterrent. The President said he is inclined, on this question, to be a lot on the side of the fixed system. Dr. Kistiakowsky also added that, now that the Polaris is moving ahead, and since the costs of Polaris and the mobile Minuteman are about the same, with fixed Minuteman much less—something like one-third—he thinks the fixed system is the best. The President said he would probably favor having at least a few of the mobile type, since in these matters it is best to have every kind of string on one’s bow.

[Here follows discussion of seismic research.]

G.
Brigadier General, General, USA
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 7.